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INTRODUCTION: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AS A BAR TO THE
DEATH PENALTY

The advent of the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Moore v. Texas1 interpreting the newest edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has changed the
interplay of diagnostic and legal standards for establishing intellectual
disability as a bar to the death penalty.2 Florida law has not kept pace.3
Psychological concepts such as concurrent function and the age of onset in the
diagnosis of intellectual disability have been misconstrued by Florida courts.4
Florida’s clear and convincing evidence standard for invoking the categorical
bar to death sentences compounds the risk that the intellectually disabled will
be executed.5 On May 21, 2020, Phillips v. State6 rolled back retroactivity of
federal precedent, further imperiling intellectually disabled defendants.7 This
article will review the etiology of intellectual disability as a bar to the death
penalty and the many misapprehensions of the clear consensus of the medical
community in intellectual disability diagnosis.8 The interpretation of
intellectual disability law by the Supreme Court of Florida, coupled with
anachronisms in Florida intellectual disability statutes, violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because they
practically guarantee that intellectually disabled men and women will be
executed.9 Unless Florida law and its interpretations change, countless unjust
executions will follow.10
In Atkins v. Virginia,11 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars execution

1.
139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam).
2.
Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1049 (2017), rev’d 139 S. Ct.
666 (2019); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 31, 37 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]; AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 38 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD-11].
3.
See Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 42 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).
4.
See id. at 37.
5.
See id. at 46 (Pariente, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6.
299 So. 3d 1013 (2020) (per curiam).
7.
Id. at 1022.
8.
See discussion infra Part I–VI.
9.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also FLA. STAT. §
921.137(1) (2019); Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1024; discussion infra Part I–VI.
10.
See Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1024; discussion infra Part VII.
11.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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of intellectually disabled people.12 Relating the diminished culpability of the
intellectually disabled to the penological philosophy of the death penalty, the
Atkins Court found execution of intellectually disabled people served no
purpose.13 Diminished intellectual capacity, with its resultant difficulties in
understanding information, inability to learn from experience, ineptitude in
logical reasoning, and impossibility of controlling impulses, makes an
intellectually disabled person less morally culpable and less amenable to
deterrence.14 If the death penalty does not serve penological aims, “it is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering.”15 Exempting the intellectually disabled from capital punishment
also protects the integrity of the trial process.16 The intellectually disabled
face a heightened risk of wrongful execution because they “give false
confessions, are . . . poor witnesses, and are less able to give meaningful
assistance to . . . counsel.”17 The central tenet of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence has been clear since 2002: “the Constitution restricts . . . the
State’s power to take the life of any intellectually disabled individual.”18
Florida law protects intellectually disabled people from execution if
they are found to have significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning, existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior,
manifested in the period between conception and age eighteen.19
"Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” is based on a
person’s intelligence quotient or “IQ” defined as “two or more standard
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.”20 Florida
law defines “adaptive behavior” as “the effectiveness or degree with which an
individual meets the standards of personal independence and social
responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.”21
As discussed in Hall v. Florida,22 the Florida statute could be interpreted
consistently with Atkins.23 Yet Florida courts have historically botched the
analysis by taking IQ scores as final, conclusive evidence of intellectual
12.
Id. at 321.
13.
Id. at 317–19.
14.
Id. at 318.
15.
Id. at 319 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
16.
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709 (2014).
17.
Id.
18.
Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017), rev'd, 139 S. Ct.
666 (2019) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see
also Hall, 572 U.S. at 714; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005).
19.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019).
20.
Id.
21.
Id.; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(b).
22.
572 U.S. 701 (2014).
23.
Id. at 711; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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disability and by barring full and fair consideration of evidence of adaptive
functioning.24 The burden of proving intellectual disability by clear and
convincing evidence rests solely with the defendant.25
Hall corrected Florida’s Eighth Amendment violations by establishing
IQ as an imprecise range with a standard error of measurement (“SEM”) and
insisting that courts consider the professional consensus of the medical
community in evaluating intellectual disability.26 In Brumfield v. Cain,27 the
Court found an IQ score of 75 was not dispositive of intellectual capability.28
As in Hall, and in concert with the unanimous consensus of the medical
community, the flaws and imprecision in IQ test scores make them a poor
vehicle for diagnosis when used on their own.29 IQ measurement accounts for
a less than perfect range of scores, especially with multiple testing that
inherently results in variable test scores.30 There are multiple reasons for IQ
test score fluctuations, with most of them not having to do with effort—a
common reason attributed to test score variability by experts, especially in
Atkins.31 Low IQ scores of all types should lead to a full, multifactored
consideration of adaptive functioning in order to improve diagnostic precision
and reduce the risk of executing intellectually disabled people in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.32
On March 23, 2017, Moore v. Texas (“Moore I”)33 authoritatively
revisited the standard for evaluating adaptive functioning and intellectual
disability.34 Bobby Moore, a man with mild intellectual disability, an IQ of
70.66, the ability to survive on the streets, play pool, and mow lawns for
money, was given a death sentence after Texas courts applied outdated
24.
See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 713–14 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam),
abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
25.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(4).
26.
Hall, 572 U.S. at 712–13, 722 (citing the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11); see
also AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 39.
27.
135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).
28.
Id. at 2278.
29.
See Hall, 572 U.S. at 722; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 41–42.
30.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 41–42.
31.
MARC J. TASSÉ & JOHN H. BLUME, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: CURRENT ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 90–100 (2018); Stephen Greenspan &
J. Gregory Olley, Variability of IQ Test Scores, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY 184, 185 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) (ebook) (“Because IQ test scores of Atkins
defendants often fall close to the conventional upper limit of 70–75, some scores are likely to
fall above or below that range. There are multiple reasons for IQ score fluctuation, with most
of them not having to do with effort, a common factor cited by forensic expert evaluators in
Atkins cases.”) (internal parenthesis omitted).
32.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33–41; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 41–42;
Greenspan & Olley, supra note 31, at 185.
33.
137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
34.
Id. at 1044.
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standards for assessing intellectual disability in Ex Parte Briseno.35 In
overruling the death penalty in Moore’s case, the Supreme Court of the United
States forged explicit new standards for assessing adaptive functioning based
on the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM-5”).36 First, perceived adaptive strengths should not be
overemphasized in intellectual disability diagnosis.37 Second, reliance on
behavior in controlled environments, like prison, does not comply with
medical consensus.38 Third, childhood trauma and learning disabilities should
be considered risk factors, rather than alternative explanations, for adaptive
deficits in intellectual disability determinations.39 Fourth, a state court may
not require a defendant to show that adaptive deficits were not related to a
personality disorder because clinicians recognize that the existence of a
personality disorder or mental health issue is not probative of the existence of
intellectual disability.40 Finally, the Supreme Court dictated that intellectual
disability determinations must be informed by the diagnostic framework of the
medical community, comply with established medical practice, and rely on
current versions of the leading diagnostic manuals, the DSM-5 and the
eleventh edition of the Manuel published by the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (“AAIDD-11”).41
When considering certiorari of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
for the second time, the Supreme Court of the United States criticized and
overruled the Texas court’s reasoning stating, “we have found in its opinion
too many instances . . . it repeats the analysis we have previously found
wanting.”42 The Texas court erred in analyzing the criteria for adaptive
functioning by overemphasizing adaptive strengths, relying on behavior in
controlled environments like prison, misattributing behavior to learning
disabilities or personality disorders rather than intellectual disability, and
failing to consider the diagnostic consensus of the medical community.43 In
35.
135 S.W.3d 1, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore v. Texas,
137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), and Ex parte Moore, 548 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1044, 1050.
36.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050–51; see also DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33–41;
ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., USER’S GUIDE TO ACCOMPANY THE 11TH EDITION OF
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1–7 (11th
ed. 2012).
37.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 1051.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 1053; see also DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37; AAIDD-11, supra note 2,
at 38.
42.
Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct 666, 670 (2019) (per curiam).
43.
Id.
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Moore II, the Court cautioned that “lay stereotypes” of the intellectually
disabled should be avoided entirely.44
Florida defines “intellectual disability” by rule and statute as
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior” manifested before the age of
eighteen.45 The statute and the rule do not reflect the diagnostic consensus of
the medical community as required by the Eighth Amendment.46 The Supreme
Court of Florida has, in effect, doubled down on the misapprehensions and
shortcomings of Florida’s statutory scheme, guaranteeing that men and
women who are more likely than not intellectually disabled under medical
criteria, will be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.47
II.
THE LAW SHOULD EVOLVE IN CONCERT WITH CHANGES IN
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY DIAGNOSIS IN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY
Intellectual disability is, at its core, a medical condition rather than a
legal one.48 The diagnosis of intellectual disability is a lengthy trajectory that
has continually changed and progressed based on medical and scientific
advancements.49 The interrelated fields of brain science record exponential
advances in research and development—discoveries in neuroscience beget a
new understanding of neuropharmacology, which can be confirmed and better
understood through new technology in radiology, which inspire and inform
new research and discovery in psychology.50 This cycle has continually
improved the understanding and diagnosis of intellectual disability over the
past century, but the law has lagged behind.51 The classification of intellectual
disability had its conceptual roots in the 1500s with writings of Fitzherbert and
44.
See id. at 669. Bobby Moore was finally resentenced to life in prison on
November 6, 2019 and was granted parole and released from a Texas prison on June 8, 2020.
Neil Vigdor, Texas Inmate Who Spent Nearly 40 Years on Death Row is Granted Parole, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2020, http://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/us/texas-death-row-bobbymoore.html.
45.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(b).
46.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712–13, 722 (2014)
(citing the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11).
47.
See Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 245 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
48.
Hall, 572 U.S. at 710.
49.
Marc J. Tassé, Defining Intellectual Disability: Finally We all Agree . . .
Almost,
SPOTLIGHT
ON
DISABILITY
NEWSL.,
http://www.apa.org/pi/disability/resources/publications/newsletter/2016/09/intellectualdisability (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
50.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 5.
51.
See Alexander H. Updegrove et al., Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases:
Adjusting State Statutes After Moore v. Texas, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527,
527 (2018).
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in the 1600s with writings of John Locke, both of whom began to differentiate
intellectual disability from mental illness.52 By the early 1880s, terms like
“idiot,” “feeble-minded,” and “imbecile,”—which are offensive by today’s
standards—were employed to describe children and adults who had
developmental deficits of the mind.53 These were clearly differentiated from
other mental disorders, such as insanity or epilepsy.54 A great figure in the
field of intellectual disability during the 1830s was French physician Edward
Seguin.55 Dr. Seguin was interested in behavior and outlined the early signs
of developmental delay and emphasized the need for early education and
diagnosis.56 He stated, “I find a class of unfortunates more to be pitied . . .
confused but lately with convicts . . . still mixed . . . with the insane and the
epileptic, I mean the idiots.”57 An understanding of “feeble-minded” was
largely based on observation until the late 1800s, when the etiological
understanding shifted based on advances in genetic and hereditary science.58
The most influential factor in differentiating intellectual disability
from other mental disorders was the development of individualized
intelligence testing at the turn of the twentieth century.59 In 1904, Alfred Binet
and Henry Simon petitioned the French government to fund the development
of a tool that could distinguish those capable of learning at normal rates from
those in need of a slower-paced, specially-designed educational program.60
Binet and Simon developed an age scale that consisted of questions utilized to
assess mental development.61 Binet was already an accomplished lawyer,
psychologist, playwright, hypnotist, and after creating his test, he became one
of the world’s first to measure intelligence.62 Binet’s original scale has gone
through numerous revisions, and the most recent Fifth Edition was published
in 2003.63
52.
Gary N. Siperstein & Melissa A. Collins, Intellectual Disability, in THE
DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 41, 42 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015)
(ebook).
53.
Id.
54.
See Marie Skodak Crissey, Mental Retardation: Past, Present, and Future,
30 AM. PSYCH. 800, 801 (1975).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 802.
59.
See Crissey, supra note 54, at 803.
60.
See id.; THOMSON GALE, PSYCHOLOGISTS AND THEIR THEORIES FOR
STUDENTS 98 (Kristine Krapp, ed. 2005).
61.
Crissey, supra note 54, at 803.
62.
See id.; THOMSON GALE, supra note 60, at 94–95.
63.
Gale H. Roid, (SB-5) Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition,
WPS, http://www.wpspublish.com/sb-5-stanford-binet-intelligence-scales-fifth-edition (last
visited Dec. 14, 2020); see also THOMSON GALE, supra note 60, at 114.
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In 1939, David Wechsler first published the Wechsler-Bellevue
Intelligence Scale, which consisted of eleven different subtests derived from
the 1937 version of the Stanford-Binet.64 It was further revised for the
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS”) in 1955, the WAIS-R in 1981,
the WAIS-III in 1997, and the WAIS-IV in 2008.65 Both the WAIS and
Stanford-Binet scales are individually administered, comprehensive,
nationally-normed intelligence batteries used to determine intellectual
function to this day.66
By the 1930s, the term “mental retardation” had replaced previous
labels.67 Practitioners began to understand that intellectual disability had
genetic roots, and might also be related to poor nutrition, neurological deficits,
trauma, and an impoverished environment.68 The advent of the intelligence
quotient, through the utilization of IQ testing, allowed for the transition from
subjective labeling to objective classifications of intellectual disability based
on IQ score.69 Thus, people with IQ scores in the range of 50–75 were
considered “morons,” people with IQ scores in the range of 25–50 were
considered “imbeciles,” and those with IQ scores less than 25 were “idiots.”70
Although the labels evolved since the 1880s, the categorization of the severity
of intellectual disability has historically been based on IQ alone.71
By the middle of the twentieth century, psychologists began to link IQ
with other diagnostic features of intellectual disability.72 The 1961 manual of
the American Association of Mental Retardation73 explained that mental
retardation was present in individuals with an IQ of 84 or lower, with deficits
64.
Thomas Valentine et al., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, in THE WILEYBLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, VOLUME II,
MEASUREMENT AND ASSESSMENT (Bernardo J. Carducci et al. eds., forthcoming Nov. 2020)
(manuscript at 3–4); Corwin Boake, From the Binet–Simon to the Wechsler–Bellevue: Tracing
the History of Intelligence Testing, 24 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 383,
387 (2002).
65.
Valentine et al., supra note 64, at 4.
66.
See id. at 3.
67.
Crissey, supra note 54, at 805.
68.
Id.
69.
Siperstein & Collins, supra note 52, at 43.
70.
Id.
71.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 8–9; see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 42 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
DSM-IV-TR]; ROGER K. BLASHFIELD ET AL., THE CYCLE OF CLASSIFICATION: DSM-I THROUGH
DSM-5 27, 38 (2014).
72.
Marc J. Tassé et al., The Construct of Adaptive Behavior: Its
Conceptualization, Measurement, and Use in the Field of Intellectual Disability, 117 AM. J. ON
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 291, 293 (2012).
73.
Id. at 292; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 48. The “AAMR” was
the precursor to the American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
(“AAIDD”). DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 48.
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in adaptive behavior, and originating during the developmental period.74 The
developmental period at that time was defined as all ages up to approximately
sixteen.75 At the time of publication of the 1961 American Association on
Mental Retardation (“AAMR”) manual, the concepts of maturation, learning,
and social adjustment were folded into the single, largely undefined construct
of adaptive behavior.76 Since 1961 the AAMR has been through numerous
revisions and was the precursor to the current version of the AAIDD-11 soon
to be revised in 2021.77
The original Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
was published in 1952, and contained 128 categories of mental diseases.78
Since then, it has been through numerous revisions, most recently DSM-5
(2013).79 The release of the DSM-5 took into account scientific progress in
such areas as cognitive neuroscience, brain imaging, epidemiology, and
genetics.80 This conceptualization and inclusion of adaptive behavior in the
definition of intellectual disability led to the development of adaptive behavior
assessment instruments, such as the Adaptive Behavior Diagnostic Scale
(“ABDS”) released in 2016; the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System
(“ABAS-3”) revised and republished in 2015; the Revised Scales of
Independent Behavior (“SIB-R”) published in 1996; and the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales (“Vineland II”) revised in 2005.81
Today, the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 are the two nationally
recognized sources providing definition and diagnostic criteria for intellectual
disability.82 The DSM-5 defines intellectual disability, or “intellectual
developmental disorder” as “a disorder with onset during the developmental
period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in
conceptual, social, and practical domains.”83 According to the DSM-5,
intellectual disability diagnosis requires a finding of: 1) deficits in intellectual

74.
See Stephen Greenspan, Evolving Concepts of Adaptive Behavior, in THE
DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 219, 221 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015);
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 136; Siperstein & Collins, supra note 52, at 43.
75.
See TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 136.
76.
Greenspan, supra note 74, at 220–21.
77.
Stephen Greenspan, The Arbitrariness of Age Ceilings in Developmental
Services, 5 GLOB. J. INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES, 70, 70–71 (2018).
78.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS v (1952); see also BLASHFIELD ET AL., supra note 71, at 25, 28.
79.
BLASHFIELD ET AL., supra note 71, at 32–33, 37.
80.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 5.
81.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 115; Tassé et al., supra note 72, at 293–
95.
82.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 40–41.
83.
Id. at 33.
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function (IQ); 2) deficits in adaptive function; and 3) “onset of intellectual and
adaptive deficits during the developmental period.”84
The DSM-5 describes intellectual functions as areas such as
reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, judgment, learning
from instruction and experience, and practical understanding.85 Intellectual
functioning is typically measured with individually administered and
psychometrically
valid,
comprehensive,
culturally
appropriate,
psychometrically sound tests of intelligence.86 The DSM-5 also emphasizes a
required level of appropriate professional training and clinical judgment in the
interpretation of intellectual test results.87
The AAIDD-11 states that intellectual disability is “characterized by
significant limitation both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior
as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.”88 This
disability originates before the age of eighteen.89 According to the AAIDD11, the following five assumptions are essential to the application of this
definition:
1.
Limitations in present functioning must be
considered within the context of community environments
typical of the individual’s age peers and culture.
2.
Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic
diversity as well as differences in communication, sensory,
motor, and behavioral factors.
3.
Within an individual, limitations often coexist with
strengths.
4.
An important purpose of describing limitations is to
develop a profile of needed supports.
5.
With appropriate supports over a sustained period, the
life functioning of the person with intellectual disability
generally will improve.90

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 37.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 6, 9, 28.
Id. at 5, 31, 45.
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The evolution of modern definitions of intellectual disability reflects
the struggles of weighing a rigid IQ score with aspects of adaptive behavior.91
IQ test scores are only approximations of conceptual functioning and can be
insufficient in assessing real-life functioning.92 A paradigm shift in
diagnosing intellectual disability occurred with the advent of the DSM-5,
which relies on an individual’s adaptive functioning in determining the
severity level of intellectual disability—an approach consistent with the
AAIDD-11 diagnostic criteria.93 Deficits in adaptive functioning “refer to
how well a person meets community standards of personal independence and
social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and sociocultural
background.”94 Now, adaptive functioning and all the ways in which a person
interacts in a community setting informs intellectual disability diagnosis in
equal measure to a range of IQ scores.95
Intellectual disability is a heterogeneous disorder that occurs during
an individual’s developmental stages.96 Thus the third prong of the definition
of intellectual disability focuses on the developmental criterion.97 To confirm
that an individual is appropriately labeled as having an intellectual disability,
there must be verification of origin during the developmental period.98
“Although the . . . [AAIDD-11 and the DSM-5] are in general agreement on
most matters, there is a divergence with regard to the developmental onset
criterion . . . .”99 The DSM-5, published in 2013, views intellectual disability
as a condition that must occur during the “developmental period,” which may
be older than age eighteen.100 The AAIDD-11, published in 2010, clings to
the age of onset at age eighteen, but the future edition of the manual will
reconsider this arbitrary number.101
The Florida Legislature initially adopted legislation to bar the
execution of the intellectually disabled in 2001.102 After Atkins established a
nationwide standard for the protection of the intellectually disabled, the
Supreme Court of Florida considered changes to the Florida Rules of Criminal

91.
Id. at 38.
92.
See id. at 38, 39.
93.
Tassé, supra note 49, at 2.
94.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37; see also Tassé et al., supra note 72, at 291.
95.
See Tassé et al., supra note 72, at 295.
96.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33, 38.
97.
Id. at 33.
98.
See id.; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 38.
99.
Greenspan, supra note 77, at 70.
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 70–71; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 28.
102.
See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019); Act effective June 12, 2001, ch. 2001202, § 1, 2001 Laws of Fla. 1831, 1832 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.137).
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Procedure and adopted Rule 3.203 in 2004.103 When the American Psychiatric
Association and the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities adopted the term “intellectual disability” as opposed to “mental
retardation,” the legislature amended the statute to follow suit.104 But the
legislature has failed to amend Florida law to reflect the present clinical
consensus in the diagnosis of intellectual disability in the DSM-5 and AAIDD11.105 The Supreme Court of Florida has compounded this problem by
following outdated precedent based on prior versions of diagnostic criteria.106
Intellectual disability is a permanent, incurable condition that is diagnosed
during the developmental period.107 While retrospective diagnosis is almost
always necessary in capital cases, the Supreme Court of Florida veers far from
accepted medical diagnostic criteria by adding the element of current adult
deficits that must be proven, by clear and convincing evidence, to bar the death
penalty for the intellectually disabled.108
III.

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA’S DEFINITION OF CONCURRENT
ADAPTIVE FUNCTION IS AT ODDS WITH MEDICAL CONSENSUS

The Supreme Court of Florida has defined the term “concurrent”
adaptive deficits of intellectual disability to mean “exist at the same time” or
“current” at the time of diagnosis.109 But, in the capital punishment context,
intellectual disability is universally diagnosed retrospectively, sometimes
years, even decades after a defendant is sentenced to death.110 Thus, the
103.
Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc. & Fla. Rules of App. Proc., 875
So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 2004); Crim. Court Steering Comm., Comments of the Criminal Court
Steering
Committee
9–10
(2003),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/326698/file/03685_CCSCCommentMentalRetardation2.pdf; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.137 (2019); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.203; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
104.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(b).
105.
See id.
106.
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 325 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
107.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 5–6.
108.
Williams v. State, 226 So. 3d 758, 768 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam).
109.
See Wright v. State (Wright II), 256 So. 3d 766, 773 (Fla. 2018) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2671 (2019); Jones, 966 So. 2d at 326; Phillips v. State, 984
So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751, 755 (Fla. 2017)
(per curiam); Williams, 226 So. 3d at 771; Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 248 (Fla. 2011) (per
curiam). “[T]his Court has interpreted [section 924.137 Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.203] to mean that subaverage intellectual functioning must exist at the
same time as the adaptive deficits, and that there must be current adaptive deficits.” Dufour,
69 So. 3d at 248 (emphasis added).
110.
Denis W. Keyes & David Freedman, Retrospective Diagnosis and
Malingering, in THE DEATH PENALTY & INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 322, 335 (Edward A.
Polloway ed., 2015) (ebook).
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requirement imposed by the Supreme Court of Florida that there be current
adaptive deficits is antithetical to contemporary diagnostic criteria, which
require intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits to exist during the
developmental period.111
A.
Jones v. State Set the Stage in 2007, Years Before the Current Versions
of the DSM-5 and AAIDD-11 Were Published
The Supreme Court of Florida first considered the definition of
concurrent function in 2007 in Jones v. State.112 At the hearing on the postconviction motion on intellectual disability, both state and defense experts
generally agreed on the definitions of significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning and age of onset that applied to Jones’ diagnosis.113 The
disagreement over the analysis of adaptive functioning stemmed from the
defense expert, Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony that a determination of deficits in
adaptive functioning primarily involves an analysis of childhood behavior,
rather than adult behavior.114 Dr. Eisenstein explained that, “adaptive
functioning has to address the issue of the individual before age [eighteen]”
and that, “at age [forty-four, Jones’] adaptive behavior, albeit important . . . is
not the criteria for defining and assessing mental retardation.”115
Rather than look to the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability
established by scientists, the Supreme Court of Florida looked to the present
tense used in the “plain language” of both Florida Statute section 921.137(2)
(“no person may be sentenced to death ‘if it is determined . . . that the
defendant has mental retardation’”) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.203(e) (providing for an evidentiary hearing to consider whether the
defendant is mentally retarded) to support a conclusion that a person must
prove current deficits in adaptive functioning to be found intellectually
disabled.116 To further support its decision, the Court cited the definition in
111.
Wright v. State (Wright II), 256 So. 3d 766, 773 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2671 (2019); see also AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 6, 43 (defining the
age of onset as prior to 18); DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33 (defining the age of onset as
“developmental period”); FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019) (defining the age of onset as prior to
18); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(b) (2019).
112.
966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
113.
See id. at 325.
114.
Id. It would be six years before the DSM-5 removed the concept of
“concurrent function” from the diagnostic definition of intellectual disability. See DSM-5,
supra note 2, at 33; but see DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 49. It may be that Dr. Eisenstein
was well ahead of his time. Jones, 966 So. 2d at 325, n.3. He was also, as it turns out, entirely
correct. See id.
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 326; FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(e).
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the DSM-IV in which the criteria for diagnosis included “[c]oncurrent deficits
or impairments in present adaptive functioning.”117 The Court interpreted this
language in the DSM-IV, stating “the word ‘present’ means ‘now.’”118 Next,
the Court used sarcasm to drive its flawed reasoning home—with a citation to
Alice in Wonderland.119 “Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony that in this phrase the
word ‘present’ actually refers to past, or childhood, adaptive functioning
would impose an Alice-in-Wonderland definition of the word ‘present.’”120
Unfortunately, interpretive errors like this are certain to occur when lawyers
and judges substitute their own judgment for the clearly established diagnostic
criteria of the scientific community.121
In keeping with the clinical purpose of the DSM-IV, the term
“present” clearly referred to adaptive deficits prior to age eighteen, as the
developmental period was defined in the old manual.122 However, since the
Supreme Court of Florida misinterpreted the DSM-IV in Jones in 2007, the
precedent has continued to survive despite the change in diagnostic criteria in
the DSM-5 in 2013.123 The Jones error has played out over and over in Florida
jurisprudence—depriving death-sentenced citizens of their Eighth
Amendment rights for an additional seven years and counting.124 Florida
courts are bound to follow precedent.125 The Jones case is still cited as
persuasive authority for the proposition that current adaptive function is
relevant to a diagnosis of intellectual disability without any consideration of
the current age of the defendant, despite the consistent trajectory of scientific
discovery embodied in the AAIDD-11 and the DSM-5 that have omitted the
term “concurrent” from the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability.126
117.
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 326; DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 49.
118.
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 327.
119.
Id.; see also LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 123 (Phila.
Henry Altemus Co. 1872) (1897) (stating “When I use a word, . . . it means just what I choose
it to mean — neither more nor less.”).
120.
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 327; see also CARROLL, supra note 119, at 123.
121.
See Jones, 966 So. 2d at 327.
122.
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 49.
123.
See Jones, 966 So. 2d at 327; Phillips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla.
2008) (per curiam); Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 248 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam); DSM-5,
supra note 2, at 33.
124.
Jones, 966 So. 2d at 325–27; Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 511 (holding
retrospective diagnosis “insufficient” because both Florida statutes and rules of criminal
procedure require concurrent adaptive deficits); Dufour, 69 So. 3d at 248. “[T]his Court has
interpreted [section 924.137 Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203] to
mean that subaverage intellectual functioning must exist at the same time as the adaptive
deficits, and that there must be current adaptive deficits.” Id.
125.
See Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 511; Dufour, 69 So. 3d at 248.
126.
Compare Jones, 966 So. 2d at 327, and Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 511, and
Dufour, 69 So. 3d at 248, with AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 45, and DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33,
and DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 49.
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The DSM-5 now calls for “[d]eficits in adaptive functioning that result
in failure to meet developmental and socio-cultural standards for personal
independence and social responsibility.”127 The DSM-5 specifically states that
adaptive functioning in controlled settings—such as prisons—is difficult to
assess, and therefore “corroborative information reflecting functioning outside
those settings should be obtained.”128 The AAIDD-11 considers adaptive
behaviors, as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills
“within the context of community . . . environments typical of the
[individual’s] age peers and [culture].”129 Both authoritative sources concur
that adaptive behavior assessment involves evaluating the individual’s
behavior in community settings that were acquired and demonstrated on a
consistent basis in the individual’s day-to-day life, outside of an institutional
setting.130 Therefore, adaptive behavior assessment in death penalty cases is
focused on the developmental period through time of the crime and is
inherently retrospective.131 Yet, the Supreme Court of Florida continues to
apply the Jones precedent requiring a showing of current adaptive deficits—
even though it is based on outdated diagnostic criteria and explicitly violates
diagnostic prohibitions against assessment of prison behavior.132
B.
The Jones Error Was Needlessly Repeated in Wright, Williams, and
Rodriguez in 2017
In Wright v. State133 the Supreme Court of Florida considered the
application of Florida’s intellectual disability statute to the case of a death-row
prisoner who was born with fetal alcohol syndrome and microcephaly,
conditions that limited the growth of his brain to two-thirds the size of
normal.134
Parental addiction, mental illness, and incarceration prevented any stable
home life. Wright learned to speak and walk much later than average
127.
128.
129.
130.

DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
Id. at 38.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 45; SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 21.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 45; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 43–45;
SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 20–21.
131.
Greenspan & Olley, supra note 31, at 189 (noting serious validity
considerations in using standardized adaptive behavior testing for current adaptive behavior in
prison settings); TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 137.
132.
Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 327 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Phillips v.
State, 984 So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam); Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 248 (Fla.
2011) (per curiam).
133.
213 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct.
360 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2671 (2019) (mem.).
134.
Id. at 893.
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children, wet his bed until he was sixteen years old, and suffered a
“remarkable” number of serial head injuries resulting in loss of
consciousness. Wright’s mother received social security benefits for
Wright’s slow learning disability and speech delays.135

Wright was convicted of murder and sentenced to death because Cherry v.
State136 set a hardline cut-off of 70 IQ score for the diagnosis of intellectual
disability in Florida.137
During post-conviction proceedings, Wright’s case was remanded for
a full hearing on intellectual disability under Hall v. Florida.138 Wright’s death
sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida (“Wright I”).139 In
holding that Wright was not intellectually disabled, the Supreme Court of
Florida relied almost exclusively on adult behavior in prison, including:
rewriting blog entries in his own words, writing letters from prison, taking
advice from other prisoners to order Kosher meals, communicating with prison
staff, knowing time allocated for prison activities, using a canteen account in
prison, knowing he needed his attorneys, and indications he was receptive to
his attorneys’ advice.140 The Supreme Court of the United States granted,
vacated, and remanded Wright’s case to the Supreme Court of Florida in
consideration of Moore I.141
The Supreme Court of Florida again affirmed that Wright was not
intellectually disabled and reinstated his death sentence.142 In Wright II, the
Supreme Court of Florida’s adaptive functioning analysis relied almost
exclusively on the circuit court’s finding that Wright’s hearing testimony and
plea colloquy established his adaptive strengths.143 The Court considered
“concurrent” adult behavior, with legal assistance and undoubtedly lots of
practice, that would never be used by a knowledgeable expert to diagnose
intellectual disability under the DSM-5.144 Similarly, the Courts balancing of
adaptive strengths against adaptive deficits would never be considered

135.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6–7, Wright v. State, 213 So. 3d 881 (Fla.
2017) (No. 17-5575) (citations omitted).
136.
959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 572
U.S. 701 (2014).
137.
See Wright I, 213 So. 3d at 893, 895; Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 713.
138.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 135, at 4; see also Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701, 724 (2014).
139.
Wright I, 213 So. 3d at 912.
140.
Id. at 899.
141.
Wright v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 360, 360 (2017) (mem.).
142.
Wright v. State (Wright II), 256 So. 3d 766, 779 (Fla. 2018) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2671 (2019).
143.
See id. at 778.
144.
Id. at 773; see also DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38.
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clinically sound.145 The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari
in Wright II, notwithstanding these grave errors in the analysis and the legal
framework for assessing adaptive deficits and concurrent function.146
A focus on adult adaptive behavior in prison violates both professional
medical consensus and the Moore standards.147 Clinicians warn against
assessing adaptive strengths in controlled settings such as prisons and
detention centers, and corroborative information reflecting functioning outside
the controlled setting should be obtained to appropriately diagnose intellectual
disability.148 By contrast, most death-sentenced inmates like Wright have their
self-determination and personal independence dramatically curtailed on death
row.149 The Supreme Court of Florida violated the holdings of Moore I & II,
as well as scientific consensus by diagnosing Wright as fully intellectually
capable based on skills performed in a controlled environment.150
The Supreme Court of Florida continues to require a showing of
current adaptive functioning, even in retrospective diagnoses.151 For example,
in Rodriguez v. State,152 the Court primarily denied an intellectual disability
claim of a man with an IQ of 64 on the grounds that he was given an invalid
Mexican IQ test.153 In assessing adaptive functioning, the Court stated: “In
Jones, we rejected the argument that, ‘in determining whether a person
experiences deficits in adaptive functioning, only the person’s childhood
behavior is considered.’”154 The Rodriguez court was clear—Florida evaluates
both “long-term and current adaptive behavior” to assess intellectual disability
and current adaptive behavior is a central requirement of a finding of
intellectual disability.155 For Rodriguez, evidence of his current adaptive
145.
See Wright II, 256 So. 3d at 774–76.
146.
Wright v. Florida, 139 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2019) (mem.); see also Wright II,
256 So. 3d at 773; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38.
147.
Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct.
666 (2019); ROBERT L. SCHALOCK & RUTH LUCKASSON, CLINICAL JUDGMENT 20 (2d ed. 2014)
(ebook); see also DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38.
148.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38; see also AAIDD11, supra note 2, at 99.
149.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 135, at 25.
150.
See Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666, 669 (2019) (per curiam);
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1050; SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 20; DSM-5, supra note 2, at
38.
151.
Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751, 757, 759 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam).
152.
219 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 2017) (per curiam).
153.
Id. at 754, 758.
154.
Id. at 757 (quoting Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 325–27 (Fla. 2007))
(emphasis added).
155.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Williams v. State, 226 So. 3d 758, 771 (Fla.
2017) (per curiam) (stating that the adaptive behavior information provided was found
“insufficient to satisfy the second prong of the intellectual disability test because it does not
address Williams’s current adaptive behavior”) (emphasis added).
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functioning produced at a hearing in 2015 was very far removed from his
developmental period, given that he was born in 1956.156 While some
members of the medical community might argue about an appropriate cut-off
for adaptive behavior analysis, it is certainly the case that deficits in a sixtyyear-old man are so far removed from the age of onset that they become
unreliable evidence of intellectual disability.157
In Williams v. State,158 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a postconviction claim of intellectual disability.159 During the post-conviction
hearing, the expert psychologist for the defense discounted the results of
adaptive behavior scales used to assess Mr. Williams’ prison behavior—
calling them “irrelevant” to an intellectual disability diagnosis.160 The expert
testimony was consistent with clear medical consensus, as expressed in the
DSM-5 and AAIDD-11, which disfavor all adaptive assessments outside of
community settings and in controlled environments like prisons.161 The Court
could have utilized Williams to bring Florida’s law back into conformity with
updated diagnostic criteria by correcting the Jones standard and holding that
current function is no longer relevant to a retrospective intellectual disability
assessment of a death row defendant.162 Instead, the opinion of Williams’
expert was used as support for the holding that the post-conviction court
correctly found a lack of adaptive deficits.163
Florida’s requirement of adaptive deficits present at the time of
diagnosis, even when a diagnosis is decades after the age of onset, is an
anachronism.164 Florida Statute section 921.137, adopted in 2001, initially
used the term “mental retardation” and tracked the language of a prior edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.165 The DSM-IV’s definition of
intellectual disability admittedly required “concurrent deficits or impairments
in present adaptive functioning.”166 However, DSM-5, published in 2013,
altered the way that intellectual disability is diagnosed by removing the term
“concurrent” from the definition of adaptive functioning and gave rise to the
dramatic shift in national jurisprudence on intellectual disability in Hall,
156.
See Rodriguez, 219 So. 3d at 755.
157.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
158.
226 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 2017).
159.
Id. at 768.
160.
Id. at 770.
161.
Id.; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38; AAIDD-11 supra note 2, at 99.
162.
See Williams, 226 So. 3d at 773; Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326–27
(Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
163.
Williams, 226 So. 3d at 773.
164.
See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 723 (2014).
165.
Act effective June 12, 2001, ch. 2001-202, § 921.137, 2001 Laws of Fla.
1831, 1832 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.137).
166.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 49; but see DSM-5, supra note 2, at 49.
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Moore I, and Moore II.167 This is especially true in cases like Rodriguez, when
the “current” adult behavior required to prove intellectual disability under
Florida law is forty years removed from the developmental period.168
While it may have been plausible to contort the definition of
“concurrent” to include both “at the same time” and “currently,” given the
DSM-IV’s suggestion that subaverage intellectual functioning occurs
concurrently with present adaptive deficits, this interpretation defies the
present medical consensus.169 Even in the DSM-IV, the term concurrent was
meant to dovetail with the age of onset criteria.170 The diagnostic definition
in the DSM-5 does not contain either the term “concurrent” or “present”
adaptive deficits.171 Instead, the DSM-5 now calls for “deficits in adaptive
functioning that results in failure to meet developmental and sociocultural
standards for personal independence and social responsibility”172 in
conjunction with the additional requirement of onset during the developmental
period.173
Using current function for retrospective diagnosis is problematic in
other respects.174 The DSM-5 specifically states that adaptive functioning in
controlled settings—such as prisons—are difficult to assess, and therefore
“corroborative information reflecting functioning outside those settings
should be obtained.”175 The AAIDD-11 explains that measuring adaptive
behavior “usually involves obtaining information . . . from a person or persons
who know the individual well” and who “have known him/her for some time
and have had the opportunity to observe the person function across community
settings and times.”176 Observations made based even on a decade of life in a
9 x 10 x 6 cell under twenty-three-hour lockdown177 have little to do with
167.
See DSM-5, supra note 2 at 49; Hall, 572 U.S. at 711; Moore v. Texas
(Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1059–60 (2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019); Moore v. Texas
(Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019) (per curiam) (Roberts, concurring).
168.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33; Rodriguez v. State, 219 So. 3d 751, 755
(Fla. 2017) (per curiam).
169.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 39.
170.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
171.
See id. at 33.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
See id. at 61.
175.
Id. at 38.
176.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 47.
177.
Id.; see also Greenspan & Olley, supra note 31, at 189 (noting serious
validity considerations in using standardized adaptive behavior testing for current adaptive
behavior in prison settings).
[C]orrections officers may have limited knowledge of a claimant’s abilities
due to rotating shift assignments, limited opportunities to witness an array of applied
skills due to the highly restricted setting, and biased perspectives. Most important,
their observations regarding inmates’ adaptive behavior within a highly structured

20

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

observations across numerous “community settings” as required by both the
DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11.178 A requirement of “current” adaptive behavior
for inmates who have spent decades after the developmental period in the
highly structured prison environment, which has been compared to “the
ultimate group home,” is barely relevant to an intellectual disability
diagnosis.179
By contrast, both the DSM-5 and the AAIDD-11 list examples of
sources of collateral and retrospective information, such as: family members,
teachers, employers, friends, and records from various sources that are all
relevant to retrospective diagnosis.180 It is diagnostically sound to interview
and administer adaptive behavior questionnaires to people familiar with the
defendant during the developmental period.181 The community environment
is the most salient source of information concerning adaptive functioning.182
While it can be difficult to locate appropriate informants of an inmate’s
community functioning after they have been incarcerated, this is the only
medically sound diagnostic practice suitable for death penalty cases.183
C.
Florida is an Outlier Among Death Penalty Jurisdictions for Using Its
Own Method of Intellectual Disability Diagnosis
Given that both the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities and the American Psychiatric Association dropped
maximum security prison do not correlate with the demands and skills that are found
in the typical community environment.

Caroline Everington et al., Challenges in the Assessment of Adaptive Behavior of People Who
are Incarcerated, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 252, 261–62 (Edward
A. Polloway ed., 2015) (ebook).
178.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 137. (“The assessment of the
individual’s ‘present functioning’ in terms of adaptive behavior . . . is challenging if the . . .
individual is incarcerated and has been for a length of time. These two . . . conditions . . . of
present functioning and community environment are at odds with one another in death penalty
cases where the individual’s ‘present’ adaptive behavior can only be assessed against life in a
prison or on death row. Prison life and expectations cannot be substituted for societies
expectations”). Id.
179.
J. Gregory Olley & Ann W. Cox, Assessment of Adaptive Behavior in
Adult Forensic Cases: The Use of Adaptive Behavior Assessment System-II, in ADAPTIVE
BEHAVIOR ASSESSMENT SYSTEM-II: CLINICAL USE AND INTERPRETATION 381, 392–93
(Thomas Oakland & Patti L. Harrison eds., 2008).
180.
Id. at 392.
181.
See id. at 388, 391; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 47–54. Assessments of
adaptive behavior must focus on typical performance and avoid self-ratings. AAIDD-11, supra
note 2, at 47–54; see also Olley & Cox, supra note 179, at 392.
182.
Olley & Cox, supra note 179, at 390, 392.
183.
See id. at 392; Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051–52 (2017),
rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
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the term “concurrent” from the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability, it
is hard to justify Florida’s continued use of this outdated term that triggers a
legal standard that defies medical consensus.184 Florida is not alone—ten
states use the term “concurrent” in their intellectual disability statutes.185 All
but two of these states properly interpret adaptive deficits to mean concurrent
with the age of onset requirement of age eighteen, or the developmental
period.186
Florida is at odds with the twenty-six of twenty-eight death penalty
jurisdictions nation-wide that define intellectual disability without this
outdated definition of concurrent function.187 Of the nine jurisdictions that use
the term “concurrent” in the definition of intellectual disability, Alabama is
the only other state that includes a requirement that intellectual disability
required a showing of current intellectual and adaptive deficits.188 In Carroll
v. State,189 the Supreme Court of Alabama considered the intellectual disability
claims of a death sentenced defendant with an IQ of 71 who was in special
education classes, failed the first grade and eighth grade twice, had learning
problems, suffered from prenatal alcohol exposure, and experienced sexual
and physical abuse as a child, including serial head injuries.190 The court
initially explained that under Alabama law, mental retardation requires a
finding that an “offender must currently exhibit subaverage intellectual
functioning, currently exhibit deficits in adaptive behavior, and these problems

184.
See Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2019) (per curiam);
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 45; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
185.
ALA. CODE § 15-24-2(3) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(K)(3)
(2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (West
2012) (held unconstitutional on other grounds by Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1, 7
(Ky. Ct. App. 2018)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.098(7) (2019); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A2005(a)(1)(a) (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10b(A)(1) (West 2020); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2)(a) (2019) (held unconstitutional
on other grounds by State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d. 343, 355 (Wash. 2018)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 81-102(a)(xiii) (2020); see also State v. Agee, 364 P.3d 971, 989 (Or. 2015) (en banc);
Updegrove et al., supra note 51, at 539–40 (stating that of twenty-nine states that address
intellectual disability as a bar to the death penalty, only four rely on the most recent editions of
the DSM and the AAIDD manuals).
186.
See Carroll v. State, 215 So. 3d 1135, 1148, 1153 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015);
Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
187.
See ALA. CODE § 15-24-2(3); FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019).
188.
ALA. CODE § 15–24–2(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(K)(5); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1376(a); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.098(7); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10b(A)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.95.030(2)(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-102(a)(xiii).
189.
215 So. 3d 1135 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
190.
Id. at 1147–49.
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must have manifested themselves before the age of [eighteen].”191 Alabama’s
highest court relied on outdated precedent from 2007 and 2009—published
years prior to the DSM-5 in supporting this flawed decision.192
Carroll’s intellectual disability claim was denied, in part, due to the
fact that he failed to prove that he currently exhibited deficits in adaptive
behavior, as he was able to work in the prison kitchen and finally pass his GED
when he was well into middle age.193 Exactly as in Wright, the petition for
certiorari filed after the Supreme Court of Alabama decided Carroll was
granted, and Alabama’s decision was vacated and reversed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on May 1, 2017.194 Although the court did not issue
a lengthy opinion, Carroll was returned to Alabama on the basis of the newly
announced nationwide standards in Moore.195
Florida legislators may have intended the use of the term “concurrent”
to mean that the limitations in skill areas must occur simultaneously with
deficits in IQ during the developmental period.196 If that is the case, the
Supreme Court of Florida has failed to properly interpret the law.197 As a
result, its decisions do not comply with the medical consensus required by
Hall, Moore I, and Moore II.198 In the meantime, analyzing concurrent
function, as “current function” without regard to the age of onset of intellectual
disability allows a denial of medically sound and legitimate intellectual
disability claims and creates an unreasonable risk that intellectually disabled
defendants will be executed.199
IV.

THE EIGHTEEN YEAR AGE OF ONSET REQUIREMENT IS THE SUBJECT
OF GROWING CONTROVERSY IN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY

Florida’s statutory requirement that intellectual disability must begin
prior to age eighteen is at odds with current medical consensus.200 Fifteen
years ago, in Roper v. Simmons,201 the Supreme Court of the United States
191.
Id. at 1148 (citing Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239, 248 (Ala. 2007))
(emphasis added).
192.
See id. at 1148; Byrd v. State, 78 So. 3d 445, 450 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
193.
Carroll, 215 So. 3d at 1152; see also Wright v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 360
(2017) (mem.).
194.
Carroll v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 2093, 2093 (2017) (mem).
195.
Id.; see also Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), rev’d, 139
S. Ct. 666 (2019).
196.
See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019).
197.
See Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 812–13 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
198.
Id. at 818; see also Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722 (2014); Moore I, 137
S. Ct. at 1048; Moore v. Texas (Moore II), 139 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2019) (per curiam).
199.
See Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 325n.3 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
200.
See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019); DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
201.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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established that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.”202 Scientific advancements in
brain development led the way to new legal standards being applied to juvenile
offenders.203 The Court has admonished that it is impermissible for courts to
disregard the teachings of the scientific community, especially when they
support a finding of lesser culpability in cases where the most severe sanctions
are at play.204 Intellectual disability, which is fundamentally considered to be
a neurodevelopmental disorder, is among a group of conditions with onset in
the developmental period well past age eighteen.205
The DSM-IV established that the age of onset for intellectual
disability must occur before age eighteen.206 To be clear, the “diagnosis” of
intellectual disability does not need to occur prior to the established age of
onset.207 Rather, diagnostic criteria require only that deficits in intellectual
and adaptive functioning were present during the established period.208 In
conjunction with studied professional consensus in 2013, the DSM-5 removed
the language regarding “age eighteen” and replaced it with onset during the
“developmental period.”209 A new edition of the AAIDD criteria, due to be
published shortly, will embody a similar update.210 Like laws in the majority
of death penalty jurisdictions, Florida statutes have not internalized the
scientific consensus that brain development and intellectual disability
diagnosis extends well past the age of eighteen.211 Although some outliers,
202.
Id. at 572–73.
203.
See id.; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding juvenile
mandatory life sentences violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74
(2010) (holding juvenile life sentences for crimes other than homicide violates Eighth
Amendment).
204.
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014).
205.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 31; see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 711.
206.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 71, at 39.
207.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 136.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
210.
Greenspan, supra note 77, at 71. “Although AAIDD, being an organization
dominated by service-providing bureaucrats, is less likely than the more medically-oriented
DSM to do away with a specific age cut-off specification, there is a strong likelihood,
approaching near certainty, that the age [eighteen] ceiling will be dramatically loosened in its
next classification manual . . . almost certainly by raising the ceiling from age [eighteen] to age
[twenty-two].” Id.; see also AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 9 tbl.1.2.
211.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019), with ALA. CODE § 15-24-2(3)
(2020) (stating that impairments must be manifested during the developmental period), and
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(a)(1)(A) (West 2020) (stating that impairment must be manifested
during the developmental period, but no later than age eighteen), and GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7131(a)(2) (2020) (developmental period), and NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.098(7) (2019)
(developmental period), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(10) (2020) (developmental
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namely Indiana and Utah, have defined the age of onset to extend to age
twenty-two.212
Significant scientific progress has been made in the last four decades
in understanding and defining the brain’s development from childhood
through adulthood.213 It is well established that the brain undergoes a
developmental process that is not complete until approximately twenty-five
years of age.214 Consequently, the utilization of the strict cut-off of age
eighteen in diagnosing neurodevelopmental disorders, such as intellectual
disability, has been re-defined in medicine as reflected by the DSM-5.215
The scientific community now considers a more accurate
“developmental period” that takes into account a body of research from the
various fields related to neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology, that has
enhanced our basic understanding regarding brain maturation.216 The
“developmental period” can be operationalized as the period of
neurodevelopment that occurs, leading to a mature brain at the end of
adolescence and into adulthood—around age twenty-five.217 The term
“adolescence” is used to describe the transition stage between childhood and
adulthood and denotes both teenage years and puberty.218 The central nervous
system changes that happen between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five are
a continuation of the process that starts in puberty, and healthy eighteen-yearold adolescents are about halfway through this process.219 At age eighteen,
the prefrontal cortex of the brain is not fully developed, and longitudinal
neuroimaging studies have confirmed that important “rewiring” processes
occur during this time.220 The prefrontal cortex is the part of the brain related
to the development of personality, judgment, problem-solving, and rational
period), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(a)(3) (2020) (impairment manifested during the
developmental period or by eighteen years of age), and WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2)(a)
(2019) (developmental period), and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-102(a)(xiii) (2020) (developmental
period).
212.
IND. CODE § 35-36-9-2 (2020) (impairment manifested prior to age twentytwo); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 (West 2020) (impairment manifested prior to age twentytwo).
213.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 136.
214.
Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain,
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE AND TREATMENT, Apr. 2013, at 449, 451; see also Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 n.5 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Brief for
the Am. Psych. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646).
215.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 7.
216.
See id. at 5.
217.
Arain et al., supra note 212, at 451.
218.
Id.
219.
Id. at 450.
220.
Id. at 451–52.
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decision making.221 In a healthy brain, it is the area that governs impulsivity,
aggression, and helps one plan and organize behavior to reach a goal.222 All
of this recent growth in neuroscientific understanding has led to “consensus
within the [intellectual disability] field that just as a prong one [i.e., IQ] cutoff of 70 was too restrictive, the same can be said for maintenance of the
outmoded third prong notion that intellectual disability must always be
manifested before age [eighteen].”223
Florida currently requires the intellectually disabled prove that their
symptoms developed prior to age eighteen.224 This requirement is used to
distinguish those whose cognitive disabilities occurred later in life after
disease, aging, or brain injury.225 But Florida’s statute unequivocally
establishes the age of onset to be age eighteen—it conflicts with medical
consensus in the understanding and diagnosis of intellectual disability, tied to
the developmental period that extends well beyond age eighteen.226
V.

THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENTIARY STANDARD CREATES AN
UNACCEPTABLE RISK THAT INDIVIDUALS WITH INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY WILL BE EXECUTED

Florida law compounds the chance that intellectual disability will be
underdiagnosed because it requires proof of each element of intellectual
disability by clear and convincing evidence.227 This is an insurmountable
gauntlet for capital defendants with intellectual disabilities and it violates
procedural due process protections and cruel and unusual punishment
standards of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.228 By utilizing the clear and convincing standard of
221.
Id. at 453.
222.
Arain et al., supra note 214, at 453.
223.
Greenspan, supra note 99, at 71.
224.
See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203(b); James W.
Ellis et al., Evaluating Intellectual Disability: Clinical Assessments in Atkins Cases, 46
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1336–37 (2018).
The vast majority of people with the level of intellectual impairment to satisfy the
first prong of the definition — and the deficits in adaptive behavior to satisfy the
second prong — first experienced their disability in childhood, and for some, the
cause can be traced back to their birth or their genetic make-up.

Ellis et al., supra note 224, at 1336–37.
225.
Ellis et al., supra note 224, at 1337.
226.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1); DSM-5 supra note 2, at 33; see also Arain et al.,
supra note 214, at 451–52.
227.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(4) (2019); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S.
348, 365 (1996).
228.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, VIII, XIV; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002); Ellis et al., supra note 224, at 1388 n.322.
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evidence, rather than the preponderance standard for intellectual disability
determinations, Florida law guarantees that people who are more likely to be
intellectually disabled than not intellectually disabled will be executed.229
Florida’s statute fails to protect intellectually disabled people from illegal
execution and is at odds with almost every other jurisdiction in the nation.230
Only three other states, Arizona, North Carolina, and Oklahoma, currently use
the clear and convincing standard for intellectual disability determinations.231
Regardless, Florida’s use of the clear and convincing standard has
dramatically more sinister effects—since 2012, Florida alone has executed
more people than all of these three jurisdictions combined.232 It is also
unconstitutional under Cooper v. Oklahoma233 and Atkins.234
In Cooper, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously
overturned an Oklahoma statute, requiring a defendant to prove incompetence
to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence, because it violated the Due
Process Clause.235 The Court explained that “both traditional and modern
practice” and the importance of competency to stand trial required rejection of
the State’s heightened burden of clear and convincing evidence.236 The Court
emphasized that “there [was] no indication that the rule Oklahoma [sought] to
defend [had] any roots in prior practice” and that “the vast majority of
jurisdictions remain persuaded that the heightened standard of proof imposed
on the accused in Oklahoma is not necessary to vindicate the State’s interest

229.
FLA. STAT. § 921.137(4); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.203; see also Cooper, 517 U.S.
at 350; Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 811–12 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam).
230.
See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350; Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/FactSheet.f1605882308.pdf (last visited Dec.
14, 2020). Cooper established a national constitutional preponderance of the evidence standard
for competency determinations. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350. Mild intellectual disability should
be treated similarly. See State v. McManus, 868 N.E.2d 778, 784–85 (Ind. 2007). See Rauf v.
State, 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del. 2016) (per curiam) (invalidating Delaware’s death penalty
scheme, including the clear and convincing standard in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(d)(3)(b)); McManus, 868 N.E.2d at 784 (holding the clear and convincing standard for
establishing intellectual disability as a bar to a death sentence unconstitutional under Atkins);
Smith v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016) (criticizing Arizona’s clear and convincing
standard for intellectual disability). Georgia, the nationwide outlier, continues to impose the
unconscionable burden of proving intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. Raulerson
v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 993 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2568 (2020).
231.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G) (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2005(c) (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.10b(E) (West 2020).
232.
Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 230.
233.
517 U.S. 348 (1996).
234.
Id. at 369; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
235.
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 350, 369.
236.
Id. at 356.
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in prompt and orderly disposition of criminal cases.”237 “Because Oklahoma’s
procedural rule allow[ed] the State to put to trial a defendant who is more
likely than not incompetent, the rule [was] incompatible with the dictates of
due process.”238 Several state supreme courts have applied the reasoning in
Cooper to hold that due process prevents a state from requiring a defendant to
prove intellectual disability by clear and convincing evidence.239 Florida
should follow suit.240
Intellectual disability is a complex condition with a wide variety of
human presentations.241 A comprehensive intellectual disability evaluation
includes assessing limitations in adaptive and intellectual functioning as well
as the identification of genetic and nongenetic medical conditions, such as
cerebral palsy, fetal alcohol syndrome, or seizure disorders, as well as cooccurring mental, emotional, and behavioral disorders.242 Even the most
comprehensive assessments may not meet the clear and convincing standard
of evidence which is both “precise” and “explicit.”243 In the simplest terms,
complex psychological concepts do not lend themselves to a heightened legal
evidentiary standard.244
The deficits in intellectual function referred to in the statute as
“significantly subaverage IQ” is an assessment of a person’s ability to reason,
make plans, solve problems, think abstractly, understand complex ideas, make
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 356, 360.
Id. at 369.
See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 369; Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 103 (Ind. 2005).
We do not deny that the state has an important interest in seeking justice, but
we think the implication of Atkins and Cooper is that the defendant’s right not
to be executed if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter
of federal constitutional law. We therefore hold that the state may not require
proof of mental retardation by clear and convincing evidence.

Pruitt, 834 N.S.2d at 103. “Just as the Supreme Court held in Cooper regarding incompetency,
we conclude that it would violate due process to execute a defendant who is more likely than
not mentally retarded.” Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 464–65 (Tenn. 2004).
240.
See discussion infra Section VII; Crim. Court Steering Comm., supra note
103, at 7–10. In 2003, when the Florida Supreme Court was considering amendments to the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding intellectual disability as a bar to the death
penalty, the Criminal Court Steering Committee, a bi-partisan group of members of the state
judiciary, recommended that a preponderance standard be adopted because the “clear and
convincing standard is likely excessive and unconstitutional.” Crim. Court Steering Comm.,
supra note 103, at 7.
241.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 31.
242.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 28; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 39.
243.
See Emily M. Williams, U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms Unconstitutionality
of
Executing
the
Intellectually
Disabled,
A.B.A.
(June
1,
2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_representation/project_press/2
014/summer/us-supreme-court-reaffirms-unconstitutionality-of-executing-th/; Fla. Std. Jury
Instr. (Civ.) 405.4.
244.
See Williams, supra note 243.
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judgments, and learn from experience.245 An individually administered,
standardized IQ test is an important part of this assessment.246 Hall and Moore
have conclusively established that IQ is not a single fixed number and should
not be viewed as “final and conclusive” evidence of intellectual capacity.247
Rather, IQ is an imprecise range with a standard error of measurement and
insist that courts consider the professional consensus of the medical
community in evaluating intellectual disability.248
Adaptive functioning deficits are found by a holistic assessment of
how a person meets community standards for social responsibility and
judgment.249 Conceptual skills include language, reading, writing, time,
money, numbers, problem-solving, and judgment in novel situations.250 Social
skills involve interpersonal skills, gullibility, social judgment, empathy, and
friendship.251 Finally, practical skills include activities of daily living and
occupational skills, among others.252 Deficits in one of three domains of
conceptual, social, and practical behavior are sufficient for a finding of
intellectual disability.253
The purpose of the adaptive functioning element of the definition of
intellectual disability is to verify that “the impairment indicated in
psychometric tests actually has a real-world impact on the individual’s life and
. . . is a disabling condition rather than . . . a testing anomaly.”254 The DSM-5
uses deficits in adaptive functioning to establish the severity of intellectual
disability because deficits in adaptive functioning determine the level of
support required.255 The assessment of adaptive functioning relies on medical
records, school records, information about an individual’s functioning over
time, standardized test measures of adaptive functioning,256
neuropsychological testing, and professional judgment.257

245.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 31.
246.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 31; see Kevin
McGrew, Intellectual Functioning, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 85,
87 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
247.
See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712 (2014); Moore v. Texas (Moore I),
137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017), rev'd, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
248.
See Hall, 572 U.S. at 713.
249.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 44; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37.
250.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id. at 38; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 43. Deficits in one of three domains
is sufficient. AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 46.
254.
Ellis et al., supra note 224, at 1374.
255.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 33.
256.
Greenspan & Olley, supra note 31, at 187–98.
257.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 47; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37.
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The simplicity of Florida’s intellectual disability standard, as
announced by the legislature and interpreted by the courts, belies the difficulty
of a full and multifactored intellectual disability diagnosis—in which
intellectual functioning, adaptive functioning, and age of onset are just the
beginning.258 The clinical judgment of a psychological professional is key.259
Clinical judgment is “rooted in a high-level of clinical expertise and
experience and judgment that emerges directly from extensive training,
experience with the person, and extensive data.”260 Clinical judgment
enhances “the quality, validity, and precision of the clinician’s decision or
recommendation in situations related to diagnosis, classification, and planning
supports.”261 Clinical judgment is also guided by the highest professional
standards and ethics.262 Clinical judgment plays a larger role in retrospective
intellectual disability assessments because it is necessary in identifying and
interpreting data that contribute to making valid diagnostic impressions.263 It
is clinical judgment, developed over years of education, training, and
experience, above all else, that fulfills the heightened need for reliability in
capital sentencing.264
Eighty to ninety percent of all intellectual disability cases are mild
cases, which includes an IQ in the range of 55 to over 70.265 Mild intellectual
disability is more difficult to diagnose because people with mild intellectual
disabilities have some capabilities and their disabilities are more subtle.266
Rather than displaying general dysfunction, people at the upper end of the
spectrum struggle with abstract thinking, planning, problem-solving, social

258.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 38.
259.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 29, 85–103; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37
(stating that “[t]he diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both clinical assessment and
standardized testing of intellectual and adaptive functions”) (emphases added); see SCHALOCK
& LUCKASSON, supra note 147, at 15.
260.
AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 29; see also DSM-5, supra note 2, at 5.
261.
SCHALOCK & LUCKASSON, supra note 147, at 19.
262.
Id.; see Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM.
PSYCH. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ethics-code-2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2020); Am. Psych. Ass’n, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology, 68 AM. PSYCH. 7, 7
(2013); AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY 3 (2013); AM. EDU. RSCH., STANDARDS FOR
EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 2 (2014).
263.
DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining that “[c]linical training and
judgment are required to interpret test results and assess intellectual performance”); TASSÉ &
BLUME, supra note 31, at 137 (explaining that psychological professionals must exercise clinical
judgment in determining age of onset retrospectively).
264.
See TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 136–37; AAIDD-11, supra note 2,
at 85–103.
265.
Siperstein & Collins, supra note 52, at 41, 43.
266.
Id. at 41.
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perception, and judgment.267 Friends and family will not usually be able to
identify someone with mild intellectual disability; they may merely describe
the person as slow or misunderstanding directions and social pragmatics.268
Clinical judgment plays a disproportionately important role in the diagnosis of
mild intellectual disability because most mildly intellectually disabled
individuals lack problems in obvious practical adaptive functioning areas such
as dressing, toileting, or using the telephone.269
Intellectual disability in a mild form can seem practically “invisible”
to a layperson because the mildly disabled “possess a number of abilities that
distinguish them from others with greater levels of impairment, yet they are
still vulnerable to a host of challenges as compared to the typically developing
population.”270 The general population holds stereotypical beliefs about
intellectual disability, founded on Hollywood theatrics, rather than known
facts about the condition.271 The AAIDD has identified pervasive stereotypes
that “interfere with justice” in intellectual disability diagnosis, which are: the
intellectually disabled talk differently, cannot do complex tasks, cannot get
driver’s licenses, cannot support their families, cannot romantically love or be
loved, cannot acquire any vocational or social skills, and do not have any
strengths in their functioning.272 Mild intellectual disability, a medical
standard subject to numerical ranges, standards of error, and analysis of
deficits over broad categories of adaptive functioning, is rarely, if ever, clear
and convincing.273 The clear and convincing standard reinforces the ideas of
the past in which the intellectually disabled are drooling and bound to a
wheelchair.274 But all mildly intellectually disabled people are exempt from
the death penalty under Atkins, Hall, and Moore, despite Florida’s
commitment to send them to their execution if they are merely more likely
than not found not to be intellectually disabled under the clear and convincing
standard.275
The clear and convincing standard of evidence makes no allowance
for the complexity of intellectual disability diagnosis.276 Along with the
consideration of multiple criteria, tests with imprecise ranges, and the wide
267.
See id. at 41, 47–48.
268.
Id. at 47–48.
269.
Id. at 47; see also SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 36 at 13–17.
270.
Siperstein & Collins, supra note 52, at 50.
271.
TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 6.
272.
SCHALOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at 26.
273.
See DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37–38; AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 153.
274.
See Updegrove et al., supra note 51, at 553, 556; Moore v. Texas, (Moore
I) 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1050 (2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019).
275.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709, 725
(2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318, 321 (2002).
276.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
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variety of clinical presentations, clinicians may have a high degree of
confidence in a diagnosis.277 Yet, proving the existence of intellectual
disability by clear and convincing evidence may be impossible.278 The
Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged this four decades ago while
considering the standard applicable to civil commitment proceedings—“the
subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually
beyond reach in most situations.”279 The subtle diagnosis of mild intellectual
disability can never meet the terms of Florida’s statute.280 Florida will
continue to execute its citizens in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless
the preponderance standard is adopted as in Cooper and the vast majority of
jurisdictions.281
VI.

DOUBLING DOWN ON OUTDATED DIAGNOSTIC STANDARDS:
PHILLIPS V. STATE

The Florida Supreme Court recently doubled down on anachronistic
diagnostic standards for intellectual disability in Phillips v. State.282 Phillips
was initially convicted of first-degree murder in 1983, and his case worked
through the cumbersome appeals process for almost two decades before the
Court permitted a full airing of Phillips’ intellectual disability claim under
Atkins in 2005.283 Phillips’ early Atkins claim was unsuccessful, in part due to
a failure to prove deficits in intellectual functioning under Florida’s statutory
scheme.284 In 2018, Phillips’ renewed claim for intellectual disability under
Atkins, Hall, and Moore was denied by the circuit court.285 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the circuit court’s denial of the renewed
intellectual disability claim by overruling the retroactive application of Hall in
its 2016 precedent in Walls v. State.286 The Phillips decision, if upheld after
the inevitable petition for writ of certiorari, will have the effect of rolling back
the diagnostic standards for intellectual disability by decades.287

277.
See id. at 430.
278.
See id. at 430–32.
279.
Id. at 430.
280.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1), (4) (2019).
281.
Williams, supra note 243.
282.
299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam).
283.
Phillips v. State, 894 So. 2d 28, 32 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Phillips v.
State, 984 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
284.
Phillips, 984 So. 2d at 509.
285.
Id.
286.
213 So. 3d 340, 340 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam), overruled by Phillips v. State,
299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam).
287.
See Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1015.
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Florida’s intellectual disability statute, barring execution of the
intellectually disabled in the wake of Atkins in 2002, could have been
interpreted consistently with Eighth Amendment protections.288 But the
Florida Supreme Court erroneously interpreted Florida’s statute to arrive at an
unconstitutional result in Cherry v. State.289 During Cherry’s evidentiary
hearing on intellectual disability, one expert testified about the wide range of
IQ scores that could be the basis for an intellectual disability diagnosis.290 He
stated that the DSM-IV, “guides us to look at IQ scores as being a range rather
than an absolute. And the [DSM-IV] manual talks about a score from 65, a
band, so to speak, from 65–75—and of course, lower than 65—comprising
mental retardation.”291 Despite the information about the medical consensus
in diagnostic criteria on the face of the record in the Cherry case, the Court
interpreted Florida’s statute to establish a strict IQ threshold of 70 for
intellectual disability.292 The Court denied Cherry’s claim that he was exempt
from a death sentence because he had an IQ of 72 rather than 70.293
As in Hall, and in concert with the unanimous consensus of the
medical community, the flaws and imprecision in IQ test scores make them a
poor vehicle for diagnosis, when used alone.294 IQ measurement accounts for
a less than perfect range, especially with multiple and repeated testing that
results in variable test scores.295 There are many reasons for IQ test score
fluctuations, with most of them not having to do with effort—a common
reason attributed to test score variability by experts, especially in Hall.296 IQ
scores within a low range should lead to a full, multifactored consideration of
adaptive functioning in order to improve diagnostic precision and reduce the
risk of executing intellectually disabled people in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.297
288.

See FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019).
As used in this section, the term “intellectually disabled” [] means
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently
with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from
conception to age [eighteen]. The term “significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning,” . . . means performance that is two or more standard
deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.

Id.
289.
959 So. 2d 702, 714 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701 (2014).
290.
Id. at 711–12.
291.
Id.
292.
Id. at 713.
293.
Id. at 714.
294.
See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722 (2014).
295.
Id. at 712–13.
296.
Id. at 713; TASSÉ & BLUME, supra note 31, at 90–98.
297.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2278
(2015); AAIDD-11, supra note 2, at 43–45.
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In Hall, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the
Supreme Court of Florida’s erroneous statutory interpretation that led to the
IQ threshold of 70 in Cherry.298 Using the definitions established by the
medical community and established medical practice, the Supreme Court of
the United States underscored the importance of the standard error of
measurement in IQ testing.299 Scientific advancements, coupled with the
statewide trend rejecting a strict 70 cut-off, “provide strong evidence . . . that
our society does not regard this strict cut-off as proper or humane.”300 The
Court concluded, “the Florida statute, as interpreted by its courts, is
unconstitutional” because “[i]ntellectual disability is a condition, not a
number.”301
Only four years ago in Walls, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized
the sweeping importance of medical consensus in intellectual disability
determinations and established that Hall was retroactive under Stovall v.
Deno.302 The court held that overruling the unconstitutional reading of Florida
statute in Cherry was a constitutional development of “fundamental
significance.”303 The Walls court reasoned that the Supreme Court of the
United States’ rejection of a strict IQ cut-off of 70 increased the number of
people exempt from the death penalty and encouraged a more holistic review
of intellectual disability as a bar to the death penalty.304 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court of Florida concluded that, “Hall warrants retroactive
application as a development of fundamental significance that places beyond
the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence—the sentence of
death for individuals within a broader range of IQ scores than before.”305
While courts and intellectuals may differ on the application of the
federal retroactivity doctrine in Walls and Phillips, denying Florida’s deathsentenced population the benefit of scientific advancements in the diagnosis
of intellectual disability promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Hall violates the promise of Atkins and the Eighth Amendment.306
Rolling back the standards to the point where a defendant like Cherry—who
298.
Hall, 572 U.S. at 711–14, 721; see also Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702,
713 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam), abrogated by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 701 (2014).
299.
See Hall, 572 U.S. at 710–14.
300.
Id. at 718.
301.
See id. at 721, 723; DSM-5, supra note 2, at 37.
302.
388 U.S. 293 (1967); see also Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla.
2016) (per curiam) overruled by Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam).
303.
See Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346.
304.
Id.
305.
Id.
306.
Id.; contra Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013, 1014 (Fla. 2020) (per curiam);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710–14 (2014); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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might be denied a claim that he is exempt from the death penalty because he
had a single IQ score of 72—is inconsistent with current diagnostic criteria
and the Constitution.307 For more than two decades, the Supreme Court of the
United States has pronounced, “the Constitution ‘restricts . . . the State’s power
to take the life of’ any intellectually disabled individual.”308 As science
broadens the definition of intellectual disability, the law must follow suit.309
The abrupt change mandated by the ill-considered Phillips decision, which
essentially nullifies the application of scientific consensus in intellectual
disability diagnosis by reestablishing a strict IQ limit of 70, is but the most
recent example of Florida law lagging far behind science.310 As a result,
Florida will continue to execute the intellectually disabled in violation of
Atkins, Hall, Moore I, Moore II, and the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.311
VII.

CONCLUSION

Atkins, Hall, and Moore set forth minimum standards for intellectual
disability as a bar to the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.312 While state legislatures and state courts have
some freedom to define intellectual disability in different ways, they may not
“diminish the force of the medical community’s consensus.”313 Florida law,
as enacted by the legislature and enforced by the courts, lags far behind current
scientific understandings of intellectual disability.314 Medical consensus now
views the age of onset as greater than eighteen.315 IQ must be viewed as a
range, not a single number.316 By continuing to apply an obsolete definition
of adaptive functioning and requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence,
Florida’s standards for intellectual disability, as a bar to the imposition of the
death penalty, remain much more wrong than right.317
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See Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346; Hall, 572 U.S. at 710–14.
308.
Moore v. Texas (Moore I), 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct.
666 (2019) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321) (emphasis added); see also Hall, 572 U.S. at 708;
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
309.
See Hall, 572 U.S. at 710; Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
310.
Phillips, 299 So. 3d at 1024.
311.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1053; Hall,
572 U.S. at 714; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
312.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1048; Moore II, 139 S.
Ct. at 672; Hall, 572 U.S. at 707–08; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
313.
Moore I, 137 S. Ct. at 1044.
314.
See Greenspan & Olley, supra note 31, at 194.
315.
Greenspan, supra note 77, at 70–71.
316.
See Hall, 572 U.S. at 712–14.
317.
Id. at 723; see also Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 230.
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INTRODUCTION

Courts impose roadblocks for employment discrimination plaintiffs
that simply do not exist for other classes of civil plaintiffs.1 Prospective
plaintiffs are forced to navigate intricate and burdensome administrative
remedies prior to initiating litigation, which in Florida, have the unique
ability to effectively bar a plaintiff’s right to civil adjudication.2 Each year,
an alarming number of discrimination claims brought under the Florida Civil
Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”)3 never see the inside of a civil courtroom.4
While some discrimination claims are denied access to Florida’s courts for
lack of merit, a great deal more are falling through the cracks of Florida’s
current workshare agreement between the two agencies that investigate
violations of the statute.5
While this Comment seeks to analyze a procedural problem within
the administrative remedies exclusive to the FCRA, a thorough analysis
mandates both reference to, and comparison of, the administrative remedies
1.
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2001).
2.
Kenneth M. Curtin, Administrative Pitfalls of Litigating Under the Florida
Civil Rights Act, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 523, 537 (2001).
3.
FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01–.11, 509.092 (2019).
4.
See, e.g., FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2017–2018: A FISCAL
YEAR IN REVIEW 9 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FC ANN. REP.].
5.
See discussion infra Part III; U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FY
2017 EEOC/FEPA WORKSHARING AGREEMENT, WORKSHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS AND THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 2 (2017) [hereinafter WORKSHARE AGREEMENT].
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under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).6 In fact, it is
the very way in which the agencies that enforce both laws interact in Florida
that this Comment suggests has created unequal access to justice under the
FCRA.7 Part II of this Comment will analyze anti-discrimination litigation
in Florida and explore the pros and cons of litigating under the FCRA.8 This
section will include both an overview of the administrative remedies
mandated under the statute and a numerical representation of how many
claims are subsequently denied access to Florida’s civil courtrooms each
year.9 Part III will outline the procedural problem created by Florida’s
workshare agreement, starting with its creation through contract to its
solidification through Florida case law.10 Part IV will address issues of
constitutionality, equal protection, and due process.11 Part V will briefly
touch on the long-standing problem’s current relevance, and Part VI will
advance multiple solutions while discussing the impact that pending
legislation may have on issues alleged herein.12
II.

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA

“[T]he United States is a land of dual sovereigns,” affording
protection to employees under both federal and state law.13 Federal law
prohibits employment discrimination under Title VII in addition to a plethora
of other “class-specific” laws including, but not limited to, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“AEDA”),14 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),15 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(“EPA”).16 In Florida, state law prohibits employment discrimination under
the FCRA.17 While the FCRA was closely patterned after Title VII and
shares significant overlap with its federal counterpart, Title VII and the
FCRA comprise distinct causes of action with considerable differences in

6.

See discussion infra Section II.B; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Curtin, supra note 2,

at 523.
7.
See discussion infra Part III; WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 1.
8.
See discussion infra Part II.
9.
See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
10.
See discussion infra Part III.
11.
See discussion infra Part IV.
12.
See discussion infra Parts V, VI.
13.
See Curtin, supra note 2, at 524.
14.
The
Florida
Civil
Rights
Act,
FINDLAW,
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-florida-civil-rights-act.html (last updated
May 26, 2016); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–626.
15.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103.
16.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
17.
FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01–.11, 509.092 (2019).
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scope and administrative schemes.18 The most notable departure between the
FCRA and Title VII is the impact that administrative remedies have on an
aggrieved party’s ability to seek redress in a civil courtroom.19
While many Florida employees may have viable claims under both
Title VII and the FCRA, the FCRA is attractive to prospective plaintiffs for a
multitude of reasons.20 Notwithstanding a defendant’s opportunity for
removal based on diversity, the FCRA allows a plaintiff to seek redress for
employment discrimination in state court.21 State courts draw their jurors
from the county in which the court sits as opposed to a district-wide pool,
allowing victims of discrimination the greatest opportunity to have their
claims adjudicated by a jury of like persons.22 It has been well documented
that employment discrimination plaintiffs experience significantly low
success rates in federal courts, particularly when their claims are adjudicated
by a judge.23 Thus, the advantage of litigating employment discrimination in
state courts cannot be understated.24
A.

A Brief History of the Florida Civil Rights Act

Put simply, the FCRA is Florida’s state law prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex . . .
national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.”25 The FCRA was enacted
in 1992, the year after Congress amended Title VII. 26 Among the most
notable amendments to Title VII were provisions that allowed for the
recovery of punitive and compensatory damages and the right to a jury trial
for plaintiffs seeking such relief.27 States, including Florida, moved to
expand the traditional coverage of their anti-discrimination statutes to match
or exceed the new protections of Title VII. 28 Florida’s new law closely
mirrored Title VII—enacting comparable remedies, guaranteeing plaintiffs a
right to a jury trial, and imposing the same pre-suit duty to “exhaust
18.
Curtin, supra note 2, at 524.
19.
See Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891,
895 (Fla. 2002).
20.
Curtin, supra note 2, at 525; 28 U.S.C. §1332.
21.
28 U.S.C. § 1332; FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2019).
22.
See FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (2019); Selmi, supra note 1, at 560.
23.
See Selmi, supra note 1, at 560; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab,
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 103, 103 (2009).
24.
See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 23, at 119.
25.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.01(2) (2019).
26.
RICK JOHNSON & ELIZABETH OAKES, NAT’L EMP’T LAWS. ASS’N, FLA.
CHAPTER, THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS: A ROGUE AGENCY 7–8 (2012).
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 8.
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administrative remedies.”29 However, the Florida Legislature added a unique
feature in which a claim under the FCRA could be barred by an
administrative finding of no cause, discussed in detail below.30
B.

A Crash Course in Administrative Remedies

As a general principle, the law requires that “[w]here adequate
administrative remedies are available, it is improper to seek relief in court
before those remedies are exhausted.”31 At their inception, both Title VII
and the FCRA either created or designated an administrative agency tasked
with supporting the enforcement of their provisions.32 Title VII created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the FCRA
greatly expanded the authority of the pre-existing Florida Commission on
Both agencies provide
Human Relations (“Florida Commission”).33
prospective plaintiffs the opportunity to engage in pre-litigation mediation
and conciliation efforts, and both the EEOC and the Florida Commission
hold varying degrees of authority to litigate claims on a plaintiff’s behalf.34
Because both Title VII and the FCRA proscribe such remedies, both laws
mandate a plaintiff to exhaust said remedies as a condition precedent to
Plaintiffs that file suit before exhausting
commencing litigation.35
administrative remedies are subject to the complete dismissal of their
claims.36
The “exhaustion of administrative remedies” generally begins with
the filing of a charge of discrimination.37 Notwithstanding the workshare
that is the subject of this Comment, plaintiffs seeking redress under federal
law are required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, whereas
plaintiffs seeking redress under the FCRA are required to file a charge of
discrimination with the Florida Commission.38 While both the EEOC and
29.
See id.; The Florida Civil Rights Act, supra note 14.
30.
JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 8–9.
31.
Palm Lake Partners II, LLC v. C & C Powerline, Inc., 38 So. 3d 844, 853
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Communities Fin. Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Regul.,
416 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
32.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4(a); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 760.03–.05 (2019).
33.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4(a); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 760.03–.06.
34.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4(g)(6); FLA. STAT. § 760.11.
35.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f); FLA. STAT. § 760.07.
36.
See Sheridan v. State Dep’t of Health, 182 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2016); Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019).
37.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 10–11; Filing a Lawsuit, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/filing-lawsuit (last visited Dec. 14,
2020).
38.
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–4(g) with FLA. STAT. § 760.11.
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the FCRA work to prevent discrimination before it occurs, the main function
of both agencies is to accept complaints from persons who feel they have
been discriminated against, investigate the charges, and issue a finding.39
An agency determination made by the EEOC and the Florida
Moreover, an agency
Commission do not take identical forms.40
determination has a dissimilar impact on a claimant’s ability to pursue civil
litigation under each respective law.41 A finding made by the EEOC,
regardless of cause, does not preclude a timely federal lawsuit under Title
VII.42 Conversely, the FCRA “clearly delineates when, and under what
circumstances, a civil action may be filed for unlawful discrimination,”
which occurs in only two distinct circumstances.43
1.

The Rigid Administrative Structure of the Florida Civil Rights Act

The FCRA provides that any person alleging a violation of the
statute “may file a complaint with the [Florida] Commission within 365 days
of the alleged violation,” and grants authority to the Florida Commission and
Florida’s Attorney General to file suit on behalf of an aggrieved party.44
Notwithstanding the statutory use of the word “may,” all persons seeking
relief must file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission or an
agency authorized to accept service on its behalf.45 The Florida Commission
is then responsible for investigating the charge and issuing a determination
within 180 days.46
A finding issued by the Florida Commission takes one of three
47
forms.
If the Florida Commission determines that there is “reasonable
cause” to believe discrimination took place, the party is free to bring a civil
action in a court of competent jurisdiction after a finding of cause is issued.48
While the Florida Commission makes every effort to issue a determination
within the statutory timeframe of 180 days, if a determination is not issued,
39.
See Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited Dec. 14, 2020); FLA. STAT. § 760.05; JOHNSON &
OAKES, supra note 26, at 5.
40.
See discussion infra Part III.C; Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 895–96 (Fla. 2002).
41.
See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 894–95.
42.
Id. at 895.
43.
Sheridan v. State Dep’t of Health, 182 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2016).
44.
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(1).
45.
Id.; see also Sheridan, 182 So. 3d at 789.
46.
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(3).
47.
Id. § 760.11(1).
48.
Id. § 760.11(4).
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the party is likewise free to proceed to court as if a cause determination had
been issued.49 However, if the Florida Commission determines that there is
“not reasonable cause” (“no cause”) to believe that discrimination took place,
it must dismiss the complaint and the charging party cannot file a civil
lawsuit alleging discrimination under the FCRA.50
If a finding of no cause is issued, an aggrieved party’s only remedy
is to request an administrative hearing before the Division of Administrative
Hearings (“DOAH”).51 If the claimant either fails to petition for an
administrative hearing within thirty-five days of the no cause determination
or the hearing results in an affirmation of no cause, the claimant’s civil
claims are barred.52 In summation, a claim under the FCRA can proceed to a
civil jury trial if, and only if, either a finding of cause has been found, or 180
days have elapsed without a finding issued by the Florida Commission.53
Claimants who receive a finding of no cause by the Florida Commission,
while free to appeal the determination, are ultimately prevented from having
the matter adjudicated by a jury of their peers.54 Despite its express terms
that the FCRA must be liberally construed to further its purposes and to
“preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the legislature,”55 a
significant number of claims are prevented from accessing Florida’s court
system by the investigatory conclusions of the Florida Commission.56
2.

Painting a Numerical Picture

Using the last year of available data, the Florida Commission issued
745 no cause findings in comparison to thirty-three reasonable cause findings
for the fiscal year of 2017–2018.57 Previous years reported very similar
trends of no cause findings.58 Analyzing the seven years of statistical data
49.
Id. § 760.11(8); see also Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla.,
Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002).
50.
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7); see also Sheridan, 182 So. 3d at 790.
51.
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7); see also JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26 at 35.
52.
FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7).
53.
See Sheridan, 182 So. 3d at 790.
54.
Id. at 792.
55.
Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000).; see also
FLA. STAT. § 760.01(3) (2019).
56.
See, e.g., 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
57.
Id.
58.
Compare id., with FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2016–2017:
A FISCAL YEAR IN REVIEW 11 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 FC ANN. REP.]; FLA. COMM’N ON HUM.
RELS., ANN. REP. 2015–2016: A FISCAL YEAR IN REVIEW 11 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 FC
ANN. REP.]; FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2014–2015 11 (2015) [hereinafter 2015
FC ANN. REP.]; FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2013–2014: A FISCAL YEAR IN
REVIEW 6 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 FC ANN. REP.]; FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP.
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available from the years spanning 2011–2018, the lowest number of no cause
findings reported was 64559 and the highest was 998.60 While no cause
findings have remained relatively constant, findings of cause made by the
Florida Commission have plummeted exponentially.61 From five years
leading up to 2015, an average of 146 claims issued a finding of reasonable
cause were reported.62 In the years 2016, 2017, and 2018, findings of
reasonable cause dropped to seventy-three, thirty-nine, and thirty-three,
respectively.63
It is important to note that a large volume of charges received by the
Florida Commission are not resolved within the statutory time frame,
allowing plaintiffs to proceed to litigation virtually by chance.64 An alarming
fifty percent of claims filed with the Florida Commission between 2017–
2018 were not closed within the statutory time frame.65 In effect, plaintiffs
that desire the opportunity to litigate may even hope that the Florida
Commission drags its feet instead of barring their claims outright through a
finding of no cause.66 The claims subject to the Florida Commission’s
jurisdiction under the current workshare are, thus, subject to a metaphorical
lottery.67 While most claims are issued a finding of no cause and prevented
from litigating, a large majority also skate through essentially, by
happenstance.68
Despite the large number of discrimination charges that are blocked
from pursuit in civil courts, employment discrimination cases account for an
alarmingly miniscule amount of total civil claims filed annually in Florida
state courts.69 Revisiting the last year of data issued by the Florida
2012–2013: A FISCAL YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 FC ANN. REP.]; FLA.
COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2011–2012: A FISCAL YEAR IN REVIEW 6 (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 FC ANN. REP.]; and FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., ANN. REP. 2010–2011: A
FISCAL YEAR IN REVIEW 8 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FC ANN. REP.].
59.
2015 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11.
60.
2017 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11.
61.
See, e.g., 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
62.
Compare 2011 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 8, with 2012 FC ANN.
REP., supra note 58 at 6, 2013 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 6, 2014 FC ANN. REP., supra
note 58, at 6, and 2015 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11.
63.
2016 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2017 FC ANN. REP., supra
note 58, at 11; 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
64.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11(8) (2019).
65.
See 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 9.
66.
Compare 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10, with FLA. STAT. §
760.11.
67.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11(8).
68.
2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
69.
See FLA. OFF. OF STATE CT. ADMIN., FY 2017–2018 STATISTICAL
REFERENCE GUIDE 4-4 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 CIRCUIT CIVIL FILINGS].
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Commission for 2017–2018, that same year the Florida Office of the State
Court Administrator reported a total of 1,717 “Employment Discrimination
or Other” circuit civil cases filed in the state.70
Moreover, while 1,717 employment discrimination claims were filed
in Florida state courts between 2017–2018, that number represents less than
one percent of the total 164,253 civil court filings that year.71 In fact,
employment discrimination cases have never exceeded more than one
percent of annual circuit civil filings in Florida for any year spanning the last
decade.72 While administrative remedies pose an important function as
discussed below, employment discrimination claims are hardly flooding the
court dockets and overwhelming our justice system.73
3.

Policy Rationales for Mandating Administrative Remedies

Mandating a duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to litigation helps to support the integrity of the administrative
process as a whole by “allow[ing] the executive branch to carry out its
responsibilities as a co-equal branch of government.”74 Advocates argue that
administrative remedies in employment discrimination cases help conserve
valuable judicial resources by preventing meritless claims and providing
parties with the opportunity to vindicate credible claims without judicial
intervention.75 One of the main arguments advanced in support of
administrative remedies is that immediate judicial access has the potential to
weaken the effectiveness of an agency by allowing people to ignore, or
otherwise circumvent, their procedures.76
4.

Criticisms of Imposing Administrative Remedies

Administrative agencies, including both the EEOC and the Florida
Commission, have been widely criticized for being overworked and
ineffective due to increasing workloads absent corresponding increases in
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 4-15.
72.
See, e.g., FLA. OFF. OF STATE CT. ADMIN., FY 2018–2019 STATISTICAL
REFERENCE GUIDE 4-4 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 CIRCUIT CIVIL FILINGS].
73.
See id. at 4-5.
74.
Santana v. Henry, 12 So. 3d 843, 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Key Haven Associated Enters. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Imp. Trust Fund, 427
So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1982); Seann M. Frazier et. al., Choice of Forum in Florida’s
Administrative and Circuit Courts: A Review of the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies, FLA. BAR J. July–Aug. 1997, at 62, 63.
75.
Santana, 12 So. 3d at 846.
76.
Id.
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staff and budget.77
The Florida Commission has been specifically
characterized by employment attorneys representing plaintiffs as a politically
charged organization that cares more about combating frivolous suits than
establishing equal opportunity.78 Nevertheless, the law appears clear that
administrative remedies are here to stay as courts consistently uphold and
enforce administrative mandates despite the frequency in which they are
challenged.79
III.

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM: FLORIDA’S WORKSHARE
AGREEMENT

In Florida, not all charges of discrimination are subject to the
stringent determination standards of the Florida Commission and
subsequently, are denied access to our courts.80 Florida, like many other
states, currently employs a workshare agreement with the EEOC to process
and investigate charges of discrimination.81 The failure to adopt uniform
agency determinations, or otherwise define the legal effect of an EEOC
determination on FCRA claims, brought significant confusion to state courts
during the infancy years of Florida’s workshare.82 As courts interpreted the
legal effect of a dual-filed charge under Florida’s current workshare, a
procedural system that favors one jurisdiction over the other has irrefutably
emerged.83

77.
JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 7; Maryam Jameel & Joe Yerardi,
Despite Legal Protections, Most Workers Who Face Discrimination Are on Their Own, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 28, 2019), http://publicintegrity.org/inequality-povertyopportunity/workers-rights/workplace-inequities/injustice-at-work/workplace-discriminationcases/.
78.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 34.
79.
See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2019); Woodham v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 898 (Fla. 2002); Sheridan v. State
Dep’t of Health, 182 So. 3d 787, 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016); McElrath v. Burley, 707
So. 2d 836, 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
80.
See WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 2; U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FY 2019 EXTENSION OF WORKSHARING AGREEMENT (2019)
[hereinafter WORKSHARE EXTENSION]. The original workshare contract and the recent
extension is available for viewing by clicking the link located on the Florida Commissions
Website. Employment: EEOC Worksharing Agreement, FLA. COMM’N HUM. RELS.,
http://fchr.myflorida.com/employment (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
81.
Employment: EEOC Worksharing Agreement, supra note 80.
82.
See Curtin, supra note 2, at 531–32.
83.
See discussion infra Section III.C; WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note
5, at 2; WORKSHARE EXTENSION, supra note 80.
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The Basic FEPA Workshare

The Florida Commission is just one of ninety-two state and local
Fair Employment Practice Agencies (“FEPA”) that the EEOC currently
contracts with through annual work sharing agreements.84 In recognition of
the procedural overlap bound to arise under both federal and state
protections, Congress authorized the EEOC to cooperate with state agencies
by entering into work sharing agreements that provide for division of labor in
processing charges of discrimination where there is concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction.85 These workshares simultaneously help agencies avoid
duplicative investigations of the same allegations while helping plaintiffs
preserve their rights under both state and federal law.86
B.

Florida’s Workshare Agreement

Under Florida’s current workshare agreement, the EEOC and the
Florida Commission each designate the other as an agent for the purposes of
receiving and processing charges, thus allowing a party to elect to “dual-file”
a charge of discrimination with both agencies.87 Dually filed charges can be
submitted to either the EEOC or the Florida Commission but are recognized
as filed with both agencies.88 While charges can be transferred between
agencies in accordance with the workshare agreement or by mutual
agreement, the agency that receives the charge first will generally retain it for
investigation.89 Thus, each charge of discrimination is subject to the
investigatory finding of the agency that receives and retains the charge.90
The original statutory scheme of Title VII anticipated that all charges
would first be investigated by a deferral agency, such as the Florida
Commission, and subsequently reviewed by the EEOC.91 However,
overwhelming workloads have caused the EEOC to instead “utilize a work-

84.
See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2018-2022, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/us-equal-employment-opportunity-commission-eeoc-strategic-planfiscal-years-2018-2022 (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
85.
Barbara J. Fick, Of Time Limits, Worksharing and Deferral, 8 1987
PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 226, 226 (1988).
86.
Id. at 228.
87.
See WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 2.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Fick, supra note 85, at 226.
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splitting procedure.”92 The current workshare agreement “divides the
principle jurisdiction of the agencies geographically, with the [Florida
Commission] processing most dual-filed claims in North Florida and the
EEOC processing most claims from South Florida.”93 Although the right is
not frequently exerted, “each agency maintains jurisdiction to perform a
substantial weight review of the determination[]” issued by the other.94
While “[t]he division of work is not solely [calculated] based on geography,”
the large majority of claims are divided by this standard.95
Importantly, the EEOC and the Florida Commission do not share
uniform investigatory processes, nor do they issue the same categories of
conclusions.96 The impact of these conclusions has a disparate impact on a
claimant’s ability to pursue their claims in a civil courtroom.97 The lack of
uniformity in agency findings under the current workshare agreement, in
conjunction with the legal effect of an EEOC determination as refined by

92.
The Florida Civil Rights Act, supra note 14; see also Donna Ballman, Is
the Florida Commission on Human Relations A Malignant Force Against Employees?,
LEXISNEXIS:
LEGAL
NEWSROOM
(Dec.
13,
2012),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/labor-employment/b/labor-employment-topblogs/posts/is-the-florida-commission-on-human-relations-a-malignant-force-againstemployees. It is important to note that the Workshare agreement itself is silent on
geographical jurisdiction. WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 1–6. However, upon
visiting a plethora of Employment firms’ websites, every law firm in North Florida mentions a
charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission whereas every law firm in South
Florida references the EEOC. E.g., Employment Law Attorneys, DOLMAN L. GRP.,
http://www.dolmanlaw.com/legal-services/employment-law-attorneys/ (last visited Dec. 14,
2020); Employment Discrimination | Processing a Discrimination Claim with the FCHR,
PRINTY & PRINTY, P.A. (June 29, 2016), http://printylawfirm.com/employment-discriminationdiscr-process/. This could be, in large part, because the Florida Commission’s headquarters
are located in Tallahassee whereas the EEOC’s Florida office is located in Miami. Compare
2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 25, with Miami District Office, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/field-office/miami/location (last visited Dec. 14,
2020). Notwithstanding current administrative orders allowing electronic submission of
charges in light of COVID-19, charges of discrimination have to be filed in person. See
Miami District Office, supra. This requirement lends support to the position that the
workshare defines geographical jurisdiction in an unpublished document. The Florida Civil
Rights Act, supra note 14. Regardless of whether this geographical boundary exists in a
document not available to the public or merely exists in common practice, the issues raised
herein remain the same. Id.; WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 2.
93.
The Florida Civil Rights Act, supra note 14.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
See discussion infra Section III.C; compare FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2019),
with Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2002).
97.
See Curtin, supra note 2, at 533.
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case law, has inadvertently created unequal access to justice under the
FCRA.98
C.

The Legal Effect of an EEOC Determination

Although the workshare itself is silent on the reciprocity of agency
determinations, the Florida Commission expressly states on its website that
“the determination issued by the EEOC serves as the determination of both
agencies.”99 However, the EEOC and the Florida Commission do not share
uniform determination decisions, which creates conflict under the rigid presuit mandates of the FCRA.100 A finding issued by the Florida Commission
issues one of two concrete findings: cause or no cause.101 On the other hand,
a standard EEOC determination form lists ten applicable findings that can be
checked by the investigator.102 These include a multitude of procedural
bases for dismissal including, “failed to provide information . . . or otherwise
failed to cooperate,” listed as box five, and while “reasonable efforts were
made to locate you, we were not able to do so,” listed as box six.103
Importantly, the large majority of claims receive the following determination
that the Florida Commission does not offer:
The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its
investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information
obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not
certify that the Respondent is in compliance with the statutes. No
finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as
104
having been raised by this charge.

There was early confusion as to whether an “unable to conclude”
finding operated as a finding of no cause under the workshare and precluded
suit under the FCRA, producing an early string of inconsistent case law.105
98.
See id. at 523–24.
99.
You Ask We Answer: Case Status with the EEOC, FLA. COMM’N ON HUM.
RELS., http://fchr.myflorida.com/faq-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
100.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 760.11, with Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 893.
101.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 760.11(3)–(8).
102.
Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 893.
103.
Segura v. Hunter Douglas Fabrication Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231
(M.D. Fla. 2002).
104.
Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 893; see also FLA. STAT. § 760.11.
105.
Compare Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 893, with Cisko v. Phoenix Med.
Prods., Inc., 797 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing lower courts’ refusal
to equate unable to conclude with no reasonable cause), and White v. City of Pompano Beach,
813 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to equate unable to conclude
with no reasonable cause).
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The Supreme Court of Florida resolved the issue in the case of Woodham v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. Inc.,106 refusing to equate “unable to
conclude” with a determination that “there is not reasonable cause.”107 The
court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be contrary to the plain language
of the statute and incompatible with the court’s requirement to “liberally
constr[ue] the FCRA in favor of a remedy for those who are victims of
discrimination . . . .”108 In reaching their holding, the Supreme Court of
Florida expressly concluded that the language used by the EEOC does not
state the claim was dismissed for lack of merit, but rather that it lacked
sufficient information from which to make a determination.109
It has been close to two decades since the ruling of Woodham, and as
of yet, the Florida Commission has yet to adopt an analogous finding of
“unable to conclude.”110 While the Supreme Court of Florida granted review
of Woodham because they found the question raised therein to be of “great
public importance,” the court’s answer begs the exploration of more
questions.111
1.

Access to Information v. Lack of Merit

It strains logic to believe that the Florida Commission has the staff
and resources to thoroughly investigate every charge of discrimination it
receives and render a determination exclusively on merit, while the EEOC
brazenly admits that it cannot.112 In general, attorneys representing victims
of employment discrimination often initiate cases based on substantially less
information than an attorney might possess for other types of claims. 113
“Employers often do not provide reasons for their employment decisions . . .
.”114 Frequently, the information necessary to corroborate a plaintiff’s
allegations lies within the exclusive knowledge and control of their
employers.115 In many cases, attorneys are forced to initiate suit with little
more than the word of the plaintiff.116

106.
829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002).
107.
Id. at 897.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 896–97.
110.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2019); Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 893.
111.
See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 892.
112.
See id. at 896.
113.
See Selmi, supra note 1, at 556, 558, 570.
114.
Id. at 570.
115.
See Lonny Scheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice:
The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 217 (2007).
116.
See Selmi, supra note 1, at 570.
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Naturally, employees likewise have limited information at their
disposal when they file a charge of discrimination with the Florida
Commission.117 While the Florida Commission utilizes a variety of factfinding models to collect information, this process undeniably falls short of
formal discovery proceedings.118 First and foremost, investigations are
conducted by investigators, not licensed attorneys.119 Despite the Florida
Commission’s express statement that “[i]t is the [i]nvestigator’s job to
determine if the evidence is relevant to [the] charge,” these investigators
arguably lack the legal expertise necessary to render such determinations.120
Generally, the Florida Commission gathers information by sending
respondents and witnesses a generic “request for information.”121 These
requests contain form questions and are not tailored to the facts of a
particular case.122 Surely, on some occasions, employers and witnesses fail
to respond to a request for information altogether.123 While the Florida
Commission has the authority to compel the cooperation and testimony of
witnesses through subpoenas, the agency does not publish any statistical data
on the frequency in which that right is exercised.124 While the Florida
Commission states that such a failure would allow for an inference “that such
information is adverse to the respondent’s interest” in rendering a
determination of cause,125 the statistical data does not support that this
happens frequently.126 Moreover, if a witness does appear before the Florida
Commission, the interview is conducted absent plaintiff’s counsel, and thus
outside of the adversarial system of justice on which our legal system was
founded.127
2.

Legislative Intent in Light of “Unable to Conclude”

In the absence of an analogous, unable to conclude determination,
how then is the Florida Commission inclined to rule if they lack the

117.
118.

See id.
See FLA. COMM’N

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 20–24.
See id. at 24.
See FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., supra note 118, at 25.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
See FLA. COMM’N ON HUM. RELS., supra note 118, at 25.

ON

HUM. RELS., INVESTIGATOR TRAINING MANUAL 16

(2005).
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information necessary to render a determination on the merits of a charge? 128
Courts tasked with interpreting the intent of the Florida Legislature have
held:
[p]roblematically, by employing a technical use of the English
language, the second category [of “no cause”] is broader than
intended and includes all possible outcomes other than a reasonable
cause finding. The Florida Legislature used “reasonable cause” to
describe the first category and “not reasonable cause” to describe the
second category.
‘Not reasonable cause’ is the negative of
‘reasonable cause.’ That is, ‘not reasonable cause’ is every response
other than a finding of reasonable cause. 129

Using the framework of this analysis, the category of “not reasonable
cause” would encompass all scenarios in which “reasonable cause” was not
expressly found.130 Findings of no cause axiomatically include no cause
found due to lack of information for any number, or combination, of
informational asymmetries.131 This Comment suggests that the no cause
issued by the Florida Commission is a misnomer and should be categorized
as “unable to conclude” when the situation demands.132
The procedural problem alleged in this Comment was created by
contract and has been solidified through decades of Florida case law.133
Under the current workshare, charges filed in the EEOC’s jurisdiction will
most likely result in a determination of “unable to conclude,” whereas
charges filed in the Florida Commission’s jurisdiction will likely result in a
determination of no cause.134 By extension, charges filed in the EEOC’s
jurisdiction have greater access to the statutory right to a jury trial under the
FCRA, whereas the majority of charges filed in the Florida Commission’s
jurisdiction will be barred.135 In synthesizing case law with the current state
of the workshare agreement, it seems clear that the greatest opportunity for
128.
See Segura v. Hunter Douglas Fabrication Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1227,
1231–32 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
129.
Id. at 1231.
130.
See id.
131.
See id.
132.
Compare id. (analyzing the intent of the Florida legislature to conclude
that a finding of no cause is issued where anything other than cause is found), with Woodham
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 896 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to equate
unable to conclude with lack of merit).
133.
See Segura, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1232; Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 892, 897;
WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 1.
134.
Compare Ballman, supra note 92, with 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4,
at 10.
135.
See Ballman, supra note 92; 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 11.
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civil redress strongly favors those plaintiffs within the EEOC’s
jurisdiction.136 A plaintiff’s access to the remedies prescribed by the statute
is therefore being delineated by arbitrary geographical boundaries rather than
afforded exclusively on merit.137
IV.
A.

QUESTIONS OF EQUAL ACCESS AND DUE PROCESS

A Direct Assault on the Constitutionality of the Florida Commission

The administrative remedies imposed by the FCRA have been
directly challenged as an unconstitutional access to courts and a deprivation
of due process of law.138 In McElrath v. Burley,139 a plaintiff, who received a
no cause determination from the Florida Commission, sued the executive
director in his official capacity seeking to have the procedures governing a
party’s ability to sue declared unconstitutional.140
Burley argued that the administrative procedures governing a party’s
ability to seek civil redress were “unconstitutional as a denial of access to
[the] courts and violative of due process and equal protection.”141 Plaintiff’s
constitutional challenge did not stem from any issues arising under the
workshare agreement between the EEOC and the Florida Commission.142
Rather, Burley argued that the statute unconstitutionally allowed “claimants
whose claims are not processed within 180 days, regardless of merit, have
the right to proceed directly to circuit court without having to go through the
administrative process to which the statute relegated [her] . . . .”143 Burley
argued two plaintiffs with identical charges are being treated differently
under the statute virtually by happenstance.144 The trial court agreed,
holding that the diversion from court violated the access-to-courts, dueprocess, and equal-protection provisions of the Florida Constitution and
declared the no cause provision of the FCRA unconstitutional.145 The
136.
Compare WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5 at 1, with Segura, 184 F.
Supp. 2d at 1231–32 (analyzing the intent of the Florida legislature to conclude that a finding
of no cause is issued where “anything other than cause” is found), and Woodham, 829 So. 2d
at 897 (refusing to equate unable to conclude with lack of merit and allowing claimants issued
a finding of “unable to conclude” to proceed with litigation under the FCRA).
137.
See Curtin, supra note 2, at 524–25.
138.
McElrath v. Burley, 707 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
139.
707 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
140.
Id. at 838.
141.
Id.
142.
See id.
143.
Id.
144.
McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 838.
145.
Id.
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victory for discrimination plaintiffs was short-lived and was quickly reversed
by the First District Court of Appeals.146
1.

Issues of Equal Protection

While many of the conclusions reached by the First District Court of
Appeals can be rationally applied to unequal access under the workshare
agreement, the problem alleged herein can be equally distinguished.147 The
equal protection argument advanced in McElrath was that two individuals
could have similarly situated claims but receive different access to courts
based on the Florida Commission’s ability to render a timely
determination.148 The court’s main focus in this case was, arguably, to
ensure that the inability of the Florida Commission to issue any ruling within
the statutory time frame did not foreclose relief to plaintiffs through no fault
of their own.149
In rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection arguments, the court held
that “it is not necessary under the equal protection clause to treat all persons
in an identical manner.”150 An equal protection analysis employs a
“minimum scrutiny test,” which requires only that “a statute bear some
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose.”151 In employing said
test, the court held that, while a statute “may result incidentally in some
inequality, or that it is not drawn with mathematical precision[s] will not
result in its invalidity.”152 The court upheld the constitutionality of the no
cause provision on the premise that the statute itself does not contain any
classification which discriminates between charging parties by mandating all
persons seeking relief to go through the same screening process.153 The
court reasoned that it was not until a determination was made that there was
any notable divergence in the treatment of charging parties.154
While this may hold true as applied to two parties filing with the
Florida Commission, there is an arguable divergence in the treatment of
charging parties under Florida’s current intra-agency workshare, which
irrefutably results in much more than some incidental inequality.155 While
146.
Id. at 841.
147.
See id. at 839, 841.
148.
Id. at 839.
149.
McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 840.
150.
Id. at 839.
151.
Id. at 839–40.
152.
Id. at 840.
153.
Id. at 840, 841.
154.
McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 840.
155.
Compare Segura v. Hunter Douglas Fabrication Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d
1227, 1231–32 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (analyzing the intent of the Florida legislature to conclude
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equal protection may not mandate treating all persons in an identical manner,
the lack of harmony between state and federal agencies is overwhelmingly
subjecting plaintiffs to different administrative standards based solely on
where they reside.156
2.

Issues of Due Process

Under Florida’s common law, an employee was considered to hold
at-will employment, which could be terminated by his employer at any time
without incurring liability.157 The FCRA modified the common law and
“created a cause of action for unlawful termination.”158 For this reason, the
First District Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s due process challenge
in McElrath, holding that “[t]he constitutional right of access to courts
guaranteed by Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution, protects only
rights which existed at common law or by statute prior to the enactment of
the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.”159 Discrimination,
retaliation, and unlawful termination were created by the Florida Legislature,
and those particular causes of action are not afforded a constitutional right of
access to courts.160 Moreover, the court reasoned that “due process is
satisfied when a party has his ‘day in court’ by virtue of an administrative
hearing and the right to appeal to a judicial tribunal.”161
3.

The Insufficiency of an Administrative Hearing as a Remedy

This Comment suggests that the administrative hearing process
described below falls short of a plaintiff’s “day in court” as held by the First
District Court of Appeal.162 While civil due process is a flexible confine
wherein states are free to impose conditions on the right to institute litigation,
due process nonetheless demands a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way.163 Should a court impose administrative remedies, they
that a finding of no cause is issued where anything other than cause is found), with Woodham
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 896 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to equate
“unable to conclude” with “lack of merit”); see also 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
156.
See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 895; Segura, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1231–32;
2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 12.
157.
Curtin, supra note 2, at 523.
158.
Id.
159.
McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 839.
160.
See id.
161.
Id. at 841 (citing Scholastic Sys., Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So. 2d 166, 169
(Fla. 1974); see also Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Bonanno, 568 So. 2d 24, 30 (Fla.
1990) (per curiam).
162.
See Curtin, supra note 2, at 525; McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 841.
163.
See McElrath, 707 So. 2d at 841.
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must be both “available and adequate,” and cannot be so “devastating that
the proposed administrative remedies would offer too little or would be too
late.”164
A temperate glance at the reality of an administrative hearing raises
credible concerns about the adequacy of the remedy as compared to a day in
court.165 As previously detailed, the overwhelming majority of parties that
file a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission are issued a
finding of no cause and locked into the sole remedy of an administrative
hearing.166 If a hearing is successfully petitioned for within thirty-five days,
the claimant will appear before an administrative law judge for a proceeding
analogous to a bench trial.167 Even in the best-case scenario, the employee is
only entitled to lost wages and costs if able to prevail; the compensatory or
punitive damages available under the statute are not available in this
setting.168
If the administrative law judge rules in the party’s favor, a panel of
commissioners thereafter approve, reject, or modify any relief granted.169 On
the rare occasion a party is afforded relief, the employer is likely to appeal as
entitled by the statute.170 If the employee is able to prevail once again, they
must renounce and forfeit all recovery won before being entitled to proceed
to court with a jury, risking the chance of losing relief previously afforded. 171
As of 2012, it was reported that “[i]n the [twenty] years this system has been
in place, not one employee has successfully navigated [this system].”172
V.

THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF AN OLD PROCEDURAL
PROBLEM

Plaintiffs that fall within the purview of the Florida Commission’s
jurisdiction are being disproportionately denied access to Florida’s courts.173
164.
Frazier et al., supra note 74, at 63; Communities Fin. Corp. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Env’t Regul., 416 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
165.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 51.
166.
Id; see also FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7) (2019).
167.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7); JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 51.
168.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 51.
169.
Id. at 51–52.
170.
Id. at 52.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Compare Segura v. Hunter Douglas Fabrication Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d
1227, 1231–32 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (analyzing the intent of the Florida legislature to conclude
that a finding of no cause is issued where anything other than cause is found), with Woodham
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 893 (Fla. 2002) (refusing to
interpret an “unable to conclude” finding issued by the EEOC to mean that the claim lacked
merit); see also 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
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A finding of no cause deprives a plaintiff access to civil adjudication, the
opportunity for meaningful discovery, early mediation, and—ultimately—
settlement negotiations.174 While the procedural deficiency created by
Florida’s workshare is by no means a novel problem, recent events revitalize
the necessity of its resolution as new charges of discrimination are
predicted.175
A.

Florida’s Workshare and Black Lives Matter

Amidst what has been hailed America’s long overdue awakening to
systemic racism, Americans are finally engaging in meaningful, albeit
overdue, conversations about race inequality in our country.176 The Black
Lives Matter movement has empowered employees across all employment
sectors to share their lived experiences with workplace discrimination.177
The wave of firsthand accounts and the rise of public consciousness
surrounding discrimination has been said to draw parallels of the #MeToo
movement of 2017.178 Following the rise of the #MeToo movement, there
was a natural increase in sex discrimination and harassment litigation
throughout the country.179 As employees continue to take to social media to
recount their experiences of employment discrimination, law firms and
corporations alike expect a similar surge in race discrimination lawsuits in
the near future.180
If this problem remains unresolved by the Florida Legislature,
victims of race discrimination are at risk of falling through the cracks of the
current workshare agreement and being denied a voice in our civil
courtrooms.181 In fact, should the procedural problem outlined herein persist
unabated, charges of discrimination based on race will arguably be the class

174.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11(7) (2019).
175.
Id.; see also Woodham, 892 So. 2d at 893; WORKSHARE AGREEMENT,
supra note 5, at 2. This Comment suggests that the procedural problem was created at the
inception of Florida’s workshare agreement and solidified through the Supreme Court of
Florida’s ruling in Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida. Woodham, 892 So. 2d
at 893; WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 2.
176.
See Justin Worland, The Overdue Awakening: Ending centuries of racism
requires systemic change, TIME, June 22, 2020, at 26, 28.
177.
See Ellen Milligan et al., Black Lives Matter to Spark Rise in Race
Discrimination
Claims,
BLOOMBERG,
(July
17,
2020,
1:00
AM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-17/black-lives-matter-to-spark-rise-inrace-discrimination-claims.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
See e.g., 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10.
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most adversely affected.182 In any given year, the most frequent charge of
discrimination filed is on the basis of race; putting black employees living in
North Florida at the greatest risk, regardless of whether the expected increase
of employment litigation proves accurate.183
B.

Florida’s Workshare and the Expansion of Title VII

The recent expansion of Title VII likewise necessitates the resolution
of the procedural problem raised in this Comment.184 The Supreme Court of
the United States has recently decreed that Title VII’s employment
prohibitions based on sex extend to employees discriminated against on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in the consolidated cases of
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) v. R.G. & G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.,185 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,186 and
Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners.187
Like Title VII, the FCRA currently prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex but has long left the term undefined in the
statute.188 The term “sex” has been liberally construed and largely left to
182.
Id.; see also 2017 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2016 FC ANN. REP.,
supra note 58, at 11; 2015 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11. In recent years there has been
a massive influx of disability discrimination charges filed with the Florida Commission. See
2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10; 2017 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2016 FC
ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2015 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11. It may appear at
first glance that charges of discrimination filed on the basis of disability contend with, if not
surpass, charges filed on the basis of race, in the last year of available data. See 2018 FC ANN.
REP., supra note 4, at 10. However, when race and color are appropriately aggregated,
charges of discrimination based on race continue to be the most frequently filed charge. Id.
Charges based on race have led by a landslide virtually every year proceeding 2015. See id.;
2017 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2016 FC ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11; 2015 FC
ANN. REP., supra note 58, at 11. This conclusion is also supported by charge statistics
reported by the EEOC when appropriately aggregated. See WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra
note 5, at 2; Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fiscal
Year
2019
Enforcement
and
Litigation
Data
(Jan.
24,
2020)
http://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-releases-fiscal-year-2019-enforcement-and-litigationdata [hereinafter EEOC Press Release].
183.
See 2018 FC ANN. REP., supra note 4, at 10; Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
184.
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
185.
884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
Georgia 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
186.
883 F.3d 100 (2d. Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
Georgia 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
187.
723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020);
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
188.
Kelly M. Peña, LGBT Discrimination in the Workplace: What Will the
Future Hold?, FLA. BAR J., Jan. 2018, at 35, 37.

2020]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

57

judicial interpretation in Florida Courts.189 At present, it remains unclear if
and when the Florida Legislature will amend the FCRA to reflect the
inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity under the umbrella of
“sex.”190 Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s momentous ruling,
legislators have tried and failed to amend the FCRA and extend its
protections to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.191 During Florida’s 2017 legislative session, Senate Bill 666 and
House Bill 623 were both introduced for consideration, but were indefinitely
postponed and later withdrawn from consideration.192
However, the legislature need not act for new cases based on sex to
seek refuge under the FCRA.193 Not only is federal case law applicable to
FCRA claims, but “[a]ny changes to federal case law on Title VII
interpretation necessitates a change in the interpretation of the FCRA.”194
Thus, cannons of statutory interpretation and basic legal principles of stare
decisis and federal preemption support the conclusion that such claims are on
the horizon.195
VI.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

It is worth noting that an aggrieved party might still have viable
discrimination claims under Title VII or other class-specific federal laws
should the Florida Commission bar such claims under the FCRA.196 If the
Florida Legislature continues to ignore the problems the workshare creates,
North Floridians are likely to abandon litigating under the rigid confines of
the FCRA altogether in favor of the more laissez-faire scheme of Title VII.197
Thus, legislative inaction could effectively deprive Florida of its state interest
in protecting its discrimination victims while potentially stressing federal
dockets.198 Instead, this Comment advocates for three possible solutions that
could easily be undertaken by the Florida Legislature to eliminate the
problem raised by this Comment.199
189.
Id.
190.
See id. at 37–38.
191.
Id. at 36.
192.
Id. at 37.
193.
Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Wright, 217 So. 3d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2017) (en banc).
194.
Id.
195.
See id.
196.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 52.
197.
See id.
198.
See id.
199.
See id. at 50; FLA. STAT. §§ 760.40–.60 (2019); Woodham v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 897 (Fla. 2002).
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A.
Align the Determinations Issued by the Florida Commission with the
Determinations Issued by the EEOC
The most prudent solution that can be undertaken is to harmonize the
Florida Commission with the EEOC by adopting an analogous finding of
“unable to conclude.”200 This solution would honor the intent of the Florida
Legislature when the FCRA was enacted by leaving the statute largely
unchanged.201 This solution would allow the Florida Commission to
maintain its right to deny access to the FCRA when a claim is blatantly
unmeritorious.202 However, potentially credible claims that cannot be proven
or disproven within the statutory time frame would be guaranteed the right to
pursue civil redress when the situation demands.203
B.
Align the Florida Commission with Other State Fair Employment
Practice Agencies
Removing the “no cause” provision of the FCRA would naturally
align the Florida Commission with both the EEOC and the majority of state
FEPAs successfully operating throughout the country.204 The EEOC used to
have a no cause provision, and many state FEPAs continue to retain the
determination.205 The key difference lies within the impact that a finding of
no cause has on a claimant’s ability to pursue civil remedies postinvestigation.206 While various discrimination statutes may still impose the
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, the effect of a no cause
finding generally involves no more than a mere refusal of further agency
involvement.207 Under such models, the integrity of the administrative
process is preserved by keeping agencies involved in allegations and
affording them the opportunity to take action while not infringing on a
party’s access to courts.208

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 897.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2019).
Id.
See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 894.
See JOHNSON & OAKES, supra note 26, at 50–51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
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C.
Align the Florida Civil Rights Act with Florida’s Other
Discrimination Statutes
Right below the FCRA, contained within the same chapter of Florida
Statutes, lies the Florida Fair Housing Act (“FFHA”).209 Both the FCRA and
the FFHA: prohibit discrimination based on the same protected classes, are
enforced by the same agency, and require the same duty to “exhaust
administrative remedies.”210 Like Title VII, the FFHA does not contain a
corresponding no cause restriction.211 At present, a civil action may be filed
after 180 days of filing a complaint with the Florida Commission, regardless
of whether an express finding of cause has been found.212 In fact, the FFHA
expressly states that “[t]his subsection does not prevent any other legal or
administrative action provided by law.”213 This model has not resulted in an
overwhelming increase in housing discrimination claims, nor has it divested
the Florida Commission of the opportunity to investigate and remedy
egregious violations of the statute.214
1.

A Comparison of Pending Legislation

Legislative changes are currently underway to completely eliminate
the administrative remedies currently required under the FFHA.215 A new
bill introduced as HB 175 passed by way of unanimous vote in both
chambers as SB 374.216 SB 347, enrolled on March 12, 2020, and pending
action by the Governor, will allow a civil action
regardless of whether . . . a complaint with the Florida Commission
[has been filed], the [Florida] Commission has resolved a complaint
if the aggrieved person chose to file one, or any particular amount
of time has passed since the . . . complaint [was filed] with the
[Florida] Commission.217
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See FLA. STAT. §§ 760.34–.37 (2019).
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 760.11.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.34.
Id.
Id. § 760.35(d).
See 2019 CIRCUIT CIVIL FILINGS, supra note 72, at 1.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Human Rel., HB 175 (2020) Final Bill Analysis
1
(Mar.
24,
2020),
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=h0175z.CJS.D
OCX&DocumentType=Analysis&BillNumber=0175&Session=2020.
216.
See Fla. S. Comm. on Gov’t. Oversight & Acct., SB 374 (2019) Staff
Analysis
1
(Dec.
6,
2019),
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2020/374/Analyses/2020s00374.go.PDF.
217.
Id.
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The bill limits an aggrieved person from filing a civil action in only one of
two instances.218 The first instance is if the claimant has consented to a
conciliation agreement or if a hearing has already been commenced by an
administrative law judge.219
The difference between the administrative mandates in like
discrimination statutes is attributable to issues of federal funding.220 For
more than a decades time, the HUD has cautioned that the Florida court’s
interpretation of the FFHA is inconsistent with federal law that allows
victims to file suit regardless of whether a complaint has been filed with
HUD.221 Florida’s continued failure to make this change has “caused Florida
law not to be certified [by HUD] as substantially equivalent to federal law,”
and thereby threatened hundreds of thousands of dollars currently used to
conduct investigations each year.222
The FCRA recently underwent its own legislative changes through
the enactment of Florida House Bill 255, signed into law by Florida
Governor Ron DeSantis on June 30, 2020.223 While the amendment affects
seven sections of the FCRA, no pertinent change was made that would
provide relief to the issues raised in this Comment.224 Conversely, the new
law requires a plaintiff be “promptly notified” of rights on the occasion that
the Florida Commission fails to render a determination within its statutory
period and defines a statute of limitations in such instance.225 While the
statute was previously silent on the issue, case law had previously held a
claim to be viable in such instance for up to four years.226 HB 255 amended
the FCRA to mandate a civil action be filed within 365 days of the failure to

218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
See Fla. S. Comm. on Gov’t. Oversight & Acct., SB 374 (2019) Staff
Analysis, at 5; Brendan Rivers, Fla. Bill Would Make It Easier For Victims of Housing
Discrimination
to File Civil Claims, WJCT NEWS (Mar. 29, 2019),
http://news.wjct.org/post/fla-bill-would-make-it-easier-victims-housing-discrimination-filecivil-cases.
222.
Mathew Dietz, Changes to Florida Statutes that Effect Civil Rights and
Fair
Housing
in
Florida,
DISABILITY INDEP. GRP.
(Mar.
22,
2020),
http://www.justdigit.org/changes-to-florida-statutes-that-effect-civil-rights-and-fair-housingin-florida; see also Rivers, supra note 221.
223.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. Sub. for HB No. 225 (2020),
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2020/255/BillText/er/PDF.
224.
See id.
225.
Id.
226.
See id.; Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. 2000).
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render a determination before such claims are barred.227 While this change
may harmonize the statute of limitations amongst determinations made by
the Florida Commission, it further distinguishes employment discrimination
from Florida’s other statutes.228
VII.

CONCLUSION

For decades, litigating under the FCRA has been a legal minefield
that plaintiffs are forced to navigate differently based on where they
reside.229 Florida continues to delineate access to justice under the FCRA
based on arbitrary geography bounds to the detriment of its northern
residents.230
As pending legislation is on track to eliminate the
administrative mandates under Florida’s other discrimination statutes, the
employment law sector continues to await any action that could result in
some relief.231

227.

See Comm. Sub. H.B. No. 255, Pub. L. No 2020–153, Fla. Laws 760

(2020).
228.
See id.
229.
See FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2019); WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5,
at 1; Ballman, supra note 92.
230.
See WORKSHARE AGREEMENT, supra note 5, at 1–6.
231.
See Rivers, supra note 221.
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INTRODUCTION

Prenuptial agreements present a puzzle.1 They juxtapose the hopes
of marriage and the disappointments of divorce, offering a stunning contrast
between the intimacy of romance and the transactional legalese of a financial
document.2 Prenuptial agreements are as practical as they are harmful; as
helpful as they are hurtful.3 They represent the end of what is thought to be
an eternal bond, and do so by outlining the beginning of the end at the
beginning of the beginning.4 It is within these paradoxes that prenuptial
agreements pose a special legal problem, one that lies not with its existence,
but rather with its interpretation through common law contract.5
This Comment will explore and seek to solve this problem of
prenuptial agreement interpretation through the examination of wide-ranging
legal and psychological concepts within the narrow confines of Florida law.6
While this Comment focuses mainly on Florida law, the notions, ideas, and
implications apply broadly not only to prenuptial agreements, but also to the
divide between law and psychology, the associations between gender and
economic inequality and bargaining power, and the contrasts and turf wars

1.
See discussion infra Section III.A; cf. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S.
1, 15 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissent) (“It is so utterly clear in normal usage that ‘intent’ does not
include conditional intent . . . .”).
2.
See Leah Guggenheimer, A Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of
Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 147, 182 (1996); discussion infra
Section III.B.
3.
See discussion infra Section IV; Chelsea Biemiller, Note, The Uncertain
Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements: Why the “Extreme” Approach in Pennsylvania Is
the Right Approach for Review, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 133, 161 (2013).
4.
Developments in the Law — The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1996, 2075 (2003) [hereinafter Marriage and Family].
5.
See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or
Maybe Not: A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades,
19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 117 (2011) (“Premarital agreements should not be
governed by contract rules applicable to commercial contracts.”).
6.
See discussion infra Part V.
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between common law contract and equity.7 First, some obligatory
background.8
Florida is an equitable distribution state.9 Equitable distribution
means the fair distribution of assets obtained and liabilities incurred during
the marriage.10 A court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding must begin
with the presumption of equal distribution, unless fairness dictates
otherwise.11 There are three components to equitable distribution relating to
marital assets and liabilities: (1) identification; (2) valuation; and (3)
distribution.12 In determining distribution, the court must consider any
relevant circumstance “necessary to do equity and justice between the
parties.”13
After equitable distribution has been decided, the court may consider
whether an award of alimony is appropriate.14 What alimony is, other than
financial support from one former spouse to the other, depends on the type of
alimony and the purpose it serves.15 Florida allows for five types of alimony:
(1) temporary, which is awarded during dissolution proceedings; (2) bridgethe-gap, which aids the party in the transition to being single; (3)
rehabilitative, which assists the party’s efforts to rehabilitate their earning
capacity; (4) durational, which provides the party with financial assistance
for an extended period of need; and (5) permanent, which provides the party
with financial assistance to cover needs and necessities for life.16 Alimony is
determined by one party’s need and the other party’s ability to pay. 17 In an
award for alimony, the court may consider any relevant circumstance
“necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.”18
Prenuptial agreements are written contracts entered into prior to a
marriage that fix, limit, or altogether waive the property rights between

7.
See discussion infra Section III.B.; discussion infra Section IV.C.;
discussion infra Section II.C.
8.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
9.
FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2019).
10.
See id. § 61.075(1).
11.
Id.
12.
Id. § 61.075(3)(b).
13.
Id. § 61.075(1)(j).
14.
FLA. STAT. § 61.075(9). Temporary alimony, which is alimony given to a
spouse in need during litigation, is awarded prior to equitable distribution. Id. § 61.071.
15.
See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980).
16.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.071, 61.08(5)–(8).
17.
Id. § 61.08(2).
18.
Id. § 61.08(2)(j). Need, for example, may be established through a
showing of “earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard
of living,” and more. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201–02.
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spouses upon dissolution of marriage.19 In other words, prenuptial
agreements preemptively define prospective spouses’ rights at divorce.20
These defined rights within prenuptial agreements thus allow “prospective
spouses to substitute their own contractual system” in place of the equitable
system covered by Florida law.21
If the equitable system under Florida law is presumptively fair, why
do people enter into prenuptial agreements?22 Or, stated differently, why
should courts even honor prenuptial agreements?23
Prenuptial agreements, first and foremost, protect assets.24 That is,
they protect the economically advantaged spouse’s wealth and earnings at
death or divorce.25 Prenuptial agreements act as insurance policies against
the crushing psychological and physiological tolls that divorce imposes upon
separating spouses and their families.26 They reduce the uncertain outcomes
surrounding “judicial division of marital assets.”27 Compared to divorce
negotiations, which are often marked by anger, hostility, and resentment,
prenuptial agreements allow parties to negotiate at a time when trust,
support, and communication are most palpable.28
Prenuptial agreements also divest assets from the economically
inferior spouse.29 They have been proclaimed to be insurance policies
“against scheming second wives,” and perhaps relatedly, they too often
19.
See Posner v. Posner (Posner I), 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970).
Prenuptial agreements also fix property rights upon death. Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143
So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1962). A broader definition of a prenuptial agreement is from the original
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”): “an agreement between prospective spouses
made in contemplation of marriage and to be effective upon marriage.” UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983). Florida adopted its own version of the UPAA
in 2007. See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(1). The 2012 revision to the UPAA defines a prenuptial
agreement as “an agreement between individuals who intend to marry which affirms,
modifies, or waives a marital right or obligation during the marriage or at separation, marital
dissolution, death of one of the spouses, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other
event.” UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2(5), U.L.A. 3–4 (2012).
20.
Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2005).
21.
Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 234 (1994).
22.
See id. at 295.
23.
Id.
24.
Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2075.
25.
Brod, supra note 21, at 239.
26.
Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2075; Biemiller, supra note 3, at
161.
27.
Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2075; Biemiller, supra note 3, at
161.
28.
Biemiller, supra note 3, at 161.
29.
Brod, supra note 21, at 239. In a typical heterosexual relationship, the
economically inferior spouse has historically been the female. Id.
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eliminate the fair and equitable judicial distribution of assets at the expense
of women.30 Compared to divorce negotiations, when both parties have
counsel, the social and economic power disparities inherent within society
lead to one-sided prenuptial agreements that overwhelmingly harm women.31
In fact, “all but the wealthiest women who have signed premarital
agreements will suffer serious economic and social harm at the end of
marriage.”32 Worse yet, prenuptial agreements that harm women also harm
the children under their care.33
Scholars have argued that prenuptial agreements promote honesty
and communication, leading to family harmony and a happier marriage.34
Others, however, equate the idea of prenuptial agreements with the idea of
eating children:
When Jonathan Swift made his famous modest proposal . . .
suggesting that children of destitute people be eaten . . . members
of polite society were either appalled or intrigued . . . . Over 200
years later, men make such modest proposals to women every day,
in the form of premarital agreements. 35

Of course, a rundown of pros, cons, and (perhaps) tongue-in-cheek
metaphors do not necessarily provide a complete, let alone unbiased, insight
into why people actually undertake prenuptial agreements.36 The reality is
that prenuptial agreements are predominantly entered into for four reasons:
(1) there is a significant asset or income disparity between the parties that the
wealthier party wishes to protect; (2) one or both parties have children from a
prior relationship, and thus wish to protect their children’s interests; (3) one
or both parties had prior negative experiences in dissolution proceedings and
30.
Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 916 (1997); Brod, supra note 21, at 239. The idea that
wealthy men need protection against “gold-digging” women is a particularly rampant
stereotype. Guggenheimer, supra note 2, at 162.
31.
See Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 171, 188 (2013). Mandatory independent legal representation is a solution hotly
debated by scholars and commentators. Id. at 213–14. Compare Sandra Kennedy, Note,
Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why States Should Adopt California’s Independent Counsel
Requirement for the Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 709, 719
(2014) (calling for “bright-line” independent counsel rules), with Elizabeth R. Carter,
Rethinking Premarital Agreements: A Collaborative Approach, 46 N.M. L. REV. 354, 373,
375 (2016) (calling independent legal representation “overly paternalistic”).
32.
Brod, supra note 21, at 251.
33.
Id. at 241.
34.
E.g., Marston, supra note 30, at 895, 907, 916.
35.
Guggenheimer, supra note 2, at 147.
36.
See Kennedy, supra note 31, at 709.
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prefer to contract to their own, certain outcomes; and (4) one or both parties
have family or business assets they wish to keep nonmarital for various
reasons personal to the circumstances.37
That said, the underlying reasons that parties enter into prenuptial
agreements are, for the purposes of this Comment, largely peripheral. 38
Rather, the focus here concerns the confounding nature of the ways in which
Florida courts interpret and enforce prenuptial agreements.39 The premise is
simple: Dissolution of marriage proceedings are held in courts of equity,
while prenuptial agreements are interpreted through common law contract.40
This adjudicatory divergence is irreconcilable.41
This Comment will examine the contradictory nature between the
distinction in dissolution proceedings and prenuptial agreement enforcement
through an analysis of the procedural, substantive, cognitive, public policy,
and flat-out common-sense issues as tied in and compared to Florida
statutory and case law.42 It will also explore policy concepts pulled from
tort, property, and criminal law, as well as examine the stark contrast
between common law contract and equity.43 Finally, this Comment will
conclude with a solution as uncomplex as the premise: Prenuptial
agreements should be interpreted through equity.44
II.
A.

EQUITY AND COMMON LAW CONTRACT

Terminology

“Equity” and “chancery” are interchangeable terms without
distinction just as “prenuptial agreement,” “antenuptial agreement,”
“premarital agreement,” and “matrimonial agreement” are equally
interchangeable without distinction.45 Indeed, under Florida’s Constitution,
circuit courts retain exclusive jurisdiction “in all cases in equity,” while
37.
Id.
38.
See Carter, supra note 31, at 355.
39.
See discussion infra Part III; Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154,
1156–58 (Fla. 2005).
40.
See discussion infra Section II.C; FLA. STAT. § 61.011 (2019);
Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015).
41.
See discussion infra Part III; Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d at 1159.
42.
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
43.
See discussion infra Section V.D; discussion infra Section II.C; discussion
infra Section III.A.
44.
See discussion infra Part VI.
45.
Ireland v. Cheney, 196 N.E. 267, 270 (Ohio 1935); Manuel R. Valcarcel,
Note, He Who Seeks Equity Must Find the Court Which Does Equity — The Current
Jurisdictional Conflict, 19 NOVA L. REV. 415, 421–22 (1994); Carter, supra note 31, at 354.
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Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes refers to equitable proceedings in a
dissolution of marriage as “chancery.”46 Chapter 61 refers to both
“antenuptial” and “premarital” agreements, while Florida courts have
deviated between “prenuptial” and “antenuptial” agreements seemingly
based upon a justice’s preferred nomenclature.47 There is also no apparent
historical distinction between usage of “prenuptial” and “antenuptial.”48 For
consistency, the terms “equity” and “prenuptial agreement” will hereinafter
be used when possible.*
B.

A Brief History of Equity

The interchangeability of “equity” and “chancery” and the relation to
the judicial system is not without historical significance.49 The English
Court of Chancery first appeared in the thirteenth century, operating as a
separate and, in theory, superior forum to the established common law
courts.50 The purpose of Chancery was to serve as a haven for those unfairly
prejudiced by a myriad of deficient and unyielding rules of the law.51 The
English Court of Chancery thus served to offer remedies “in accordance with
the principles of equity”: Where the fixed ideals of the law failed, equity
granted relief on the broad moralistic principles of justice and fairness.52
Florida courts, which evolved from the English legal system like all
other jurisdictions in the United States, administer justice “according to good
conscience.”53 Originally, Florida courts of equity were separate from courts
of law.54 In 1967, Florida established the merger rule, which abolished the
procedural differences between law and equity but retained the substantive

46.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 20(c)(3); FLA. STAT. § 61.011 (2019).
47.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.052(5); FLA. STAT. § 61.079; Del Vecchio v. Del
Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962) (using both “antenuptial agreement” and “prenuptial
contract”); Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460, 461, 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (using
“antenuptial,” in the majority opinion and using “prenuptial” in the concurring opinion).
48.
Compare Forde v. Forde, 10 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 1942) (prenuptial), and
Famiglio v. Famiglio, 279 So. 3d 736, 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (prenuptial), with Ball
v. Ball, 36 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1948) (antenuptial), and Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240,
1241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (antenuptial).
49.
See Valcarcel, supra note 45, at 422.
50.
See 30A C.J.S. Equity, § 7 (2020).
51.
Joel Levin & Banks McDowell, The Balance Theory of Contracts:
Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations, 29 MCGILL L.J. 24, 58 (1983); Degge v. First State
Bank of Eustis, 199 So. 564, 565 (Fla. 1941) (en banc).
52.
See Ireland v. Cheney, 196 N.E. 267, 270 (Ohio 1935); Hedges v. Lysek,
84 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 1955).
53.
Degge, 199 So. at 565; see also Ireland, 196 N.E. at 270.
54.
Valcarcel, supra note 45, at 421–22.
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differences.55 That is, in order to advance the administration of justice, a
court maintains jurisdiction (as opposed to a transfer from the equity side to
the “law side of the court”) over a cause of action regardless of whether the
ultimate relief is legal or equitable.56 Today, there is technically no
“chancery court” judiciary in Florida; rather, the circuit courts have often
been labeled “chancery courts” when exercising equity jurisdiction.57
C.

Equity Versus Common Law Contract in Florida

Over sixty years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida famously
confirmed that “a court of equity is a court of conscience; it ‘should not be
shackled by rigid rules of procedure and thereby preclude justice being
administered according to good conscience.’”58 In other words, strict
adherence to bright line rules is inconsistent with the well-established tenants
of equity.59 Equity thus has “wide discretion in fashioning remedies to
satisfy the exigencies of the circumstances.”60
Contract, on the other hand, is a question of law; a question
determined by formal, often rigid, rules of presumption and interpretation.61
Unambiguous terms in a contract are conclusive and “must be applied as
written.”62 A court may only resort to contract interpretation when the
contract language is unclear.63 Contract interpretation is governed by the
language “within the four corners of the document.”64 Only the intent from
the plain language and common usage of the words used may be

55.
Emery v. Int’l Glass & Mfg., Inc., 249 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.040 (“There shall be one form of action to be known as
‘civil action.’”).
56.
Emery, 249 So. 2d at 498; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.040.
57.
Valcarcel, supra note 45, at 422.
58.
Wicker v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Dade Cnty., 106 So. 2d 550, 558 (Fla.
1958) (quoting Degge v. First State Bank of Eustis, 199 So. 564, 565 (Fla. 1941) (en banc));
accord Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 925
(Fla. 2017).
59.
See Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, 211 So. 3d at 925.
60.
Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(citing to Singer v. Tobin, 201 So. 2d 799, 800–01 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (per curiam));
see also Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, 211 So. 3d at 925.
61.
See Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n v. Whispering Lakes I, L.L.C., 155 So.
3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
62.
Brooks v. Green, 993 So. 2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Stokes v. Victory Land Co., 128 So. 408, 410 (Fla. 1930).
63.
Boat Town U.S.A., Inc. v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 364
So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
64.
Gold Crown Resort Mktg. Inc. v. Phillpotts, 272 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
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considered.65 The intention inside the minds of the parties to a contract is
irrelevant.66 Outside factors may not be considered unless the face of the
document is ambiguous.67 Contract provisions may not be considered in
isolation; intent is determined through examination of the entire instrument.68
Equity’s sweep is broader and more general, awarding appropriate
relief as reasonable to the circumstances given the particular facts of a case.69
For example, equity may compel partial performance of a contract where
strict performance would be unjust.70 Equity may also reform a contract that
violates the intention of the parties.71 “In an equitable action, the court
should balance the equities between the parties to do complete justice.”72
Equity will always seek to prevent an injustice caused by accident or
mistake.73
In contract, the law requires a court give effect to all provisions of an
agreement when possible.74 A court of law may not inquire into an
agreement’s fairness.75 A trial court of law may never rewrite an otherwise
valid contract in order to make a bad bargain more reasonable.76 Under
Florida’s common law, courts must uphold freely made agreements—no
matter how unfair or unreasonable—so long as the agreements are not
violative of public policy.77 Freedom to contract is a fundamental, elemental
right.78 Parties are bound by the language of the bargain, regardless of how
unfavorable that language later proves.79
These mantras, each repeated frequently, consistently, and at times
unabashedly over the past hundred years throughout the Florida common law
court system, serve to demonstrate the stark contrast between equity and
65.
Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A. v. Law Offices of E. Clay Parker, 160 So.
3d 955, 958 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
66.
Stokes, 128 So. at 410.
67.
Boat Town U.S.A., Inc., 364 So. 2d at 17.
68.
Canal Lumber Co. v. Fla. Naval Stores & Mfg. Co., 92 So. 279, 281 (Fla.
1922); Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., 160 So. 3d at 958.
69.
See Rennolds v. Rennolds, 312 So. 2d 538, 542 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
70.
Presley v. Worthington, 53 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1951) (en banc).
71.
Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
72.
22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 50 (2020).
73.
Hedges v. Lysek, 84 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 1955).
74.
Perez-Gurri Corp. v. McLeod, 238 So. 3d 347, 350 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2017).
75.
Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
76.
E.g., Brooks v. Green, 993 So. 2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
77.
Petracca, 706 So. 2d at 911.
78.
Id. at 910; e.g., Barakat v. Broward Cnty. Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193,
1195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
79.
Doty v. Bryson, 154 So. 3d 457, 460 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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contract.80 If equity is a court of conscience, contract is a court of
consequence.81
Consider, briefly, just one example of such consequence.82 The
following facts are taken from Lashkajani v. Lashkajani,83 during a certified
question to the Supreme Court of Florida in 2005: Three days prior to their
wedding, the wife, age twenty-five, signed a prenuptial agreement with her
husband, age forty-five.84 Ten and a half years later, the wife, who had been
a homemaker and stay-at-home mother to the couple’s three children, filed
for dissolution.85 The wife alleged adultery and claimed the husband was
physically and emotionally abusive toward her and their children.86 The wife
sought to invalidate the prenuptial agreement on grounds of coercion and
unfairness.87 The prenuptial agreement contained a prevailing party clause
that stated, in part, if either party sought enforcement or prevention of the
agreement and failed, the prevailing party would be awarded attorney’s
fees.88
The Court held that prenuptial agreements are enforced “as a matter
of contract.”89 The wife, a stay-at-home mother, was thus required to pay her
decamillionaire soon-to-be ex-husband $63,022.92 in attorney’s fees for her
failure to invalidate the prenuptial agreement during litigation.90 The Court
continued: “[Because] prevailing party clauses have long been enforceable
in ordinary contracts, we find no reason not to enforce them here.”91

80.
Compare Degge v. First State Bank of Eustis, 199 So. 564, 565 (Fla.
1941) (en banc) (calling equity “a court of conscience”), with Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460,
464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Farmer, J., concurring) (opining “[w]hy should the law be
concerned about anyone . . . ‘contracting away valuable rights?’”).
81.
See Levin & McDowell, supra note 51, at 40. There are, of course,
exceptions: Fraud, coercion, duress, reliance, mistake, foreseeability, implied conditions,
impossibility, and unconscionability, to name a few. Id. at 41.
82.
See Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 2005).
83.
911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2005).
84.
Respondent/Former Wife’s Answer Brief at 8, Lashkajani v. Lashkajani,
911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2005) (No. SC03-1275).
85.
Id. at 9.
86.
Id.
87.
Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d at 1155.
88.
Id. at 1155 n.1.
89.
Id. at 1158.
90.
Id. at 1155–56, 1160. The husband had a net worth of “at least $12
million.” Id. at 1155. Attorney’s fees in a dissolution of marriage proceeding are based on:
(1) need; and (2) ability of the other party to pay. See FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (2019).
91.
Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d at 1158. “[I]t is not unjust to place this risk on the
challenging party when she or he voluntarily entered this agreement knowing the clause was
included.” Id. at 1159 n.3.
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CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

Marriage is a contract.92 A valid marriage, like a valid contract,
must be entered into voluntarily.93 Like any agreement, a marriage must be
effectuated by parties legally eligible to contract.94 The parties to a marital
contract must be mentally competent, and the marriage, like a contract, must
not be contrary to public policy.95 A marriage, also like a contract, may be
void ab initio or voidable subject to ratification.96 The right to marry, like
freedom to contract, is a fundamental right.97
Prenuptial agreements are also contracts.98 A valid prenuptial
agreement must be entered into voluntarily in contemplation of marriage.99
The contract must be signed, in writing, by both parties in order to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.100 A prenuptial agreement must not be the product of
fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching, and may be unenforceable if
unconscionable at the time of execution.101 The provisions within a
prenuptial agreement must not be in contravention of public policy.102 For
example, a prenuptial agreement may not eliminate rightful child support

92.
See Smith v. Smith, 224 So. 3d 740, 746 (Fla. 2017); Mahan v. Mahan, 88
So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. 1956) (“The marriage contract is one of the most sacred of compacts.”);
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 96 (Batoche Books 1999) (1861) (“[T]he movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”).
93.
Goldman v. Dithrich, 179 So. 715, 717 (Fla. 1938).
94.
Id. In order to marry in Florida, both parties must be eighteen years of age
or older. FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (2019). However, there is one exception: if one party is
seventeen, has written parental consent, and the other party is not more than two years older.
Id. § 741.04(1)(a)–(b).
95.
Goldman, 179 So. at 717; see also Mahan, 88 So. 2d at 548. Examples of
marriages that contravene public policy include incest and bigamy. Janine Campanaro, Note,
Until Death Do Us Part? Why Courts Should Expand Prenuptial Agreements to Include TenYear Marriages, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 583, 585 (2010).
96.
See Smith, 224 So. 3d at 746.
97.
Id. at 749. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015)
(“The right to marry is fundamental . . . .”), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(“Marriage is . . . fundamental to our very existence and survival.”), with Barakat v. Broward
Cnty. Hous. Auth., 771 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“A fundamental
tenet of contract law is that parties are free to contract.”), and Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d
904, 910 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“[F]reedom to contract is fundamental . . . .”).
98.
See Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 2005).
99.
FLA. STAT. § 61.079(2)(a) (2019).
100.
Id. §§ 61.079(3), 61.079(2)(a); Kersey v. Kersey, 802 So. 2d 523, 525
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
101.
FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)(1)–(3).
102.
See id. § 61.079(4)(a)(8).
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payments.103 Finally, the right to contract to a prenuptial agreement is a
fundamental right.104
In Florida, the adjudicatory proceedings of the cancelation of the
marital contract—i.e., dissolution of marriage—are held in equity.105 The
prenuptial contract, on the other hand, is adjudicated under the common law
of contract.106
If this divide appears contradictory, that is because it is.107 Consider
the following: A dissolution of marriage proceeding typically includes the
equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities, an award of alimony,
and determination of incidents related to children of the marriage (such as
child support, timesharing, and parental responsibility).108 Chapter 61 of the
Florida Statutes is aptly titled, “Dissolution of Marriage; Support; Timesharing”; the first provision under Chapter 61 states, “Proceedings under this
chapter are in chancery.”109 It is thus reasonable to believe that all
proceedings under Chapter 61 are in equity.110 Prenuptial agreements, which
most commonly include alimony and distribution of assets, are also covered
under Chapter 61.111 Yet, despite the statute expressly stating that all
proceedings under Chapter 61 are in equity, prenuptial agreements instead
proceed through common law contract.112
In fact, the court in Lashkajani readily acknowledged this apparent
contradiction, despite ultimately interpreting the prenuptial agreement
through contract: “Although contract principles play a role in dissolution
proceedings,” the Court conditioned, “courts must remember that
proceedings under [C]hapter 61 are in equity and governed by basic rules of
fairness as opposed to the strict rule of law.”113 Trial judges, the court
continued, are given “wide leeway to work equity in [C]hapter 61
proceedings.”114
103.
Id. § 61.079(4)(b).
104.
See Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1158 (Fla. 2005); Levin &
McDowell, supra note 51 at 81.
105.
FLA. STAT. § 61.011.
106.
See, e.g., Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015).
107.
See id; FLA. STAT. § 61.011.
108.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.052.
109.
Id. § 61.011 (emphasis added).
110.
See id.
111.
Id. § 61.079. Under Chapter 61, the section on “Premarital agreements” is
situated between “61.075 Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets and Liabilities” and “61.08
Alimony.” Id. §§ 61.075–61.08. See also Elizabeth R. Carter, Are Premarital Agreements
Really Unfair?: An Empirical Study, 48 HOFSTRA L. REV. 387, 390 (2019).
112.
FLA. STAT. §§ 61.011, 61.079.
113.
Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1159 (Fla. 2005) (citation
omitted).
114.
Id. (citation omitted).
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The Lashkajani ruling leaves more questions than answers.115 If
“contract principles play a role” and trial judges are given “wide leeway” in
dissolution proceedings, the questions then are which contract principles play
a role, why those count but others do not, and why, if judges are given wide
leeway, do contract principles play a role at all?116 Consider the following
contract principles, from Whitley v. Royal Trails Property Owners’ Ass’n,117
a contract case concerned with the interpretation of specific homeowner’s
association provisions within the association’s declaration, articles, and the
by-laws:
The parties’ intention governs contract construction and
interpretation; the best evidence of intent is the contract’s plain
language. The court should reach a contract interpretation
consistent with reason, probability, and the practical aspect of the
transaction between the parties.
When two or more documents are executed by the same parties at
or near the same time, in the course of the same transaction, and
concern the same subject matter, they will be read and construed
together. Where a writing expressly refers to and sufficiently
describes another document, that other document, or so much of it
as is referred to, is to be interpreted as part of the writing. Thus,
the meaning is gathered from a general view of the whole writing,
with all of its parts being compared, used, and construed, each
118
with reference to the others.

Apply the Whitley contract principles to a dissolution proceeding:
When two documents—the prenuptial agreement and the marriage
contract—concerning the same subject matter—marriage—are executed in
the course of the same transaction, just prior to, and at the time of marriage,
they should be read and construed together.119 Where one document refers to
the other—prenuptial agreements unavoidably refer to the marriage
contract—the meaning should be gleaned from the overall view, and
interpreted with reason, probability, and practicality.120 This section first
aims to interpret and understand prenuptial agreements through a general
examination of the marital contract by looking at “intent.”121 Next, this
section will show why the dual interpretation is incompatible from the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 1158–1160.
See id. at 1159.
910 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 383 (citations omitted).
See id.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.079 (2019).
See discussion infra Section III.A; Whitley, 910 So. 2d at 383.
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perspective of cognitive psychology.122 Finally, this section will conclude
with the neglected, but readily available, remedy of interpretation through
equity.123
A.

Conditional Intent

“Intent” encapsulates an unavoidable contradiction within the notion
of prenuptial agreements.124
Because intention governs contract
interpretation, it is vital that the parties’ actual intent be reconciled.125 This
section aims for such reconciliation.126
Marriage is “enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It .
. . promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . [and] a bilateral
loyalty.”127 Marriage “is an association for as noble a purpose as any . . .
.”128 When two people agree to marry, their purpose is to unite into
perpetuity; the expectation a couple has is a lifelong commitment of love,
companionship, and stability.129 The hope then, upon marriage, is never
dissolution; logically, it follows that the hope upon signing a prenuptial
agreement is to never enforce the prenuptial agreement.130
Is this reconcilable?131 Former Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia thought the answer to be no.132 True “intent,” Justice Scalia wrote,
can never indicate a conditional purpose that a party hopes will not occur:
“Intent” is “[a] state of mind in which a person seeks to
accomplish a given result through a course of action.” One can
hardly “seek to accomplish” a result he hopes will not ensue . . . .

122.
See discussion infra Section III.B; Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the
Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).
123.
See discussion infra Section III.C; Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442,
446 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
124.
Cf. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 13 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
125.
See Whitley v. Royal Trails Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 910 So. 2d 381, 383
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
126.
Id.; see also discussion infra Section III.C; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 cmt. a. (AM. L. INST. 2002).
127.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
128.
Id.
129.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
130.
See discussion infra Section III.B; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486; Baker &
Emery, supra note 122, at 443.
131.
See Holloway v. United States., 526 U.S. 1, 13 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
132.
Id. at 14.
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....
. . . It is an unheard-of usage [] to speak of my having an “intent”
to do something, when my plans are contingent upon an event that
is not virtually certain, and that I hope will not occur. When a
friend is seriously ill, for example, I would not say that “I intend to
go to his funeral next week.” I would have to make it clear that
the intent is a conditional one: “I intend to go to his funeral next
week if he dies.”133

Justice Scalia is referring to “conditional intent.”134 Imagine the
absurdity of a prospective spouse proclaiming, just days before
solemnization, “I intend on divorcing and enforcing my prenuptial
agreement.”135 If intent is to be ascertained within the four corners of a
prenuptial agreement, the conditionality of such intent must be recognized
and distinguished from true intent.136 Simply put, intent cannot be
conditional, and no justification can alter this reality.137 The law must
recognize this reality.138 But how?139 To understand the application within
the marital context using Justice Scalia’s interpretation of intent—that is, true
intent can never be conditional—one must look beyond the scope of the
law.140
B.

Psychological Intent

One way to better understand the concept of intent is to depart from
the notion of legal intent and view intent from within its natural habitat:
psychology and the human mind.141 One study famously examined marriage
license applicants and their perceptions of the risk of divorce, both for
themselves and for the population as a whole.142 The findings were
revealing: While marriage license applicants accurately estimated half of all
133.
Id. at 13–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
134.
Id. at 13. (“Conditional intent is no more embraced by the unmodified
word ‘intent’ than a sea lion is embraced by the unmodified word ‘lion.’”)
135.
Campanaro, supra note 95, at 587. The reason for such absurdity is, if the
sole or overriding intention of entering into a prenuptial agreement is to protect assets, then
why marry at all? Id. A cohabiting relationship protects assets better than a prenuptial
agreement. Id. at 587–88.
136.
See Gold Crown Resort Mktg. Inc. v. Phillpotts, 272 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
137.
Holloway, 526 U.S. at 13–14 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
138.
See id. at 14.
139.
See id.
140.
See id. at 14, 15.
141.
See Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 440–44.
142.
Id. at 439.
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couples in the United States would end up divorced, the median response to
the applicants’ own likelihood of divorce was zero percent.143 In other
words, everyone knew the risk of divorce was fifty percent while
simultaneously and irrationally concluding an outright immunity from their
own personal risk of divorce.144
Now consider the true intent of a party presented with an
unreasonable or unfair prenuptial agreement: The party knows the societal
risk of divorce—fifty percent—but the party also presumes the risk does not
apply to him or herself.145 These exceptionally idealistic, naïve, and
unwarranted expectations provide an example of “representativeness bias,”
in which people believe themselves to be unrepresentative of the population
as a whole.146 Thus, the true intent upon signing a prenuptial agreement may
more realistically reflect the uncomplicated intent to simply get—and stay—
married.147
Judges have often relied upon the notion that prenuptial agreements
are voluntarily entered into because a party may either choose to sign the
agreement, marry, and live with the consequences, or instead choose not to
sign and, presumably, not marry.148 Never mind that this binary perspective
would render virtually every putative agreement voluntary; human
psychology does not support such black and white reasoning.149
A study in 2017 outlined the theory of “deliberate ignorance” based
on anticipated regret.150 Where a person anticipates that a risk might lead to
an unknown and possibly negative result, the person, with deliberate
ignorance, will choose the known option in order to circumvent that regret.151
Avoiding the anticipation of regret and maintaining positive emotions are the

143.
Id. at 443.
144.
Id. at 446–47.
145.
See id.
146.
Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 445–46.
147.
See id. at 443, 446; Marston, supra note 30, at 895–96.
148.
See, e.g., Eager v. Eager, 696 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997). (“It is not a threat or duress for the proponent of the agreement to make it clear that
there will be no marriage in the absence of the agreement. To hold otherwise would
effectively provide a per se basis to invalidate most, if not all, antenuptial property
agreements.”)
149.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 201; Levin & McDowell, supra note 51, at 42.
This binary perspective would render agreements entered into via blackmail and extortion as
equally voluntary. Levin & McDowell, supra note 51, at 42. There is also a third option that
judges fail to consider: “negotiating a prenuptial agreement to both parties’ satisfaction.”
Gan, supra note 31, at 212.
150.
Gerd Gigerenzer & Rocio Garcia-Retamero, Cassandra’s Regret: The
Psychology of Not Wanting to Know, 124 PSYCHOL. REV. 179, 181 (2017).
151.
Id. at 182.
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motives for deliberate ignorance.152 In the marital context, anticipated regret
is the risk of not signing the prenuptial agreement (and thus potentially
ending the relationship); signing the prenuptial agreement and going forward
with the marriage, on the other hand, enables the party to maintain the status
quo of positive emotions.153 That is, a party may sign a prenuptial
agreement—thereby foregoing the risk and anticipated regret of ending the
relationship—by picking the definite option of continuing a happy
relationship where the anticipated regret of breaking up will be impossible.154
Succinctly put, the inner conflict between anticipated regret and
continued happiness leads a party in a prenuptial agreement to close their
eyes to reality and sign away valuable rights with deliberate ignorance.155
The question is, then, should this really be treated as intent?156
Although deliberate ignorance is a widespread state of mind, not
everyone closes their eyes to risk, and many, in fact, attempt to evaluate and
embrace it.157 Unfortunately, those who do attempt to assess long-term
risk—here, the long-term risk of a prenuptial agreement ever coming to
fruition—often analyze risk poorly and evaluate themselves with marked
overconfidence.158
The more confident the prediction, the larger the gap in accuracy.159
Worse, the more distant a prediction is in time, i.e., temporal distance, the
152.
Id. at 181.
153.
See id. at 183.
154.
See id.
155.
See Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, supra note 150, at 180; compare
Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Farmer, J., concurring)
(“Why should the law be concerned about anyone, including a prospective spouse,
‘contracting away valuable rights?’”), with Peacock Hotel, Inc. v. Shipman, 138 So. 44, 46
(1931) (“[W]here it is perfectly plain to the court that one party . . . has gained an unjust and
undeserved advantage . . . a court of equity will not hesitate to interfere . . . .”).
156.
See Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, supra note 150, at 181. Certainly, the
law has not been favorable to deliberate ignorance, i.e. willful blindness, although in law,
willful blindness encompasses closing one’s eyes to criminal or tortious activity, not
contracting away valuable rights. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S.
754, 769 (2011). It may be argued the purpose of holding the willfully blind accountable is to
both deter harmful criminal activity and protect citizens. See id. The same purpose could be
served here. See id. While the law protecting its citizens from their own willful ignorance
sounds like the tricky-to-navigate-road toward paternalism, equitable remedies that alleviate
some of the more harmful effects of deliberate ignorance should be favored. See Levin &
McDowell, supra note 51, at 26.
157.
Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, supra note 150, at 195; Robert P.
Vallone, et al., Overconfident Prediction of Future Actions and Outcomes by Self and Others,
58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 582, 583 (1990).
158.
Vallone, et al., supra note 157 at 585; see also Baker & Emery, supra note
122, at 446.
159.
Vallone, et al., supra note 157, at 590.
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more optimistic and confident the individual feels.160 This unwarranted
overconfidence leads to increased risk-taking, and ultimately, poor decisionmaking, with definite repercussions for the long-term success of any given
marriage.161 What then of intent?162
[Cognitive biases and other psychological] difficulties are
exacerbated in the context of premarital agreements because of
the possibility that the agreement will be invoked many years
after it was entered. About half of all divorces occur after the
seventh year of marriage. A contract whose terms are intended to
apply, for the first time, more than seven years after its execution
is otherwise uncommon.163

Judicial inquiry into the parties’ intent from, perhaps, a decade
earlier, viewed without cognitive context and solely from within the four
corners of the prenuptial document, seems inconsistent with reason,
probability, and practicality.164 Such inquiry is, in a word, inequitable.165
There is very little practical intention, or even conditional intent, involved
with signing and anticipating the eventual enforcement of a prenuptial
agreement.166 People are irrationally overconfident and ignorantly optimistic
about the prospects of their marriages.167 They avoid the anticipated regret
of not signing a proposed prenuptial agreement while being predisposed to
engage in long-term risk-taking.168 This lack of true intent is exacerbated
when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances: The true intent
of the parties was to get, and to stay, married.169
160.
Shiri Nussbaum, et al., Predicting the Near and Distant Future, 135 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 152, 159 (2006). “Temporal distance is defined as how much
time (e.g., past or future) separates between the perceiver’s present time and the target event.”
Yaozhong Liu & Jinjing Xu, The Effect of Temporal Distance and Social Distance on the
Choice of Consumers’ Preferences, 6 MOD. ECON. 275, 276 (2015).
161.
See Nussbaum, et al., supra note 160, at 152; Vallone, et al., supra note
157, at 590; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 (AM. L. INST. 2002).
162.
See Whitley v. Royal Trails Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 910 So. 2d 381, 383
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
163.
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05.
164.
See Gold Crown Resort Mktg. Inc. v. Phillpotts, 272 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2019); Whitley, 910 So. 2d at 383.
165.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. a.
166.
See id. at cmt. b.
167.
See Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 445–46; PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b.
168.
See Gigerenzer & Garcia-Retamero, supra note 150, at 182; Vallone, et
al., supra note 157, at 585–86.
169.
See Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 447.
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Solving Intent

While common law contract derives intent from inside the four
corners of the prenuptial agreement—or, if guided by Whitley, through the
context of the marital contract—the true intent of the parties is much more
nuanced.170 When the true intent is to remain married forever—and thus
never enforce the prenuptial agreement—how can the courts of contract
glean this intent from plain language?171 The reality is that courts of
contract, with their strict and typically all-or-nothing rules, simply cannot.172
Enter equity.173 Equity—the court of conscience, the court of
fairness, the court of justice—can determine true intent.174 Equity is
reasonable to the circumstances and can understand that prenuptial
agreements must be viewed in light of the true intent of the marital
contract.175 Equity can balance all the factors to do complete justice, fully
understanding that cognitive biases cloud the intentions of parties to marital
and prenuptial contracts.176 Equity, unimpeded by the harsh rules of
contract, has wide discretion in sculpting remedies that “satisfy the
exigencies of the circumstances,” and thus has the ability to fashion solutions
that differ, say, between a marriage lasting two years and a marriage lasting
twenty-two or forty-two years.177 If the intent to a prenuptial agreement is in
need of determination, equity can serve as the interpreter.178
IV.

PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND THE WOMEN THEY HARM:
DEFENSES AND AVOIDANCE

Thus far, this Comment has mostly ignored the proverbial elephant
on the page: Prenuptial agreements harm women.179 Proponents of
170.
See Whitley v. Royal Trails Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 910 So. 2d 381, 383
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Gold Crown Resort Mktg. Inc. v. Phillpotts, 272 So. 3d 789,
792 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
171.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b.
172.
See Phillpotts, 272 So. 3d at 792.
173.
See Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
174.
See id.
175.
See Rennolds v. Rennolds, 312 So. 2d 538, 542 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
176.
22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 50; Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2085.
177.
Schroeder, 825 So. 2d at 446; Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando,
Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 925 (Fla. 2017); see also FLA. STAT. § 61.08(4) (2019)
(noting differences in marriage length for purposes of determining alimony).
178.
See Presley v. Worthington, 53 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1951) (en banc);
Schroeder, 825 80. 2d at 445; 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 50; discussion supra Section II. C.
179.
See Brod, supra note 21, at 239.
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prenuptial agreements charge those who believe in such harm with spreading
paternalistic notions that women are “uneducated, unsophisticated, [and]
economically dependent.”180 These proponents argue that women and men
are equal, and contractual freedom should reflect this equality.181 After all,
women have long been racing toward closing the gender gap; and in fact, are
currently outpacing men in college enrollment, college degrees, and
workforce participation.182 The number of stay-at-home dads is growing.183
So too are the number of wives out-earning their husbands.184 Gender
equality, it seems, is nearly here.185
Yet, nearly is not equivalent to finally, and prenuptial agreements do,
in fact, disproportionately harm women.186 The notion of prenuptial
agreements harming women is hardly in need of evidentiary support, as the
idea is so pervasive that is has become cliché.187 It is patently obvious to all
except zealots of freedom of contract, and perhaps, affluent feminists who
deny the existence and consequences of gender inequality in the same way
some African-American celebrities deny the existence and consequences of
racism.188 Unfortunately, prenuptial agreements harming women is plainly
180.
Carter, supra note 111, at 388.
181.
Jenna Christine Colucci, Note, The P Word: Ohio Should Adopt the
Uniform Premarital Agreements Act to Achieve Consistency and Uniformity in the Treatment
of Prenuptial Agreements, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 215, 234 (2017); see also Guggenheimer,
supra note 2, at 156 (“If women are successful in voiding bad agreements, they will never
learn to contract more thoughtfully and successfully.”).
182.
Carter, supra note 31, at 358; Tara Law, Women Are Now the Majority of
the U.S. Workforce — but Working Women Still Face Serious Challenges, TIME (Jan. 16, 2020
4:55 PM), http://www.time.com/5766787/women-workforce/.
183.
Jason Beaubien, Stay-At-Home Dads Still Struggle with Diapers, Drool,
Stigma and Isolation, NPR (June 17, 2018, 5:37 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/06/17/619557786/stay-at-home-dads-still-struggle-with-diapers-drool-stigma-andisolation.
184.
Aimee Picchi, More Women Are Now Outearning Their Husbands – and
Emotions Can Be Big, USA TODAY: MONEY (Mar. 3, 2020, 12:44 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/03/gender-wage-gap-more-women-outearning-husbands/4933666002/.
185.
See Colucci, supra note 181, at 234.
186.
Brod, supra note 21, at 239.
187.
See id.; Oldham, supra note 5, at 89 n.45; Prenup, Google Dictionary,
http://www.google.com/search?q=google+dictionary#dobs=prenup (last visited Dec. 14,
2020). The Google dictionary example-sentence for “prenup” is: “Did you get her to sign a
prenup?” Prenup, supra. A gendered example sentence phrased, “get her to sign” speaks to
the obviousness of such harm. Id.
188.
Oldham, supra note 5, at 89; Brod, supra note 21, at 239; Waton v.
Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is undisputed that the
agreement is patently unreasonable. However, if an unreasonable agreement is freely entered
into, it is enforceable.”); Jenice Armstrong, Black Celebs Who Deny Racism Exists Are Out of
Touch,
PHILA.
INQUIRER
(Mar.
26,
2015,
3:01
AM),
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evident throughout case law.189 Exploring and solving the problems
associated with prenuptial agreements harming women has, for decades,
been the topic of innumerable scholarly articles.190 Even comedian Chris
Rock famously joked about why he “understands” men wanting to murder
their wives during and after divorce:191
[He] should’a had a prenup. That’s right, prenuptial agreement.
Everybody needs a prenup. People think you gotta be rich to get
a prenup, oh no. You got twenty million, your wife want ten, big
deal, you ain’t starving. But if you make thirty thousand, and
your wife want fifteen, you might have to kill her! 192

That prenuptial agreements harm women is further evident through
even a cursory look at gender statistics: Women, on average, make less
money than men;193 women marry at younger ages than men194 and therefore

http://www.inquirer.com/philly/living/20150326_Black_celebs_who_deny_racism_exists_are
_out_of_touch.html. “[R]acial inequities in America are systemic and can’t just be
kumbaya’d away . . . .” Armstrong, supra. Gender inequalities cannot be “kumbaya’d” away
either. See Brod, supra note 21, at 240; cf. Carter, supra note 111, at 388.
189.
Oldham, supra note 5, at 89 n.45.
190.
Compare Brod, supra note 21, at 295 (calling for states to adopt better
procedural and substantive standards of fairness), with Oldham, supra note 5, at 84 (calling for
states to adopt better procedural and substantive requirements).
191.
CHRIS ROCK, O.J., I Understand, on ROLL WITH THE NEW (DreamWorks
Records 1997). Of course, reducing a funny stand-up bit to writing without providing context,
timing, or tone often removes the comedy entirely. See id.; Olga Khazan, The Dark
Psychology of Being a Good Comedian, THE ATLANTIC: HEALTH (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/02/the-dark-psychology-of-being-a-goodcomedian/284104/. The brilliance of comedians lies in their ability to turn tragedy—in this
case, Rock was joking about the gruesome murder of Nicole Brown Simpson—into comedy.
ROCK, supra; Khazan, supra. While the bit was objectively funny (from the standpoint of any
reasonably prudent observer), the overarching idea exposes “prenups” for what they truly are:
harmful to women. ROCK, supra. That a comedian would devote a “bit” to poking fun at the
notion of men violently attacking women over the man’s hard-earned money serves as
evidence of the pervasiveness of the cultural acceptance of men wishing to keep their money
and women taking that money away. ROCK, supra. The moral Rock presents, albeit tonguein-cheek, is that “prenups” allow men to continue controlling their money while men without
prenups are doomed to such an extent that murder is actually a viable remedy. ROCK, supra.
192.
ROCK, supra note 191.
193.
See PINC-03. Educational Attainment-People 25 Years Old and Over, by
Total Money Earnings, Work Experience, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pinc/pinc03.2018.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2020). Among men and women twenty-five years and
older, men significantly outearn women in every statistical category. Id. Men without college
degrees outearn similarly educated women by more than $20,000 per year. Id. Among those
with bachelor’s degrees, men earn $27,000 more per year. Id. Men with professional degrees
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marry older men;195 women are more likely to pause or altogether stop their
careers to take care of children;196 and women who have experienced career
interruptions return to the workforce making less money at lower positions
than their male counterparts.197 Women are less likely to be hired or
promoted to managerial positions and five-fold less likely to be CEOs or
CFOs.198 More than two-thirds of wives in dual-income households earn less
than their husbands, and relatedly, in times of economic downturn, women’s
careers are more likely to take a back seat or end altogether.199 The list goes
on.200 This economic disparity between men and women is present in
virtually every single quantifiable statistic that exists.201
Substitute gender inequality for the more generalized correlation
between age and money, and common sense dictates that older people make
more money and have more assets, giving them more reasons to enter into
prenuptial agreements.202 However, common sense also dictates that because
women of equal age, education, and occupational experience still, on
earn $62,000 more per year. Id. Even men with bachelor’s degrees outearn women with
master’s degrees by more than $16,000 per year. PINC-03., supra.
194.
CASEY E. COPEN, ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., FIRST
MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY
GROWTH 5 (2012). “The median age at first marriage was 25.8 for women and 28.3 for men.”
Id. Women are also nearly three times more likely than men to marry before reaching the age
of twenty. See id. at 5–6.
195.
Carter, supra note 111, at 402; Dan Kopf, Younger Women Tend to Marry
Older Men in the US. That’s finally changing, QUARTZ (Oct. 17, 2018),
http://qz.com/1426405/marriages-in-the-us-are-finally-seeing-more-age-equality/.
196.
Lauren Winn, Job Hunting After 50: How Women Can Plot Their
‘Comeback
Careers’,
NBC
NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2020,
4:23
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/better/lifestyle/job-hunting-after-50-how-women-can-plot-theircomeback-ncna1127376.
197.
See Lauren Weber, Women’s Careers Could Take Long-Term Hit from
Coronavirus
Pandemic,
WALL
ST.
J.
(July
15,
2020,
8:00
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/womens-careers-could-take-long-term-hit-from-coronaviruspandemic-11594814403.
198.
Jess Huang et al., Women in the Workplace 2019, MCKINSEY & CO. (Oct.
15,
2019),
http://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/gender-equality/women-in-theworkplace-2019.
199.
Weber, supra note 197.
200.
See Megan Friedman et al., 18 Ways Women Still Aren’t Equal to Men,
MARIE CLAIRE (Aug. 9, 2019), http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/news/a15652/genderinequality-stats/.
201.
Id.; PINC-03., supra note 193.
202.
See PINC-03., supra note 193. Common sense says that a younger spouse
enters the marriage with less education, a lower-level job, or both; lower-level jobs at younger
ages translate into lower annual income due to fewer years in the workforce; lower annual
income, with fewer years earning the income, translates into fewer accumulated assets; fewer
accumulated assets translates into fewer assets to protect. See id.
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average, make significantly less money than their male counterparts, older
women, on average, have less incentive to enter into prenuptial agreements
because, relative to men, they have less income and fewer assets to protect.203
The gender gap is real enough when two similarly situated partners marry; 204
it is further magnified when younger women marry older men,205 and taken
to its logical and disturbing extreme when the older men are more
educated.206
Combine the data with common sense and the picture is clear:
Prenuptial agreements are overwhelmingly created by and entered into by
wealthy, older men who wish to protect their assets from the younger women
they marry.207 The agreements waive, or significantly reduce, property rights
that women would otherwise possess through equitable distribution.208 The
agreements waive or significantly reduce alimony rights that women would
otherwise be entitled to by statute.209 These agreements are unfair,

203.
See id.
204.
See id. For example, a man between the ages of twenty-five and thirtyfour with a bachelor’s degree who marries a woman between the same age range and
education makes, on average, nearly $15,000 more per year. Id.
205.
See PINC-03., supra note 193. For example, a man between the ages of
thirty-five and forty-four with a bachelor’s degree who marries a younger woman between the
ages of twenty-five and thirty-four with the same education makes, on average, nearly
$40,000 more per year. Id. If both have professional degrees, the man makes on average
almost $120,000 more per year. Id.
206.
See id. For example, a man between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four
with a professional degree who marries a younger woman between the ages of twenty-five and
thirty-four will make, on average, nearly $150,000 more per year. Id. That is, the man will
make ten times the difference when compared to a man and woman of the same age and
education level. PINC-03., supra note 193.
207.
See Brod, supra note 21, at 243; Oldham, supra note 5, at 89 n.45.
Common sense dictates that two similarly situated spouses either have little need to enter into
a prenuptial agreement because they have few or no assets to protect, or any agreement
entered into would reflect their equal bargaining positions and thus be presumptively fair,
negating any reasons to challenge the validity of the agreement upon dissolution. PINC-03.,
supra note 193.
208.
Compare Berg v. Young, 175 So. 3d 863, 868 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2015) (determining the wife waived all rights to equitable distribution), and Flaherty v.
Flaherty, 128 So. 3d 920, 921 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (asserting the prenuptial
agreement waived “any interest in assets acquired during the marriage”), with Brod, supra
note 21, at 234–35, 235 n.20 (“It would be contrary to the very purpose of most premarital
agreements to give the economically vulnerable spouse more than he or she would be entitled
to receive under state law.”), and FLA. STAT. § 61.075 (2019) (“[T]he court must begin with
the premise that the distribution [of assets] should be equal . . . .”).
209.
See, e.g., Waton v. Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (concluding the “[w]ife waived all rights to alimony and equitable distribution by
signing an antenuptial agreement”); FLA. STAT. § 61.08.
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inequitable, and overwhelmingly the product of what feminist theory treats
as duress.210
While feminist literature spans a wide breadth with many diverse
schools of thought, Dr. Orit Gan’s analysis of duress in Contractual Duress
and Relations of Power carries particular weight given her lengthy focus on
duress in relation to prenuptial agreements.211 Gan’s analysis involves a
broad and complex examination of consent with regard to both the micro
forces—from relational dynamics to specific circumstances surrounding
individual agreements—and macro forces—including social, gender, and
economic power disparities—that lead, on the whole, to women succumbing
to coercive pressures in prenuptial agreements.212 However, before delving
into Gan’s analysis, duress and overreaching must first be examined from
within Florida’s common law.213
A.

Duress as Defined Through Florida’s Common Law

Florida courts have defined duress as a mental state “produced by an
improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free
agency of a party and causes him to do an act or make a contract not of his
own volition.”214 Duress requires two showings: (1) the prenuptial
agreement was signed involuntarily; and (2) the involuntariness was caused
by the other party’s coercive conduct.215 In other words, duress involves the
“loss of volition in response to outside compulsion.”216
More important in the prenuptial agreement context is understanding
the factual approximation of what is, and is not, duress.217 For example,
signing a prenuptial agreement under threat of non-marriage does not
constitute duress.218 Threats encompassing life-altering repercussions, on the
210.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 209.
211.
See id. at 208–16.
212.
See id. at 175–87.
213.
See, e.g., Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 524–25 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Brod, supra note 21, at 253–54.
214.
Francavilla, 969 So. 2d at 524–25 (emphasis added); see also infra note
262 and accompanying text. When defining duress in prenuptial agreement cases, the use of
male gendered pronouns in reference to the victim — while women are the parties using the
duress defense — is not insignificant. See Gan, supra note 31, at 194. “Duress typically
excludes women’s perspectives and experiences and ignores pressures unique to women’s
lives.” Id. at 192. “Duress doctrine generally acknowledges pressures and constraints that are
predominantly endured by men.” Id.
215.
Francavilla, 969 So. 2d at 525.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.; Gan, supra note 31, at 175.
218.
E.g., Eager v. Eager, 696 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
“To hold otherwise would effectively provide a per se basis to invalidate most, if not all,
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other hand, do constitute duress.219 Courts have often declared seemingly
arbitrary delineations: Receiving a prenuptial agreement two weeks before
the wedding is not duress, but receiving an agreement two days before the
wedding constitutes duress.220 Accordingly, signing an agreement after
receiving it at 11:30 p.m. the night before the wedding is duress.221 Yet,
signing a prenuptial agreement while seven months pregnant—an hour
before the wedding ceremony—is not duress.222 From this smattering of case
law, the all-or-nothing standards of duress present as defective.223
Other all-or-nothing criteria present as equally dubious.224 Signing a
prenuptial agreement without the advice of an attorney is not duress; neither
is signing an agreement based upon the misrepresentation that it would never
be enforced.225 Bafflingly, signing a prenuptial agreement as a twicedivorced woman with a college nursing degree is, apparently, enough
definitive evidence to negate the possibility of duress:
We first address whether the agreement was reached under duress,
coercion, or overreaching. The record before us presents the
former wife as an individual with a high level of education and
business acumen who, having twice married, understood the
significance of the document she was about to sign and chose not
226
to seek the advice of a lawyer.

The guide of a textured, equitable standard is severely wanting.227
antenuptial property agreements.” Id. The fact that the court recognized that “most, if not
all,” prenuptial agreements are signed under threat of non-marriage is quite disturbing. See id.
219.
Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240, 1243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019). It
cannot be overlooked that the wife’s testimony in this case was unrebutted by the husband
because the husband did not show for trial. Id. at 1242 n.6.
220.
Waton v. Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding no duress); Hjortaas v. McCabe, 656 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(finding duress). The court also noted that the disparity between the husband and wife’s net
worth at the time of marriage demonstrated the “financial power” the husband held over the
wife. Hjortaas, 656 So. 2d at 170.
221.
Flaherty v. Flaherty, 128 So. 3d 920, 921, 924 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2013).
222.
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007). The court noted that the evidence indicated “some months” of negotiations. Id.
223.
See infra note 246 and accompanying text; Levin & McDowell, supra
note 51, at 57.
224.
See Levin & McDowell, supra note 51, at 72–73, 84.
225.
See Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So. 3d 615, 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009);
Cuillo v. Cuillo, 621 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
226.
See Gordon, 25 So. 3d at 616–17.
227.
Levin & McDowell, supra note 51, at 83. Duress, it could be argued, is a
meaningless doctrine outside of equity. See id. at 83 n.141.
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Overreaching

Overreaching, the often mentioned but rarely defined step-cousin of
duress, has no real case law test or precedent in Florida save for a single
case.228 In Schreiber v. Schreiber,229 the court analyzed an overreaching
defense regarding a marital settlement agreement as follows:
The problem we find with [the overreaching] argument is the lack
of competent evidence that the MSA was the product of
overreaching on appellee’s part. It definitely was one-sided and
unfair. But, that alone, no matter how egregious, does not translate
into overreaching absent a sufficient showing that the MSA
resulted from an inequality of bargaining power or other
circumstances such that there was no meaningful choice on the
part of the disadvantaged party. Basically, overreaching involves
the situation where one party, having the ability to force the other
230
into an unfair agreement, does so.

Thus, to constitute overreaching—which, by statute, is an
enumerated defense to invalidate a prenuptial agreement—the party must
show: (1) disproportionate bargaining power or other circumstances; and (2)
no meaningful choice.231 This definition of overreaching necessitates a reexamination of the scenarios Florida case law found were not duress.232
Specifically, is signing a prenuptial agreement under threat of nonmarriage overreaching?233 Should the prospective husband in Lashkajani—
twenty years older and with a significant asset and income advantage—have
been characterized as having disproportionate bargaining power when
compared to his younger, asset-poor prospective wife?234 What about
meaningful choice: Does the prospective wife, when deciding whether to
end the potential marriage over the decision not to sign a document—a

228.
See Schreiber v. Schreiber, 795 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2001). A prenuptial agreement is unenforceable if it is “the product of fraud, duress, coercion,
or overreaching.” FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)(2) (2019). In Schreiber, the court — without a
Florida common law definition — relied on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
“overreaching.” Schreiber, 795 So. 2d at 1057 n.3.
229.
795 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
230.
Id. at 1057.
231.
See id. at 1056, 1057 n.3; FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)(2).
232.
Schreiber, 795 So. 2d at 1056.
233.
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2007); see also infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
234.
See Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 2005).
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document that she never expects to be enforced—have a meaningful
choice?235
What about the woman in Francavilla v. Francavilla,236 who, while
seven months pregnant, signed the prenuptial agreement an hour before the
wedding ceremony?237 Does late-stage pregnancy qualify as “other
circumstances”?238 Did she have a “meaningful choice”?239
In both Lashkajani and Francavilla, the opinions each quoted the
same line from the Supreme Court of Florida decision in Casto v. Casto:240
A prenuptial agreement may be set aside if “reached under fraud, deceit,
duress, coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching.”241 Inexplicably, both
Lashkajani and Francavilla subsequently disregarded any definition,
analysis, or even mention of the word “overreaching” again.242 Perhaps the
Lashkajani and Francavilla courts were merely following Casto’s precedent:
In Casto, the wife sought to set aside a postnuptial agreement “because of
duress and overreaching conduct.”243 The Court touched on duress in its
analysis, but never mentioned or examined overreaching despite the wife
using it as a specific defense to the contract.244 While the length to which
attorneys and litigants within the marital context use overreaching as a
defense is unclear, Florida judges have seemingly scoffed and refused to use
overreaching as a defense to prenuptial agreements seriously.245

235.
Hjortass v. McCabe, 656 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
see also discussion supra Section III.B.
236.
969 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
237.
Id. at 525.
238.
See id.
239.
See id.
240.
508 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1987).
241.
Id. at 333; see also Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1157 (Fla.
2005); Francavilla, 969 So. 2d at 524. Misrepresentation is no longer a valid defense per se,
although the reference likely refers to the misrepresentation of assets, which would be part of
an unconscionability defense. See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a) (2019).
242.
See Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d at 1157; Francavilla, 969 So. 2d at 524.
243.
Casto, 508 So. 2d at 332. The husband threatened to blow up the wife’s
house if she could not find a lawyer who would allow her to sign his proposed agreement. Id.
at 335. Postnuptial agreement case law is controlling for prenuptial agreements. Waton v.
Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 423 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also discussion infra Part
V.
244.
See Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334.
245.
See Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d at 1160; Francavilla, 969 So. 2d at 524.
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“Legal Duress” Versus Gan’s Analysis of Duress

Legal duress,246 i.e., how the common law defines duress, focuses on
the threats of the individual actor while ignoring the exploitation and subtle
economic vulnerabilities women face that directly influence a woman’s
ability to negotiate and contract.247 For example, one-sided, unfair, and
egregious contractual terms proposed by a socially and economically
advantaged party are seen merely as “offers.”248 In Gan’s analysis of duress,
however, Gan sees these one-sided offers through the scope of the parties’
disparate negotiation starting points.249 Taking into account social power
dynamics and systemic economic pressures, Gan’s analysis of duress sees
these “offers” for what they truly are: points along a spectrum ranging from
voluntary (consent) to duress (threats):
[F]eminists see consent as a complicated and nuanced concept . . .
. Human behavior is complex and often cannot be classified as
either duress or consent; there are many intermediate situations in
which hesitation or ambiguity occurs, which the current law does
not recognize. Parties might experience hesitations, conflicted
feelings, subtle pressures, stress, or constraints. They might feel
obligated, pressured, stressed, exploited, or compelled. All of
these intermediate feelings fall in between the two extremes of
250
either consent or duress.

Consider, briefly, the relevant facts of Hahamovitch v.
Hahamovitch:251
Mr. Hahamovitch, a successful thirty-nine-year-old
commercial real estate developer, hired a twenty-one-year-old woman to
work for him for $30,000 per year.252 After a five-year relationship ensued,
the couple decided to marry.253 Mr. Hahamovitch presented his future wife
with a prenuptial agreement that waived all of her rights and claims to
current and future property titled solely in Mr. Hahamovitch’s name, which,
as Mr. Hahamovitch was a real estate developer, meant she would be

246.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 187–88. To distinguish common law duress
from “Gan’s analysis of duress,” the remainder of this section will refer to common law
duress as “legal duress.” See discussion infra Section IV.C.
247.
Gan, supra note 31, at 187–88.
248.
Id. at 188.
249.
See id. at 187–88.
250.
Id. at 201.
251.
174 So. 3d 983 (Fla. 2015).
252.
See Initial Brief on the Merits for Petitioner at 3, Hahamovitch v.
Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 2015) (No. SC 14-277).
253.
Id. at 3–4.
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waiving all rights to his future business.254 Now consider the nearly twentyyear age difference, the employer/employee relationship, and the wide
economic disparity between the parties.255 Does this add up to exploitation?*
Are there subtle economic vulnerabilities at play?* Does the negotiation
starting point—a waiver of all property rights—qualify as an offer between
parties on a level playing field?* The question is, when the woman signs, is
this voluntary?* Duress?* Overreaching?* Or none of the above?*
Legal duress is binary: The contract is either voluntary or a product
of threats.256 The truth is, most, if not all prenuptial agreements, as with
contracts generally, fit somewhere in the middle.257 Gan’s analysis of duress
calls for contractual voluntariness to be viewed along a spectrum, ranging
from consent to coercion, with overreaching, social and economic
inequalities, and pressures unique to women’s lives packing the gray areas in
between.258 Contract, with its rigid rules and binary thinking, is not equipped
to utilize Gan’s analysis of duress.259 Equity, on the other hand, is.260
Equity, the court of conscience, the court of fairness, the court with
“wide discretion in fashioning remedies to satisfy the exigencies of the
circumstances,” is fully equipped to evaluate prenuptial agreements through
Gan’s analysis of duress.261 If contract views duress as binary, equity sees
duress in three dimensions.262
254.
Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d at 985.
255.
See discussion infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text; Gan, supra
note 31, at 188, 193–94.
256.
Gan, supra note 31, at 201. Legal duress “acknowledges pressures and
constraints that are predominantly endured by men, such as the threat of physical harm, threat
to damage goods, threat to breach a contract, and other economic threats.” Id. at 192.
257.
Id. at 194; see also Eager v. Eager, 696 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
258.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 201. An incomplete list of pressures unique to
women’s lives include social sexual pressures, prostitution, sexual harassment, forced
marriage, and rape. Id. at 192.
259.
See discussion supra Section II.C; Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n v.
Whispering Lakes I, L.L.C., 155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
260.
See discussion supra Section II.C; Wicker v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of
Dade Cnty., 106 So. 2d 550, 558 (Fla. 1958).
261.
Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
see also Gan, supra note 31, at 201.
262.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 201. In Florida, the common law duress
definition originates from a 1928 Supreme Court of Florida ruling. See Herald v. Hardin, 116
So. 863, 864 (Fla. 1928). “Duress is a condition of mind produced by an improper external
pressure or influence that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do
an act or make a contract not of his own volition.” Id. Needless to say, while American
society’s views on women have changed considerably since then, the common law definition
of duress has remained the same. Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 524–25 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (using seventy-nine-year-old common law definition of duress).
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Reconsider the basic facts from Lashkajani, viewed through Gan’s
analysis: Three days prior to their wedding, the wife, age twenty-five, signed
a prenuptial agreement with her significantly wealthier husband, age fortyfive.263 Where does a twenty-year age gap between parties with wide
economic disparity fit along the spectrum of voluntary and duress?264 If a
court of equity balances each of the relevant factors, weighing the social and
economic inequalities with the unique pressures women face both at the
macro level (within society) and at the micro level (three days prior to the
wedding), then perhaps such a court would arrive at a conclusion where the
most egregious and unfair parts of the agreement are invalidated, the contract
is reformed, or the agreement is held void in its entirety.265 While the
outcome cannot be determined beforehand with precision, this much is clear:
As contract toils in black and white, equity thrives in color.266
D.

A Note on Unconscionability

Unconscionability, like duress, is a defense to contract
enforcement.267 At common law, an unconscionable contract is viewed as
one “no man [sic] in his senses and not under delusion would make on the
one hand, and as no honest and fair man [sic] would accept on the other.”268
Florida courts favor a balancing approach to unconscionability.269 This
means that while both the procedural and substantive prongs of
unconscionability must be present in order to invalidate a contract, “they
need not be present in the same degree.”270 Under common law, an
263.
Respondent/Former Wife’s Answer Brief at 8, Lashkajani v. Lashkajani,
911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2005) (No. SC03-1275).
264.
Id.; see also Gan, supra note 31, at 201.
265.
Cf. Goodall v. Whispering Woods Ctr., L.L.C., 990 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Reformation in equity is available when mutual mistake causes the
contract to inaccurately “express the true intention or agreement of the parties . . . .” Id.
266.
Compare Bethany Trace Owners’ Ass’n v. Whispering Lakes I, L.L.C.,
155 So. 3d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (explaining common law contract
interpretation is a question of pure law involving formal, rigid rules), with Rennolds v.
Rennolds, 312 So. 2d 538, 542 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
267.
AMS Staff Leasing, Inc. v. Taylor, 158 So. 3d 682, 687 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2015).
268.
Id. at 688 (quoting Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)).
269.
Basulto v. Hialeah Auto., 141 So. 3d 1145, 1159 (Fla. 2014).
270.
Id. Procedural unconscionability focuses on “the manner in which the
contract was entered,” including the relative bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, the
negotiation process, and “the complaining party’s ability and opportunity to understand the
disputed terms of the contract.” Id. at 1157 n.3. Substantive unconscionability focuses on the
“outrageous degree of unfairness” within the contract itself. Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So.
2d 884, 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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outrageously unfair substantive contract or provision, for example, requires
only a “modicum” of procedural unfairness in order to be invalidated.271
Unconscionability is thus a flexible “safety valve” from the rigid
rules of contract.272 It is “chameleon-like,” without black letter rules, and is
“so vague that neither the courts, practicing attorneys, nor contract draftsmen
can determine with any degree of certainty when it will apply in any given
situation.”273 Perhaps for these reasons, and given the nature of the
relationships of parties agreeing to prenuptial agreements, the guidelines for
unconscionable prenuptial agreements are codified in the Florida Statutes.274
Under Chapter 61, a prenuptial agreement or provision is
unenforceable if the defending party proves: (1) the agreement was
unconscionable at the time of execution; and (2) the defending party shows
he or she was not provided with, did not waive, and could not have
reasonably known, the other party’s property or financial obligations.275 The
guidelines for unconscionable prenuptial agreements were outlined in the
1962 Supreme Court of Florida case, Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio.276 There,
the Court stated, “[a] valid antenuptial agreement contemplates a fair and
reasonable provision therein . . . or, absent such provision, a full and frank
disclosure . . . of the husband’s worth, or, absent such disclosure, a general
and approximate knowledge . . . of the prospective husband’s property.”277
In other words, an unconscionable prenuptial agreement is an unfair
agreement “executed in the absence of full and fair financial disclosure . . .
.”278
But what constitutes “full” financial disclosure?279 Consider the
divide between the majority and dissent in Gordon v. Gordon.280 There, the
Fourth District evaluated the husband’s failure to disclose his airline pension
271.
Basulto, 141 So. 3d at 1159.
272.
Steinhardt, 422 So. 2d at 890; see also Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A. v.
Law Offices of E. Clay Parker, 160 So. 3d 955, 958 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (listing
other contractual safety valves).
273.
Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 283 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); see also Steinhardt, 422 So. 2d at 890; Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda,
464 So. 2d 626, 628 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
274.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a) (2019); Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334
(Fla. 1987). (“[P]arties to a marriage are not dealing at arm’s length . . . .”).
275.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)(3)(a.)–(c.). The defending party must
show: (1) the substantive prong, as defined by the vague term “unconscionable”; and (2) the
procedural prong, as defined by the process of financial disclosure. Id.; Casto, 508 So. 2d at
333–34.
276.
143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
277.
Id. at 20.
278.
Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
279.
See id.
280.
25 So. 3d 615 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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plan prior to the wife signing the prenuptial agreement.281 The majority held
that disclosure of “every minute detail” was not required and thus the
prenuptial agreement was valid.282 The dissent, on the other hand,
characterized the husband’s underreporting of potentially $229,000 as
“neither a minute detail nor excusably inexact.”283 By comparison, the
Second District in Hjortaas v. McCabe,284 found the omittance of two
million dollars in financial statements as insufficient disclosure.285 The line,
it seems, falls somewhere in between.286 Enter equity:
The law in Florida is clear that an unconscionable contract or an
unconscionable term therein will not be enforced by a court of
equity. “It seems to be established by the authorities that where it
is perfectly plain to the court that one party [to a contract] has
overreached the other and has gained an unjust and undeserved
advantage which it would be inequitable to permit him to enforce,
that a court of equity will not hesitate to interfere, even though the
victimized parties owe their predicament largely to their own
stupidity and carelessness.”287

What is clear is that the vague standards of unconscionability and
binary standards of legal duress are in need of both clarity and revision.288
These concepts require better measures than common law contract has thus
far provided, but not one in which contract, or any other area of the law, is
incapable of providing.289 The law, in fact, constantly reviews and adjusts to
broad and vague concepts—from due process and copyright infringement to
reckless driving and the best interests of the child—and adjusts with
standards of reasonableness and fairness in mind.290 Here, in the case of
prenuptial agreements, the solution is not a rewriting of common law
contract, but a slight nudge toward interpretation in line with the rest of
Chapter 61 proceedings.291

281.
Id. at 616.
282.
Id. at 617.
283.
Id. at 618 (Ciklin, J., dissenting).
284.
656 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
285.
Id. at 170.
286.
See id.; Gordon, 25 So. 3d at 617–18.
287.
Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422 So. 2d 884, 889 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(quoting Peacock Hotel, Inc. v. Shipman, 138 So. 44, 46 (1931)).
288.
See Gan, supra note 31, at 194, 197–98.
289.
See id.; discussion supra Section II.C.
290.
See Biemiller, supra note 3, at 148–49.
291.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.30(11)(a)(11) (2019).
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CONTRACT MODIFICATION: THE SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE STANDARD

People invariably change over time.292 Personality, once thought to
be a fixed set of traits that remain static across life, is now seen as dynamic
and ever-changing.293 A considerable source of personality change is the
effect that life events have upon a particular person.294 Specifically, the
transition to marriage and the ongoing marital relationship have been
identified as major contributors to personality change.295
Scientists measure personality through the “Big Five” personality
traits: agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and
openness to experience.296 Although fluctuations in marital satisfaction have
been linked to each of the “Big Five” traits, upward changes in neuroticism
have most consistently been associated with a decline in marital
satisfaction.297 Importantly, initial levels of neuroticism are less relevant to
marital satisfaction than the changes of neuroticism over time. 298 Thus,
292.
Justin A. Lavner et al., Personality Change Among Newlyweds: Patterns,
Predictors, and Associations with Marital Satisfaction over Time, 54 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH.
1172, 1183 (2017).
293.
Id. While young people experience a greater magnitude of change,
personality changes are evident throughout all ages and phases of life. Jordi Quoidbach et al.,
The End of History Illusion, 339 SCIENCE 96, 98 (2013).
294.
See Madison S. O’Meara & Susan C. South, Big Five Personality
Domains and Relationship Satisfaction: Direct Effects and Correlated Change over Time, 87
J. PERSONALITY 1206, 1207 (2019). Personality may also impact and direct certain life events,
which in turn further impacts personality. See Lavner et al., supra note 292, at 1183.
Personality is thus said to “covary” — meaning fluctuate alongside — with changes in marital
satisfaction. Id.
295.
See Lavner et al., supra note 292, at 1172. Marriage, among other things,
affects “lifestyle, identity, and responsibilities.” Id. at 1173.
296.
Diederik Boertien & Dimitri Mortelmans, Does the Relationship Between
Personality and Divorce Change over Time? A Cross-Country Comparison of Marriage
Cohorts, 61 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 300, 302 (2018). The “Big Five” is a classification system
that consolidates the expansive list of traits identified by researchers into five categories. Id.
In general, agreeableness refers to traits including trust, cooperation, and sympathy;
conscientiousness includes discipline, detail, and ambition; extraversion refers to sociability;
neuroticism is marked by hostility, insecurity, anxiety, self-consciousness, and depression;
and openness to experience includes boldness, originality, and creativity. Id.; see also Carly
D. L. LeBaron, Stability and Change in Women’s Personality Across the Life Course (July
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bringham Young University) (on file with Brigham
Young University).
297.
See Boertien & Mortelmans, supra note 296, at 302, 312 (suggesting
martial satisfaction predictors include agreeableness, openness to experience, and
neuroticism); Lavner et al., supra note 292, at 1173 (“[N]euroticism, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, and extraversion are associated with an individual’s own marital
satisfaction . . . .”).
298.
O’Meara & South, supra note 294, at 1217. Perhaps of relevance,
research shows that entering into a new relationship is associated with a significant increase in
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while negative changes to openness to experience and conscientiousness are
direct indicators of an increased likelihood of divorce, changes leading to
increased neuroticism mark the most “rapid pathways toward divorce.”299
What does this all mean?300 It means that adults—specifically
married adults—change over time.301 The problem is, people are able to
recognize and reflect upon past personality changes but cannot and do not
recognize the possibility of future personality changes.302 This is called the
“end of history illusion.”303 The end of history illusion is a cognitive bias
that causes parties to miscalculate both the likelihood of personal changes
Specifically, people are
and the consequences of such changes.304
predisposed to view the present as a milestone—that is, the defining moment
of their own personal history—where who they currently are, will forever
remain who they will be.305 The end of history illusion has wide-ranging
implications for marriage and divorce, causing parties to overpay for future
possibilities (e.g., divorce) in order to satiate their current preferences (e.g.,
marriage).306 Add prenuptial agreements to the mix, and the inability to
predict how and when a party will change has tremendous consequences.307
Changes are not just limited to a person’s personality.308 While
personality changes might factor into the demise of a marriage, other
significant changes may transform a previously fair prenuptial agreement
into an oppressive burden should the parties divorce.309 The point, then, is
extraversion and a decrease in neuroticism. Lavner et al., supra note 292, at 1173. This
means that new relationships may be characterized by unusual changes to neuroticism; how
the individual’s neuroticism fluctuates over the course of the relationship, as opposed to the
actual neuroticism level, may better correspond with the overall marital satisfaction. Id. at
1173.
299.
See Boertien & Mortelmans, supra note 296, at 313; Ronald D. Rogge et
al., Predicting Marital Distress and Dissolution: Refining the Two-Factor Hypothesis, 20 J.
FAM. PSYCH. 156, 159 (2006). One study found that the transition to parenthood was marked
by significant changes to a wife’s neuroticism. See LeBaron, supra note 296.
300.
See Lavner et al., supra note 292, at 1183.
301.
Id.
302.
See Quoidbach et al., supra note 293, at 98.
303.
See id. at 96.
304.
Id.
305.
Id.
306.
Id.
307.
See Famiglio v. Famiglio, 279 So. 3d 736, 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2019) (“The tiniest words can have the greatest consequence. In this appeal of a judgment
interpreting a prenuptial agreement, the word ‘a,’ the smallest of words in the English
language, could mean the difference of a million and a half dollars.”).
308.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 cmt. b, illus. 1 (AM. L. INST. 2002).
309.
See id. Consider the following adapted illustration: Prior to their
marriage, Husband and Wife entered into a prenuptial agreement that designated all property
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that people and their lives change in unexpected ways, or at least, unexpected
to them.310 Equity allows for these changes to be taken into consideration,
while common law contract, for the most part, does not.311 This section will
explore how equity, specifically in Florida’s Chapter 61 proceedings, allows
for fair modifications to otherwise set-in-stone contracts, agreements, or final
judgments due to the substantial, material, and unanticipated change tests.312
A.

Chapter 61 Modifications

Chapter 61 proceedings in equity legitimize and thus allow
unexpected life changes—changes that render prior agreements and
judgments inapplicable, unjust, or unrealistic—as grounds for
modification.313 Accordingly, Chapter 61 proceedings seek equitable
solutions through a weighing of all the necessary factors.314 While the
analysis and outcomes between child support, timesharing, parental
responsibility, and alimony may vary, Florida’s statutory policy recognizes
that people change, situations differ, outcomes are unexpected, and fairness
dictates that these problems are resolved properly.315

titled in the other’s name as nonmarital and waived any and all future alimony. Id. Husband
and Wife were the same age, held the same job, earned the same income, held no significant
assets, and neither wanted children. Id. However, two years into the marriage, Wife’s sister
died in a tragic car accident, leaving Wife as the legal guardian of her two young nieces. Id.
With her husband’s blessing, Wife switched to part-time in order to devote her time to
parenting; soon after, Wife dropped out of the workforce altogether. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b, illus. 1. Meanwhile, Husband received several promotions with
corresponding pay raises. Id. Several years later, Husband and Wife divorce. Id. Wife
leaves the marriage with no job, no assets, no alimony, two children, no child support (her
Husband did not legally adopt the children), and no retirement plan. Id. Meanwhile, Husband
leaves the marriage with significant assets, a substantial retirement plan, and twice the income
as when the marriage began. Id.
310.
Quoidbach et al., supra note 293, at 96.
311.
See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 29 (2020); PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b, illus. 1; FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a) (2019).
312.
See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 29; PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §
7.05; discussion infra Section V.A.
313.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (allowing modification to parental
responsibility and timesharing); id. § 61.14(1)(a) (allowing modification of alimony); id. §
61.30(1)(b) (allowing modification of child support).
314.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05; FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3).
315.
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05.
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Child Support

In Chapter 61 proceedings, child support is determined by the
Florida statutory guidelines.316 Florida uses the income shares model, where
each parent pays their pro-rata share of the support amount.317 However, as
the proceedings are in equity, judges have the discretion to deviate from the
guideline amount based on a balancing of any relevant factors unique to the
parties and their children.318 Once child support has been determined via
final judgment or agreement by the parties, the trial court retains continuing
jurisdiction, and either parent may petition to modify child support provided
the statutory criteria are met.319
“[A] fundamental prerequisite to bringing an action to modify child
support payments is a showing of substantial change of circumstances.”320
Because future events and the resulting effects cannot be known at the time
of original child support determination, Florida case law allows for a threepart test for child support modification.321 The moving party must show:
“(1) a substantial change in circumstances; (2) the change was not
contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) the
change is sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in nature.”322
In order to prove a substantial change in circumstances, the movant
must show a difference of fifteen percent or fifty dollars per month,
whichever is greater, between the initial monthly child support obligation
and the current statutory obligation if the changed circumstances are
accepted.323 A significant increase in income due to a promotion or second
316.
FLA. STAT. § 61.29.
317.
See id. Child support is calculated from net income, which is gross
income minus post-tax and involuntary contributions. FLA. STAT. § 61.30(3).
318.
FLA. STAT. § 61.30(11)(a). If the deviation is greater than five percent
above or below the guideline amount, the judge must provide written findings why the
deviation is fair. Id. § 61.30(1)(a).
319.
See id. § 61.13(1)(a)(2); Maher v. Maher, 96 So. 3d 1022, 1022 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2012). In the event the parties agree to a non-guideline child support amount,
the judge must examine the agreement to ensure the child’s right of support has not been
adversely affected. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1)(a)(1)(c).
320.
Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811, 813 (Fla. 1997); accord Brown v.
Brown, 180 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (per curiam); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 61.13(1)(a)(2).
321.
Harbin v. Harbin, 762 So. 2d 561, 562 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
322.
E.g., id. When the initial determination is based upon an agreement by the
parties, as opposed to a final judgment, “there is a heavier burden on the party seeking a
downward modification.” Wood v. Wood, 162 So. 3d 133, 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(per curiam).
323.
FLA. STAT. § 61.30(1)(b); Brown, 180 So. 3d at 1073. For example, a pay
cut from $100,000 per year down to $97,000 per year would not qualify as a substantial
enough change. See FLA. STAT. § 61.30(1)(b).
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occupation, for example, is grounds for an upward modification of child
support.324 Voluntary retirement does not qualify as grounds for a downward
modification of child support, but forced retirement, because it is involuntary
and unanticipated, is grounds for downward modification.325 Likewise, a
substantial decline in income due to major business losses is also grounds for
downward modification.326 A dramatic drop in 100% commission-based
salary, however, is not grounds for downward modification where
fluctuations were previously contemplated and expected.327
In total, a trial court in Chapter 61 proceedings has the power to
make any adjustments and modifications necessary in order “to achieve an
equitable result.”328
2.

Parenting Plan

In Chapter 61 proceedings, modifications to a parenting plan—which
include timesharing and parental responsibility—also require a prerequisite
substantial change test.329 Specifically, the moving party must show: (1) a
substantial, material change in circumstances; (2) the change was
unanticipated by the parties; and (3) the modification serves the best interests
of the child.330 Because the presumption favors the reasonableness of the
original parenting plan determination, the party moving for modification
carries an extraordinary burden of proving each element of the substantial
change test.331 Thus, a showing of hostility, poor communication regarding
324.
See Shaw v. Nelson, 4 So. 3d 740, 742, 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
However, a court may disregard income from a second occupation if such employment was
obtained in order to support subsequent children. FLA. STAT. § 61.30(12)(a).
325.
Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1992); Harbin, 762 So. 2d at
562–63.
326.
Suarez v. Suarez, 284 So. 3d 1083, 1085, 1087 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2019). The court held the substantial loss in business income — which occurred due to
changed industry regulations, severe market fluctuations, and the loss of a preeminent client
— warranted an adjustment in alimony, but reversed and remanded the change in child
support due to a separate error by the trial judge. Id. at 1087, 1090. The test for child support
and alimony is otherwise the same. See Harbin, 762 So. 2d at 562 n.2.
327.
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 264 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
328.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.30(11)(a)(11).
329.
Brown v. Brown, 180 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(per curiam).
330.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2); see, e.g., Korkmaz v. Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d 263,
265 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). Florida Statute section 61.13(3) enumerates a laundry list
of considerations when determining the best interest of the child. See FLA. STAT. §
61.13(3)(a)–(t).
331.
See, e.g., Ragle v. Ragle, 82 So. 3d 109, 111 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2011). Courts view changes to child timesharing arrangements as disruptive. Id. at 113. The
goal is to promote stability and finality for the children, and modification proceedings run
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important decisions, and an angry and bitter relationship on the part of one
parent toward the other is insufficient to establish changed circumstances as
a justification for modification.332 A showing of parental alienation, on the
other hand, may justify modification.333 Conversely, a parent’s relocation,
even to another state, does not constitute a substantial change.334
B.

Alimony Modification

Compared to child support, timesharing, and parental responsibility,
alimony modification proceedings should have a more direct parallel to how
prenuptial agreements are adjudicated considering the frequency of which
prenuptial agreements contain or waive alimony payments.335 However, this
is not the case.336 While prenuptial agreements are enforced through
common law contract, alimony modification is adjudicated in accordance
with the principles of equity.337 The problem though is that the analyses and
policy arguments offered by the courts in favor of equitable alimony
modification erode and often directly contradict arguments held out in favor
of strict contractual enforcement of prenuptial agreements.338
In Chapter 61 proceedings, modifications to alimony also require—
hardly surprising at this point—the prerequisite substantial change test.339
The elements to the substantial change test for alimony are identical to the
child support test.340 The moving party must show: “(1) there has been a
substantial change in circumstances; (2) the change was not contemplated at
counter to this goal. See Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d at 265. Therefore, policy governs that trial
courts be given less discretion in modification than during initial child timesharing
determinations. Ragle, 82 So. 3d at 113. The presumption and resulting modification
standard apply to settlement agreements incorporated into final judgments as well as final
judgments that resulted after adversarial hearings. Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 934
(Fla. 2005).
332.
Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d at 266; see also Sanchez v. Hernandez, 45 So. 3d 57,
62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (asserting acrimonious relationship does not qualify as a
substantial change).
333.
Korkmaz, 200 So. 3d at 265.
334.
Ragle, 82 So. 3d at 112.
335.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(4)(a)(4). (“Parties to a premarital agreement may
contract with respect to: . . . [t]he establishment, modification, waiver, or elimination of child
support . . . .”).
336.
See Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. 1992).
337.
See id.
338.
Compare id. at 536–37 (arguing public policy favors downward
modification of alimony under certain, reasonable circumstances), with Petracca v. Petracca,
706 So. 2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding unreasonable and unfair
domestic bargains are enforceable because public policy favors freedom of contract).
339.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a).
340.
Harbin v. Harbin, 762 So. 2d 561, 562 n.2 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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the time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) the change is sufficient,
material, permanent, and involuntary.”341 However, there are two notable
differences in application of the test.342 First, the party seeking the alimony
modification bears the same burden of proof regardless of whether the
alimony award was initiated through a final judgment or a marital settlement
agreement.343 Second, and most importantly, the equitable substantial
change test for alimony also applies to prenuptial agreements despite
decades of contradictory case law.344
1.

Alimony Modification in Case Law

In Pimm v. Pimm,345 the Supreme Court of Florida answered a
certified question as to whether alimony payments from a final judgment of
dissolution of marriage could be modified due to the husband’s voluntary
retirement.346 The judgment was silent regarding alimony payments posthusband’s retirement.347
The wife argued that the retirement was
contemplated at the time of the final judgment, and the silence in the
agreement was evidence that, regardless of retirement, the husband would
continue paying.348 The husband argued that if his reduced income upon
retirement—after retiring at a normal age—was not considered a substantial
change, then he would never be able to retire.349
The Court in Pimm, fully in line with equitable principles, dictated
that the lower court weigh the reasonableness of a voluntary retirement
against the consequences that a reduction in alimony would have upon the
receiving spouse.350 The Court explicitly mandated a balancing test with the
retiree’s age, health, motivation, and occupation weighed against the
receiving spouse’s needs, income, and accumulated assets.351 In other words,
the Court mandated that a voluntary agreement entered into thirteen years

341.
E.g., id.; Bauchman v. Bauchman, 253 So. 3d 1143, 1147 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2018); Dogoda v. Dogoda, 233 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
342.
See Dogoda, 233 So. 3d at 486; Posner v. Posner (Posner II), 257 So. 2d
530, 534 (Fla. 1972).
343.
FLA. STAT. § 61.14(7); Dogoda, 233 So. 3d at 486; Garvey v. Garvey, 138
So. 3d 1115, 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
344.
See Posner II, 257 So. 2d at 534.
345.
601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
346.
Id. at 535. The alimony portion of the judgement was reached via marital
settlement agreement. Id.
347.
Id. at 537.
348.
Id.
349.
Pimm, 601 So. 2d at 536.
350.
Id. at 537.
351.
Id.
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prior be interpreted and modified through equity.352 Yet, prenuptial
agreements—which are also putatively voluntary and often entered into
thirteen or more years prior—are interpreted and enforced through
contract.353
Moreover, since Pimm was decided in 1992, a substantial amount of
case law has recognized the equitable principles regarding alimony
modification.354 From Bauchman v. Bauchman355—“The trial court has
broad discretion to modify a former spouse’s alimony obligation ‘as equity
requires, [giving] due regard to the changed circumstances’” of the parties—
to Dogoda v. Dogoda356—“when the parties enter into an agreement for
payments for . . . alimony . . . the court has jurisdiction to make orders as
equity requires, with due regard to the changed circumstances or the
financial ability of the parties”—and Suarez v. Suarez:357 “In considering
[alimony] modification, the court can and should take into consideration all
factors and contrast the total circumstances at the time of the original order
with all the current circumstances.”358 There is a reason these cases continue
to cite the same or similar language: The language is codified in Chapter 61
of the Florida Statutes.359 The court in Gelber v. Brydger360 summed it up
best:
Concerning modifications of support, maintenance, and alimony
agreements or orders, section 61.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2017),
is primarily concerned with equity and fairness. In the part
pertinent to this case, the statute provides:

352.
See id. It bears noting that institutionalized sexism could play a role in
cases like these. See Brod, supra note 21, at 266–67 (observing hostility toward gender
equality is apparent in many judicial opinions). When women have sought to invalidate
prenuptial agreements that were unfairly paying little or nothing after a period of many years,
courts have had no trouble enforcing the agreements as contracts; in Pimm, however, when the
man sought to modify the marital settlement agreement because he felt it was unfair to pay the
same amount after retirement, the court deemed it necessary to interpret the agreement in
equity. See Pimm, 601 So. 2d at 537.
353.
See Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015).
354.
Pimm, 601 So. 2d at 535; see also Bauchman v. Bauchman, 253 So. 3d
1143, 1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Dogoda v. Dogoda, 233 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Suarez v. Suarez, 284 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
355.
253 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
356.
233 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
357.
284 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
358.
Suarez, 284 So. 3d at 1086–87 (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 37 So. 3d 877,
880 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010)); Bauchman, 253 So. 3d at 1146; Dogoda, 233 So. 3d at
486; FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a) (2019).
359.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a).
360.
248 So. 3d 1170 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
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When the parties enter into an agreement for payments for . . .
alimony . . . and the circumstances or the financial ability of either
party changes . . . either party may apply to the circuit court . . . for
an order decreasing or increasing the amount of . . . alimony, and
the court has jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires, with
due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of
the parties . . . decreasing, increasing, or confirming the amount of
. . . alimony provided for in the agreement or order. The statute
refers to changed circumstances and financial ability and permits
the court to enter orders “as equity requires.” 361

In other words, alimony modifications due to changed circumstances
are adjudicated in equity.362 The statute is clear and the case law
interpretation is clear.363 So why are prenuptial agreements adjudicated in
contract?364 An “agreement for payments” bears no logical differentiation
from a “prenuptial agreement for payments.”365 The answer lies deep within
Florida’s case law.366
2.

Prenuptial Agreement Modification in Case Law

In Casto, the Supreme Court of Florida used the terms “postnuptial
agreement,” “settlement agreement,” “property settlement agreement,”
“separation agreement,” and “marital agreement” interchangeably.367
Subsequent decisions interpreted the Casto Court’s ambivalent terminology
as precedent when applied to both prenuptial and marital settlement
agreements.368 Accordingly, if marital settlement agreements for alimony are
modifiable in equity, and Casto set a precedent that marital settlement and
361.
Id. at 1172.
362.
See id.
363.
Id. That the statute is clear may admittedly be hyperbole; the line quoted
is a long and winding 199 words and is virtually indecipherable without repeated re-readings.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a).
364.
See Posner v. Posner (Posner II), 257 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla. 1972).
365.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a). Of course, a prenuptial agreement may
waive alimony and thus not technically be an agreement for payments. Id. In such instances,
the substantial change test could still apply, given that trial courts have broad discretion to
modify an alimony obligation — in this case, an obligation of zero dollars — as equity
requires. See id.
366.
See Chief Reporter’s Foreword, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at xvii (AM. L. INST. 2002).
367.
See Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 331–34 (Fla. 1987).
368.
See Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So. 3d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(noting Casto’s principles apply to prenuptial agreements); Schreiber v. Schreiber, 795 So. 2d
1054, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court’s interpretation of Casto as
applied to alimony provisions in marital settlement agreements).
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prenuptial agreements are to be viewed equally, why then, are prenuptial
agreements viewed as unmodifiable contracts at dissolution of marriage?369
Actually, the Supreme Court of Florida twice ruled that prenuptial
agreements are modifiable.370 In Posner v. Posner (Posner I),371 the seminal
case on prenuptial agreements, the Court held:
In summary, we hold that the antenuptial agreement, if entered
into under [procedurally fair conditions], was a valid and binding
agreement between the parties at the time and under the conditions
it was made, but subject to be increased or decreased under
changed conditions as provided in [section] 61.14, Florida
372
Statutes, F.S.A.

After a remand to the trial court, the wife was precluded from
presenting evidence relating to changed circumstances during the
marriage.373 The wife appealed to the Third Circuit, interpreting Posner I as
allowing for the wife to “show a change of circumstances from the date of
the execution of the antenuptial agreement,” as opposed to the trial court’s
interpretation that a change in circumstances could only be shown after the
entry of final judgment.374 At issue, it seems, was a single line of language
in dicta taken from Posner I that stated, “the question of the modification
thereof upon a showing of a change in circumstances after the entry of the
decree of divorce.”375 When the Third Circuit affirmed, the wife again
appealed, asking the Supreme Court of Florida to clarify its prior language
from Posner I.376 In quashing the Third Circuit and trial court’s
369.
Posner v. Posner (Posner I), 233 So. 2d 381, 385–86 (Fla. 1970).
370.
See Posner v. Posner (Posner II), 257 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1972).
371.
233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
372.
See id. at 386. Prenuptial agreements that divided property at the death of
a spouse were long recognized as “conducive to marital tranquility” and thus favored by
public policy. Id. at 383; Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962).
Prenuptial agreements that facilitated divorce, however, were illegal. Posner I, 233 So. 2d at
382. Posner I spurred the national movement as the first case to recognize prenuptial
agreements as valid at divorce. Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2078.
373.
Posner II, 257 So. 2d at 533.
374.
Posner v. Posner, 245 So. 2d 139, 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971), rev’d,
257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972).
375.
Posner I, 233 So. 2d at 385 (emphasis added). Justice Spector’s
concurring opinion in Posner I further stated, in part, “I agree with Justice Roberts[] . . . that
the wife’s circumstances have so changed since the amount agreed upon was incorporated in a
divorce decree.” Id. at 386 (Spector, J., specially concurring). While neither Justice Spector’s
concurring nor Justice Roberts’ majority opinions explicitly held the change in circumstances
must be post-judgment, one can understand why the trial and appellate courts interpreted
Posner I as they did. See id.
376.
See Posner II, 257 So. 2d at 533.
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interpretations, the Court reiterated its mandate by holding that changed
circumstances may be shown from the date of final judgment as well as the
“date of the agreement”:
In addition, the mandate of this Court required consideration by
the trial court of Florida Statutes [section] 61.14, F.S.A., which
provides that a change in circumstances of the party since the date
of the agreement can be considered by the Chancellor in
modification of support and alimony provided for in an antenuptial
377
agreement.

Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida unequivocally mandated that
trial courts follow the statute in regard to equitable modifications of
prenuptial agreements.378 Specifically, the Court noted that changed
circumstances apply from the date the agreement was signed.379 The Court
further espoused equitable principles regarding prenuptial contract
interpretation: “Freedom to contract includes freedom to make a bad
bargain. But freedom to contract is not always absolute. The public interest
requires that antenuptial agreements be executed under conditions of candor
and fairness.”380 Whether Posner II called for an equitable interpretation of
prenuptial agreements or a less rigid contractual interpretation remains open
for discussion.381 However, this much is clear: While prenuptial agreement
case law since Posner II has shifted toward greater freedom of contract,
Florida Statute section 61.14—which allows for equitable alimony
modifications to any agreements—has remained the same.382
So, what does this contradiction in the law mean, and how should
this misunderstood statute apply?383 First, any prenuptial agreement that
contains alimony provisions—either waiver or express payments—should be
modifiable under the substantial change test at dissolution of marriage
adjudication.384 Second, while the statute and the Posner I and Posner II
377.
Id. at 534. (emphasis omitted).
378.
Id.
379.
Id.
380.
Id. at 535.
381.
See Osborne v. Osborne, 604 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (per curiam). Citing Posner II, the Second Circuit in Osborne affirmed the trial court’s
upward modification of alimony due to changed circumstances. Id. (citing Posner II, 257 So.
2d at 533). The changed circumstances included a fifteen-year marriage, two children, a
significant increase in the husband’s income, and a five-fold increase in the husband’s net
worth. Id. at 859–60; Posner II, 257 So. 2d at 535, 537.
382.
Compare Posner v. Posner (Posner I), 233 So. 2d 381, 385–86 (Fla. 1970)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 61.14), with FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a) (2019).
383.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a).
384.
See id.
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rulings do not mention asset distribution, it should reasonably follow that
asset distribution in a prenuptial agreement be similarly modifiable at
dissolution of marriage adjudication.385 These two substantial change test
applications—although contrary to Florida’s current common law contract
interpretation of prenuptial agreements—are not novel concepts; in fact, the
American Law Institute (“ALI”) recommended precisely the same
measures.386
C.

The American Law Institute’s Recommendations

In 2002, the ALI released Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, a comprehensive restatement
and set of black-letter recommendations in the area of family law.387
Deliberately titled “Principles,” the ALI decided against a more formal
“Restatement” of the law because it felt the social and legal consequences of
marital dissolutions necessitated better legislative and judicial guidance.388
Of particular significance, section 7.05 examined circumstances surrounding
enforcement of prenuptial agreements where, if enforced, such agreements
“would work a substantial injustice” against one of the parties to the
agreement.389 Section 7.05 contains a set of black-letter statutory guidelines
and associated commentary that the ALI felt would better serve the
administration of justice.390
Specifically, section 7.05 called for greater scrutiny of prenuptial
agreements where, since the time of execution: (1) ten or more years
elapsed; (2) the couple, without prior children in common, either birthed or
adopted a child; or (3) a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances
has occurred.391 In essence, each of the first two factors could fit within the
385.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.14; Posner I, 233 So. 2d at 385–86; Posner II, 257
So. 2d at 537. Unlike alimony, equitable distribution is not modifiable after final judgment;
this has more to do with res judicata and the impracticality of modifying property awards
many years down the road. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(7)–(8). Imagine, for example, a house
awarded to one spouse at final judgment; six years down the line, the other seeks modification
to get the house back; two years later, the first seeks modification to get the other’s car. See
FLA. STAT. § 61.075. This kind of back-and-forth property-switching litigation would amount
to utter absurdity. See id.
386.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05(2)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2002).
387.
Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2083.
388.
Director’s Foreword, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at xv (AM. L. INST. 2002).
389.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05.
390.
Id.; Chief Reporter’s Foreword, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at xvii (Am. L. Inst. 2002).
391.
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b, § 7.05(2)(a)–(c).
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guise of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change.392 In the first
factor, the transition to divorce from a decade or more of marriage is a
substantial and material change, while numerous psychological studies have
shown that the possibility of divorce is unanticipated.393 In the second
enumerated factor, the addition of children to a family is a de facto
substantial and material change, and the myriad of possibilities a planned-for
child, let alone an unplanned child, brings to a family can never be fully
anticipated.394
The ALI further advised that if one or more of the substantial change
elements are met, the party seeking to invalidate the agreement must then
prove “enforcement would work a substantial injustice.”395 Courts should
consider: (a) the disparity between the agreement and the likely outcome
absent an agreement; (b) for short-term marriages, the disparity between the
defending party’s circumstances with enforcement relative to imagined
circumstances had the marriage not occurred; (c) the purpose of the
agreement, the current relevance, and whether the terms serve to further such
purpose; and (d) the impact upon the children.396 That is, the ALI
recommends a balancing of factors in order to do complete justice to the
parties of prenuptial agreements, which, of course, sounds not unlike
enforcement in equity.397
D.
Examination of ALI’s Ten-Year Recommendation Through Legal
Policy Analogies
A prenuptial agreement is essentially a long-term, personal contract
where enforcement remains a mere possibility; even then, the possibility sits
years or even decades into the future.398 Such long-term agreements are
otherwise uncommon.399 This section will take a brief step back to review

392.
See id.
393.
See Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 443. One might be forgiven for
asking if there is ever a case where divorce is not a substantial, material, and unanticipated
change. See id.
394.
See Beaubien, supra note 183.
395.
PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05(3).
396.
Id.
397.
See id. The ALI did not explicitly recommend equitable enforcement, but
rather alluded to equitable enforcement as “appropriate.” Id. § 7.05 cmt. a. “[E]nforcement . .
. dependent upon a review of the fairness . . . is familiar in American law . . . . [C]ourts have
often applied a judicially created rule of equity . . . . This judicial gloss upon the statutory
provisions governing premarital agreement is appropriate.” Id.
398.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b.
399.
Id. Long-term commercial agreements, while common, are not analogous.
Id. Long-term commercial agreements govern ongoing relationships, not terminated
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public policy concepts from other areas of the law that reflect the ALI’s
recommendation for greater scrutiny of prenuptial agreements.400
1.

Equity of Redemption

Perhaps the closest parallel to signing a prenuptial agreement is the
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship.401 Consider the mortgagor.402 The
mortgagor is the grantor of the mortgage, i.e., the homeowner.403 The
mortgagee is the grantee of the mortgage, i.e., the lender, typically a bank.404
For purposes of this analogy, the homeowner is the wife, while the bank is
the wealthy husband.* The mortgage contract is the prenuptial agreement,
and it states: In the event of default—divorce—the homeowner wife loses
all rights to the property.* This agreement, while harsh, seems fair because,
upon signing the mortgage contract, the wife knows she will never default.405
Suppose the homeowner wife signed a thirty-year mortgage, and
after twenty-two years of paying on time, defaults on a single payment.406
Perhaps she lost her job or fell ill; her child’s college tuition or her father’s
nursing care took financial precedence; maybe she signed an ARM loan and
was doomed from the beginning.407 No matter.* After twenty-two years of
equity paid into the marriage, the bank wants a divorce.408 Under the terms
of the bank’s prenuptial agreement, the bank will reclaim the wife’s home,
leaving her with nothing.409 Historically, this is precisely what would
happen; once the mortgage contract was breached, “the mortgagor forfeited
all right and interest in the property” leaving the bank with the ability to

relationships; they are often entered into by teams of experts who typically employ riskshedding strategies and reject unfair terms. Id.
400.
See discussion infra Section V.D.1–3; PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION § 7.05.
401.
See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. b.
402.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (per curiam).
403.
See id.
404.
See id.
405.
See Baker & Emery, supra note 122, at 443.
406.
Cf. Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 2015).
407.
See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Mass.
2008). An adjustable-rate mortgage, or ARM loan, is a loan with a fixed interest rate for the
first few years that varies considerably over the remaining life of the mortgage. Id. ARM
loans practically doom the mortgagor to foreclosure. Id. at 554.
408.
See Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d at 985.
409.
See id. at 986.
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“reenter and assume full ownership.”410 However, public policy shifted over
time, and courts began to recognize this unfairness.411 Enter equity.412
Equity responded with a fair remedy to the harsh breach of the longterm mortgage contract by recognizing the homeowner’s right of redemption
as an “interest in the mortgaged property.”413 This interest, or equity of
redemption, has long been favored in Florida as “inherent in any
mortgage.”414 The equitable right of redemption is thus the homeowner’s
right to “reclaim [her] estate in foreclosed property after it has been forfeited
. . . at law.”415 In other words, courts have recognized that public policy
favors leaving the “dutiful and faithful” mortgagor with something after a
long-term relationship ends in default.416
The ALI’s recommendation that greater scrutiny be given to
prenuptial agreements in marriages of ten or more years essentially reflects
the same principles in the equity of redemption.417 That is, after ten years, a
spouse has “paid” enough equity into the marriage to warrant some sort of
return despite a contrary prenuptial agreement.418 Ten years, however, is not
a bar to prenuptial agreement enforcement, but rather a sign that—just like a
mortgagor paying down a mortgage for ten or more years—strict
enforcement is likely to lead to injustice.419
2.

Laches

The equitable defense of laches is, by statute, available to either
party in limiting the time for prenuptial agreement enforcement.420 The
defense of laches entails a failure to assert a right for an unreasonable length
of time that would prejudice the defending party.421 Evidence disappears,
410.

Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (per

411.
412.
413.
414.

See id.
See id.
See id.
In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

curiam).

1983).
415.
Saidi v. Wasko, 687 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
416.
Cf. Posner v. Posner (Posner II), 257 So. 2d 530, 537 (Fla. 1972) (“[T]his
case is not to be confused with . . . an effort to obtain a lifetime of independence from a [short]
shipwrecked marriage.”).
417.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2002).
418.
See id.
419.
See id.
420.
FLA. STAT. § 61.079(9) (2019).
421.
Ticktin v. Kearin, 807 So. 2d 659, 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per
curiam).
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memories fade, people change, and parties move on.422 Essentially, an
agreement that sits idle and unenforced for a long enough period should
While there are no Florida cases on point,
remain unenforced.423
hypothetically, laches could be raised to invalidate a prenuptial agreement
after a long-term marriage if the wife could show enforcement would be
prejudicial to her rights as a spouse otherwise entitled to alimony and
equitable distribution.424
In Flaherty v. Flaherty,425 the Second District declined to allow the
defense of laches to validate a voidable prenuptial agreement.426 The wife in
Flaherty successfully argued the prenuptial agreement was a product of
duress.427 The husband conceded, contending that because duress renders a
contract voidable, the wife’s failure to bring forth a challenge during the
marriage served to ratify and thus validate the agreement.428 The court
disagreed, citing several other jurisdictions that unanimously refused to
consider laches as a method to validate an otherwise invalid prenuptial
agreement.429 Requiring a spouse to disrupt the marriage by revising,
amending, or challenging the validity of the agreement not only contravenes
public policy against litigation during an intact marriage, it equates silence
with consent.430
Flaherty aside, it remains to be seen the extent to which a Florida
court would allow laches as a defense to enforcement.431 Should a defense of
laches be allowed after a twenty-year marriage?432 That is, should a court
accept a twenty-year delay between signing and enforcement as a valid
contractual defense?433 It should; the defense is codified in Chapter 61.434
The ALI, while not explicit, agrees.435 From a policy standpoint, the ALI’s
recommendation of greater scrutiny, after ten years, derives from the same

422.
See id.
423.
See id.
424.
Cf. id.
425.
128 So. 3d 920 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
426.
Id. at 924.
427.
Id. at 922.
428.
Id. at 923.
429.
Id. at 923–24.
430.
See Flaherty, 128 So. 3d at 924; accord Kellar v. Estate of Kellar, 291
P.3d 906, 918 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); Gan, supra note 31, at 186–88.
431.
Cf. Flaherty, 128 So. 3d at 924.
432.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(9) (2019).
433.
Id.
434.
See id. Equitable defenses limiting the time for prenuptial agreement
enforcement, including laches and estoppel, are available to either party. Id.
435.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2002).

2020]

EMBRACE ENFORCEMENT IN EQUITY

111

foundational principle: The greater the passage of time, the less that strict
enforcement makes sense.436
3.

Statutes of Repose

A similar concept to laches is the policy behind statutes of repose.437
“A statute of repose precludes a right of action after a specified time [has
elapsed].”438 The precluded right of action, in this case, would be one party
to a long-term marriage precluding the other party from enforcing the
prenuptial agreement.439 While traditionally limited to areas such as medical
malpractice, products liability, and other areas of tort law, the underlying
principles favoring statutes of repose are analogous.440 That is, at a certain
point, a party should be entitled to a fresh start, no longer beholden to past
events.441 Imagine a scenario where a spouse of fifty-five years seeks
enforcement of a prenuptial agreement upon divorce; does strict enforcement
sound like desirable public policy?442 In other words, people should be
allowed to move on from unenforced civil agreements made decades in the
distant past.443 While specific statutes of repose are a matter for the
legislature, the ALI’s directive toward expanded scrutiny for ten-year
marriages is, as in laches, merely an illustration of the same public policy
argument.444
E.

Toward an Equitable Solution

Where the ALI stopped short of explicitly recommending courts
enforce prenuptial agreements in equity, The Law of Marriage and Family
nearly solved the riddle.445 After a lengthy and thorough analysis of the gaps
436.
Id.
437.
See Doe v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170, 1174
n.2 (Fla. 1993).
438.
Id.
439.
See id.
440.
Carr v. Broward Cnty., 505 So. 2d 568, 571 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
aff’d, 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989); see also CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 7(2014)
(“[S]tatutes of repose . . . limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts.”);
Carr v. Broward Cnty., 541 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing statutes of repose “restrict
or limit causes of action in order to achieve certain public interests”).
441.
See Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 392 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(likening statutes of repose to the Double Jeopardy Clause).
442.
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 cmt. b. (Am. L. Inst. 2002).
443.
See id.
444.
See id.; Waldburger, 573 U.S. at 8.
445.
Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2098.
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between the academic principles and the principles actually in practice
within family law, The Law of Marriage and Family concluded:
A system in which judges undertake substantive fairness review at
the time of an agreement’s enforcement and presumptively
invalidate agreements failing to approximate equal division of
marital property would strike an appropriate compromise between
the contractual and partnership approaches by consistently treating
446
spouses as equal parties to the marital relationship.

The Law of Marriage and Family thus called for a balancing of outcomes
between the prenuptial agreement as enforced, compared with the statutory
guidelines regarding, in Florida’s case, equitable distribution and alimony
awards upon dissolution of marriage.447 In other words, a fair prenuptial
agreement is one that approximates the outcome of a dissolution of marriage
proceeding in equity.448 That recommendation—a disguised equity light—
would be improved with the explicit use of the textured, equitable standard
of fairness that equity has developed over the centuries, i.e., the kind of
analysis recommended in this Comment.449
VI.

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, this Comment may, at times, read like an idealistic and
sentimental allegiance to the one-and-only court of equity.* However, like
equity, this Comment is attentive to the circumstances and understands that
equity is not the be-all and end-all.* Certainly, outcomes in equity are not
always fair nor always reasonable.450 Equity is not a set of contractual
training wheels; it will not transform “oopsies” into lottery tickets, nor rescue
a party because the terms are unfavorable, unfortunate, or imprudent.451
Equity is not omniscient; it cannot resolve cognitive biases, nor cure gender
and economic inequality.452 Equity, sadly, is not the answer to all of the

446.
Id.
447.
See id.
448.
Id.
449.
See discussion supra Section III.C; Presley v. Worthington, 53 So. 2d 714,
716 (Fla. 1951) (en banc); Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 445 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
450.
Schroeder, 825 So. 2d at 443; see also Rennolds v. Rennolds, 312 So. 2d
538, 541–42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
451.
See 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 29 (2020).
452.
See Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So.
3d 918, 925 (Fla. 2017).
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law’s problems; but it does offer a robust and creative solution to prenuptial
agreement interpretation.453
How, exactly, might an equitable interpretation of prenuptial
agreements work?454 It would operate just like any other proceeding in
Chapter 61: through a balancing of factors necessary to do complete
justice.455 That an agreement was signed with the intent to stay married is a
factor.456 That cognitive biases affecting judgment and risk are factors.457
That a marriage lasted or endured fifteen years, and two children are factors;
that a marriage lasted six months, too, is a factor.458 That the husband was
forty-five, and the wife was nineteen are factors that weigh more heavily
than a husband of thirty and a wife of thirty-one.459 That a wife, or husband,
left the workforce for eleven years to raise the couple’s children is also a
weighty factor; her or his age, education, and abilities must also be factors. 460
That the agreement was signed days, weeks, or months before the wedding,
with or without counsel, with or without negotiations: Those, too, are
factors.461 That substantial and unforeseen changes occurred—from a
debilitating disability to a substantial increase in wealth—must also be
factors.462 That distribution and alimony without a prenuptial agreement
would be exponentially higher is also a factor.463 This list of factors is not
comprehensive; a court of equity, while interpreting a prenuptial agreement,
should consider “[a]ny other factors necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.”464 It is equity’s flexibility and welcoming of additional
factors and novel circumstances that make it as powerful of a tool as it is.465
Florida is clear that Chapter 61 proceedings are already in equity:
Equitable distribution is “based on all relevant factors,” alimony is
determined through a weighing of “all relevant factors,” and timesharing and
parental responsibility are decided by “evaluating all of the factors.”466 The
Florida family court system currently provides answers to the gray areas of
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

See id.
See Marriage and Family, supra note 4, at 2098.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(j) (2019); 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 50 (2020).
See FLA. STAT. § 61.079(2)(a)–(3).
See id. § 61.08(2)(c).
See id. § 61.08(2)(b).
See id. § 61.08(2)(j).
See id. § 61.075(1)(j).
See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(j).
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Schroeder v. Gebhart, 825 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.

466.

FLA. STAT. §§ 61.075(1), 61.08(2), 61.13(3).

2002).
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who gets what property, how much money goes where and to whom, and
what serves the best interests of the children.467 Equity has “wide discretion
in fashioning remedies to satisfy the exigencies of the circumstances.”468
Whether a court wishes to reform a provision, to strike an entire section, or
to avoid or enforce an agreement in its entirety is ultimately a matter of
which factors weigh heaviest under the specific facts and circumstances of
the case.469 That courts are weighing all the appropriate factors during the
same proceedings in which prenuptial agreements are adjudicated makes this
solution all the more practical and familiar.470
This Comment argues that prenuptial agreements should be decided
like any other proceeding in Chapter 61, where fairness should always count,
and reasonableness should always guide.471 In a larger sense, the risk of
equity’s discretion must be considered against the narrow and rigid common
law strictures complacent with one-size-fits-all.472 While this conflict is
played out in all types of legal disputes, not all disputes are of the same
nature.473 Florida family law is one arena without reason for such conflict;
Chapter 61 mandates that family law proceedings accommodate equity’s
principles of fairness, reasonableness, good faith, equality, and ethical
considerations.474
Recall the puzzle that prenuptial agreements present; when viewed
through the lens of equity, Florida’s natural home of family law, those
problems dissipate, the paradox evaporates, and the possibility of reconciling
prenuptial agreement expectations with fair resolutions emerges.*

467.
See id. § 61.001(b)–(c).
468.
Schroeder, 825 So. 2d at 446; see also Planned Parenthood of Greater
Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 925 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Shaw v. Palmer, 44
So. 953, 954 (Fla. 1907)).
469.
See discussion supra Section II.C; 22 FLA. JUR. 2D Equity § 50 (2020);
Rennolds v. Rennolds, 312 So. 2d 538, 542 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
470.
See discussion supra Section I; FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1)(a); Posner v. Posner
(Posner I), 233 So. 2d 381, 385–86 (Fla. 1970).
471.
See FLA. STAT. § 61.001; Lashkajani v. Lashkajani, 911 So. 2d 1154, 1159
(Fla. 2005).
472.
Cf. Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (arguing
poorly decided but well-settled precedent promotes predictability and preserves judicial
integrity).
473.
See Oldham, supra note 5, at 117.
474.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001, 61.075(1); Rennolds, 312 So. 2d at 542.
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INTRODUCTION

The death penalty has been around, in some form, dating back as
early as eighteenth century B.C.1 However, it was not until roughly 250
years ago that the anti-death penalty movement—also known as the abolition
movement—began with the publication of the Italian criminologist and
philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s book titled Dei delitti e delle pene.2
Beccaria’s book, which was published in 1764, has been translated into more
than twenty languages, including English, as an essay On Crimes and
Punishment in 1767.3 It was not until the publication of Beccaria’s famous
work that Western European nations began doing away with capital
punishment.4 In his work, Beccaria argued that capital punishment is neither
just nor necessary, unless the death of the citizen is the only real way to deter
others from committing crimes.5 However, Beccaria goes on to explain why
capital punishment comes up short in its endeavor to deter others from
committing crimes:
It is not the intensity of the punishment that has the greatest effect
on the human mind, but its extension, for our sensibility is more
easily and firmly affected by small but repeated impressions than
by a strong but fleeting action. The rule of habit is universal over
every sentient being, and just as habit helps man to walk and talk
and satisfy his needs, so moral ideas are impressed upon the mind
only by enduring and repeated blows. It is not the terrible but
fleeting spectacle of a criminal’s death that is the most powerful
brake on crimes, but the long and arduous example of a man
deprived of his liberty, who, having become a beast of burden,
repays the society he has offended through his toils. Much more
compelling than the idea of death, which men always perceive at a
vague distance, is that efficacious because often repeated reflection
that I myself shall be reduced to such a protracted and miserable
6
condition if I commit similar misdeeds.

1.
Early History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/early-history-ofthe-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
2.
John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement Comes of Age: From Capital
Punishment as a Lawful Sanction to a Peremptory, International Law Norm Barring
Executions, 79 MONT. L. REV. 7, 8 (2018); CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT
AND OTHER WRITINGS 55 (Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen trans., Univ. Toronto Press 2008)
(1764).
3.
Bessler, supra note 2, at 8.
4.
Id. at 9.
5.
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 52.
6.
Id. at 52–53.
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Proponents of the death penalty usually argue that its application is
effective because it is less costly than life imprisonment, or because it is an
effective means to deter crime.7 However, as further discussed later in this
Comment, both of these rationales have been discredited by experts and
data.8 Additionally, proponents of the death penalty may argue that the
criminal gets what he or she deserves: the criminal killed, and so, the
criminal should be killed.9 However, this line of logic is the ultimate form of
retributivism, or an eye for an eye.10 “In civilized society, we reject the
principle of literally doing to criminals what they do to their victims: The
penalty for rape cannot be rape, or for arson, the burning down of the
arsonist’s house. We should not, therefore, punish the murderer with
death.”11
Despite the arguments made by death penalty proponents, starting in
the 1950s, public sentiment began to turn away from capital punishment.12
Many allied nations either discontinued the practice of the death penalty or
limited its use.13 Meanwhile, the number of executions in the United States
dropped dramatically.14 While there were 1289 executions nationwide in the
1940s, there were only 715 executions in the 1950s.15 This trend continued
into the 1960s and 1970s as the number of executions nationwide plummeted
to 191 from 1960 to 1976.16 In 1966, public support for the death penalty
reached an all-time low, as a Gallup poll showed support for the death
penalty at only 42%.17 The decline in support of the death penalty still
continues today, as evidenced by the fact that over the last fifteen years, ten
states, and the District of Columbia, have moved to abolish the death penalty,
and another three states have implemented gubernatorial moratoriums.18
7.
Tom Head, 5 Arguments in Favor of the Death Penalty, THOUGHTCO.,
http://www.thoughtco.com/arguments-for-the-death-penalty-721136 (last updated Jan. 20,
2020).
8.
See discussion infra Part V.
9.
See Head, supra note 7.
10.
See Punishment, JRANK.ORG, http://law.jrank.org/pages/9576/PunishmentTHEORIES-PUNISHMENT.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
11.
The Death
Penalty:
Questions and Answers, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/other/death-penalty-questions-and-answers (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
12.
The Abolitionist Movement, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/the-abolitionistmovement (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
The Abolitionist Movement, supra note 12.
18.
State
by
State,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
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Two of the latest states to abolish the death penalty are New Hampshire in
2019, and Washington in 2018.19 Using these two states as examples, this
comment will seek to urge the State of Florida to be the next state to formally
abolish the barbaric practice of the death penalty.20 Part II of this comment
will delve into the history of the death penalty by examining the early history
of the death penalty, followed by the history of the death penalty in America,
and, finally, the history of the death penalty in Florida.21 Part III of this
comment will examine and distinguish the two primary theories of
punishment and show how the death penalty is inconsistent with the theory
of punishment employed in today’s modern society.22 Part IV of this
comment will then analyze the rationales used in New Hampshire and
Washington in their respective decisions to abolish the death penalty.23
Then, applying the rationales used in New Hampshire and Washington, as
well as other reasonings, Part V of this comment will suggest that the State
of Florida should be the next state to formally abolish the death penalty. 24
Part VI of this comment will illustrate why life imprisonment without parole
is a superior alternative to the death penalty, thereby rendering the practice of
the death penalty obsolete.25 Finally, this comment will conclude that there
are absolutely no benefits to employing the death penalty, and the practice—
whose consequences are irreversible—should be halted, and more
specifically, the State of Florida should be the next state in the country to
abolish this barbaric, retributive practice.26
II.
A.

HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY

Early History of the Death Penalty

As mentioned earlier, the first established death penalty laws date as
far back as eighteenth century B.C. in the Code of King Hammurabi of
Babylon, which established the death penalty as the punishment for twentyfive different crimes, not including murder.27 “The first death sentence
historically recorded took place in [sixteenth] [c]entury B.C. Egypt, where . .
19.
Id.
20.
See discussion infra Part IV–V.
21.
See discussion infra Part II.
22.
See discussion infra Part III.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV.
24.
See discussion infra Part V.
25.
See discussion infra Part VI.
26.
See discussion infra Part VII.
27.
Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY’S FINAL
SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1, (Laura E. Randa
ed., 1997).
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. a member of nobility, was accused of magic, and [instructed] to take his
own life.”28 Additionally, the death penalty was implemented in the
fourteenth century B.C.’s Hittite Code, as well as in the seventh century
B.C.’s Draconian Code of Athens, which made death the punishment for all
crimes.29 The death penalty was also codified in the fifth century B.C.’s
Roman Law of the Twelve Tablets.30 During these infant years of the death
penalty and its practice, crimes punishable by death included:
the publication of libels and insulting songs, the cutting or grazing
of crops planted by a farmer, the burning of a house or a stack of
corn near a house, cheating by a patron of his client, perjury,
making disturbances at night in the city, willful murder of a
freeman or a parent, or theft by a slave.31

Further, methods of execution during these infant years were particularly
cruel and inhumane, as death sentences were carried out by such means as
crucifixion, drowning, beating to death, burning alive, and impalement.32
Moving forward to tenth century A.D., hanging emerged as the usual method
of execution in Britain.33 Nevertheless, in the following century, “William
the Conqueror would not allow [anyone] to be hanged or otherwise executed
for any crime, except in times of war.”34 However, this trend would not last
as the sixteenth century saw an estimated 72,000 people executed under the
reign of Henry VIII.35 During the reign of Henry VIII, common methods of
execution included “boiling, burning at the stake, hanging, beheading, and
drawing and quartering,” and crimes punishable by death included “marrying
a Jew, not confessing to a crime, and treason.”36 The next two centuries saw
Britain increase the number of capital crimes, which culminated with 222
crimes punishable by death by the 1700s, including “stealing, cutting down a
tree, and robbing a rabbit warren.”37 However, because of the severity of the
death penalty and the negligible acts for which it was being imposed, juries,
in an attempt to minimize government abuse, “would not convict defendants

28.
29.

Id.
Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1; Reggio, supra note 27,

30.

Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1; Reggio, supra note 27,

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Reggio, supra note 27, at 1.
Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1.

at 1.
at 1.
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if the offense was not serious.”38 This led to reforms in Britain’s death
penalty which resulted in the death penalty being eliminated from more than
100 of the 222 crimes punishable by death from 1823 to 1837.39
B.

The Death Penalty in America

More than any other country, Britain tremendously influenced
America’s use of the death penalty.40 When the British settlers came to
America, they brought with them the practice of capital punishment.41 The
British influence of capital punishment was particularly prominent in
Virginia, where the first recorded execution in the English American
Colonies occurred in 1608.42 Virginian officials executed Captain George
Kendall in the Jamestown colony of Virginia for allegedly conspiring to
betray the British to the Spanish.43 Then, “[i]n 1612, Virginia’s Governor,
Sir Thomas Dale, [enacted] the Divine, Moral, and Martial Laws, [which
prescribed the death] penalty for even minor offenses such as stealing grapes,
killing chickens, killing dogs or horses without permission, or trading with
Indians.”44 However, these laws would be softened seven years later due to
the fear that this excessive obtrusion of the death penalty would deter
individuals from settling in Virginia.45 Virginia was also responsible for the
first legal execution of a criminal, Daniel Frank, who was executed in 1622
for the crime of theft.46
At first, death penalty laws varied from colony to colony.47 While
some colonies were very strict in their use of the death penalty, other
colonies were quite lenient.48 For example, in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, the first execution took place in 1630, despite the Capital Laws of
New England not being implemented until years later.49 However, under the
Capital Laws of New England that went into effect between 1636 and 1647,
the death penalty was imposed for crimes including, but not limited to: Pre38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reggio, supra note 27, at 2–3; Early History of the Death Penalty, supra

43.

Reggio, supra note 27, at 3; Early History of the Death Penalty, supra

44.

Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1; Reggio, supra note 27,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Reggio, supra note 27, at 3.
Id.
Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1.
Reggio, supra note 27, at 3.
Early History of the Death Penalty, supra note 1.

note 1.
note 1.
at 3.
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meditated murder, sodomy, witchcraft, and adultery.50 Yet, by 1780, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts limited its application of the death penalty
to only seven capital crimes: Murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson,
rape, and treason.51 Moreover, the New York Colony implemented the
Duke’s Laws of 1665 which authorized the death penalty for acts including
“denial of the true God, pre-meditated murder, killing someone who had no
weapon of defense, killing by lying in wait or by poisoning, sodomy,
buggery, kidnapping, [and] perjury in a capital trial . . . .”52 On the other
hand, South Jersey and Pennsylvania were two of the more lenient colonies
when it came to capital punishment.53 In fact, the death penalty was not used
for any crime in South Jersey, and only two crimes—murder and treason—
were punishable by death.54 Despite the discrepancies among the colonies
regarding the death penalty, by 1776 most of the colonies had similar death
penalty statutes which prescribed death—usually by hanging—for the crimes
of “arson, piracy, treason, murder, sodomy, burglary, robbery, rape, horsestealing, slave rebellion, and often counterfeiting.”55
“The first reforms of the death penalty occurred between 1776 and
1800.”56 This era saw Thomas Jefferson make an unsuccessful effort to
revise Virginia’s harsh death penalty laws by proposing a law that
recommended the death penalty for only murder and treason.57 Additionally,
a great impact was made on American intellectuals by European theorists
including Montesquieu and Voltaire, as well as by English Quaker prison
reformers John Bellers and John Howard.58 However, the most influential
voice of this era regarding abolishing the death penalty came from none
other than Cesare Beccaria, whose essay On Crimes and Punishment had an
especially strong impact on the early reform movement in America.59 In his
work, Beccaria states, “[T]he death penalty is not a right, but the war of a
nation against a citizen, which has deemed the destruction of his being to be
necessary or useful.”60 However, as stated earlier in the introduction,
Beccaria goes on to illustrate why the destruction of a citizen is almost never
necessary nor useful, and the death penalty fails in its ultimate quest to deter
50.
51.
52.

Reggio, supra note 27, at 3.
Id.
Reggio, supra note 27, at 3–4; Early History of the Death Penalty, supra

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Reggio, supra note 27, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reggio, supra note 27, at 4.
Id.; see also BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 52.
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 52.

note 1.
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future crime.61 This inaugural reform era also saw the formation of
organizations in different colonies in an effort to abolish the death penalty, as
well as relieving poor prison conditions.62
The second great reform era took place between 1833 and 1853,
which saw public hangings as cruel.63 Prior to this reform era, hangings
were a public spectacle, much like a modern-day sporting event, which
would often attract an attendance of tens of thousands of people to view the
hangings, while local merchants would sell souvenirs and alcohol.64 This
second reform movement led to fifteen states prohibiting public executions
by 1849.65 More importantly, this second reform era reached its peak in
1846 when Michigan became the first state to formally abolish the death
penalty.66 Further, in 1852, Rhode Island followed suit and formally
abolished the death penalty, while Massachusetts limited its use to only firstdegree murder.67 This reform era concluded with a fourth state, Wisconsin,
abolishing the death penalty in 1853.68
The next great reform era began at the end of the century and
occurred between 1895 and 1917.69 This era saw Congress pass legislation
reducing the number of federal death crimes.70 Of even more significance,
this era saw nine more states abolish capital punishment, while votes in other
states came close to reaching abolition.71 The death penalty abolition
movement cooled down until 1955, when England and Canada both
completed exhaustive studies which were largely critical of capital
punishment.72 On the heels of these studies, Hawaii and Alaska abolished
the death penalty in 1957 and were followed by Delaware in 1958 and
Oregon in 1964.73 In 1965, Iowa, New York, West Virginia, and Vermont
ended the death penalty, with New Mexico following suit in 1969.74
However, despite the great traction that was made by these reform

61.
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64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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71.
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movements, one of the greatest moments for the abolition movement did not
occur until 1972.75
The difficulty in trying to end capital punishment state-by-state
forced death penalty abolitionists to turn their efforts to the courts.76 This
new plan of attack proved to be fruitful, as the Supreme Court of the United
States delivered a monumental decision in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia,77
which “effectively ended capital punishment in the United States.”78 In
Furman, the Court was tasked with addressing “whether the administration
of the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”79 “In the 5-4 decision, the majority
opinion of the Court held that the current statutes under which the death
penalty was administered amounted to cruel and unusual punishment on the
grounds that the current practice illustrated patterns of arbitrary and
discriminatory sentencing decisions.”80 However, the majority opinion in
Furman made sure to clarify that it was the “current administration of the
death penalty, and not the concept of death as the ultimate punishment,
which violated the protections of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”81
This left the door open for states to modify their death penalty statutes in
order to conform with the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States.82 And that is exactly what happened, as several states
developed new death penalty statutes after the Furman decision in an effort
to keep the death penalty alive.83 In 1976, just four years after the Furman
decision, the Court approved the death penalty statutes presented in the cases
of Gregg v. Georgia,84 Jurek v. Texas,85 and Proffitt v. Florida,86 and
effectively revived the death penalty.87 Some of the modifications made to
death penalty statutes resulting from these cases included creating a

75.
See id.
76.
Id.
77.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
78.
Id. at 239–40; Reggio, supra note 27, at 8.
79.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239; Stacy L. Mallicoat, Politics and Capital
Punishment: The Role of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Decisions in the Practice of
Death, in INVITATION TO AN EXECUTION: A HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 9–10 (Gordon Morris Bakken ed., 2010).
80.
Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 10.
81.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40; Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 10.
82.
Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 10; see Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.
83.
Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 10.
84.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
85.
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
86.
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
87.
Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 10.
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bifurcated process for capital crimes . . . [which] separated the guilt
and sentencing decisions into two separate trials . . . . [as well as a
system of automatic appeal,] which mandated that the highest court
of each state review all convictions and death sentences to protect
against constitutional errors.88

Despite years of back and forth between proponents of the death penalty and
abolitionists, “[t]he controversy over the death penalty [still] continues
today.”89
C.

The Death Penalty in Florida

The first known execution in Florida took place in 1827 when
Benjamin Donica was hanged for murder.90 Nearly 100 years later, in 1923,
a bill was passed in Florida that placed all executions under state jurisdiction,
rather than local jurisdiction, and replaced the incumbent execution method
of hanging with the electric chair.91 After years of uninterrupted executions
in the state of Florida, the 1972 decision in Furman forced the state to
discontinue its practice of executing inmates.92 However, as mentioned
earlier, this abolition was short-lived, as Florida subsequently passed a new
capital punishment statute, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1976 in Proffitt.93 Following its reinstatement of the death
penalty, Florida became the first state to conduct “a non-voluntary execution
post-Gregg” and Proffitt, when it executed John Spenkelink in 1979.94 The
use of the electric chair led to the state of Florida botching the executions of
both Jesse Tafaro in 1990, and Pedro Medina in 1997.95 Both of these
executions “ended with flames erupting from the[] heads” of Tafaro and
Medina “due to the improper use of sponges designed to conduct electricity
to their brains.”96 The state blamed these botched executions on humanrelated error, and the state legislature subsequently transitioned to lethal
injection as its default method of execution in 2000.97 Years later, in 2016,
“Florida statutorily abolish[ed] judicial override,” a practice by which trial
88.
Id.
89.
Reggio, supra note 27, at 9.
90.
Florida, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stateand-federal-info/state-by-state/florida (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259–60 (1976); Florida, supra note
90.
94.
Florida, supra note 90.
95.
See id.; Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 12–13.
96.
Mallicoat, supra note 79, at 12–13.
97.
See id. at 13; Florida, supra note 90.
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judges were granted the authority to impose death sentences on defendants
despite a jury’s recommendation for life imprisonment.98 One year later, in
2017, “Florida statutorily abolish[ed] non-unanimous jury recommendations
for death and require[d]” a unanimous recommendation of death from the
sentencing jury before a trial judge could impose a death sentence.99
Today, Florida is recognized as one of the nation’s leaders in
imposing the death penalty.100 Since 1979, when executions were reinstated
post-Gregg and Proffitt, Florida has executed ninety-nine Floridians, while
exonerating a nation-high twenty-nine individuals due to evidence of
wrongful convictions.101 These statistics indicate roughly a 30% rate of
error, much higher than the national rate of error of about 11%.102
Additionally, in 2019, Florida ranked number one in the nation in the number
of new death sentences, number two in the nation in the size of death row,
and number five in the nation in the number of executions.103 Finally,
Florida taxpayers pay more than fifty-one million dollars annually to try to
enforce the death penalty, over and above the cost [of] seeking life
imprisonment without the possibility for parole for these same defendants—
roughly one million dollars a week.104
III.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT: RETRIBUTIVISM VS. UTILITARIANISM

Although there are multiple theories of punishment, only two stand
out as the most popular theories which dominate criminal law textbooks:
retributivism and utilitarianism.105 The retributive theory of punishment can
be best described as an eye for an eye.106 This theory of punishment is
backward-looking in that the retributivist looks back at the transgression—
the crime itself—as the basis for the punishment, and stresses guilt and desert
while “denying that the consequences of punishment . . . have any relevance
to justification.”107 The retributive theory seeks to punish offenders for
98.
Florida, supra note 90.
99.
Id.
100.
See Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, FLORIDIANS FOR ALTS. TO DEATH
PENALTY, http://www.fadp.org/florida-death-penalty-fact-sheet/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.;
Innocence,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/innocence (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
103.
Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
104.
Id.
105.
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16–18 (8th ed.
2018).
106.
See Punishment, supra note 10.
107.
See id.; Mark A. Michael, Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the
Difference?, 29 AM. PHIL. QUARTERLY 173, 174 (1992).
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criminal behavior because criminals deserve to be punished.108 “Criminal
behavior upsets the peaceful balance of society, and punishment helps to
restore the balance.”109 The rationale employed by retributivists is that
“human beings have free will and are capable of making rational decisions;”
therefore, a person who makes a conscious choice to upset the balance of
society—absent insanity or incompetency—should be punished.110
Conversely, the utilitarian theory of punishment is more forwardlooking, as its goal for a justified system of punishment “is one which brings
the greatest net benefit to all.”111 As opposed to the retributive theory of
punishment, which disregards the consequences of punishment, the
utilitarian theory of punishment is “consequentialist” in nature.112 It
recognizes that punishment has consequences for both the offender and
society, but maintains that the total benefit produced by the punishment
should exceed the total harm done.113 The utilitarian theory concedes and
accepts that a crime-free society is both impractical and non-existent, but
even so, its goal is to inflict only as much punishment as necessary to prevent
future crime.114 Moreover, the utilitarian theory of punishment punishes
offenders for the purpose of deterring future crime and holds that laws that
are meant to punish criminal conduct should be designed to dissuade future
criminal conduct, not merely to punish the offender.115 Deterrence works on
both a general and specific level.116 General deterrence occurs when the
punishment of one person deters or prevents other members of society from
committing crimes.117 In order to accomplish general deterrence, the
punishment must serve as an example to the rest of society by illustrating
that criminal acts will not be tolerated, and in turn, will be punished.118 On
the other hand, specific deterrence is meant to prevent the original criminal
from committing any further crimes.119 The goal of specific deterrence is
accomplished in two ways: first, the criminal is placed in jail or prison to
physically prevent him or her from committing any other crimes; and second,
the incapacitation of the criminal is designed to be so unpleasant as to
dissuade the criminal from repeating his or her criminal behavior once
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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released back into society.120 Finally, unlike under the retributive theory of
punishment, rehabilitation is a massive component under the utilitarian
theory of punishment.121 “The goal of rehabilitation is to prevent future
crime by giving offenders the ability to succeed within the confines of the
law.”122 “Rehabilitative measures for criminal offenders [may] include
treatment for afflictions such as mental illness” and chemical dependency, as
well as educational programs that give offenders the knowledge and skills
needed to compete in the job market.123
While it must be conceded that elements of both retributivism and
utilitarianism are found within the United States’ criminal justice system—
when sentenced to prison, the punishment is, in some form, retribution—
there is evidence that supports the assertion that the United States leans
considerably towards a utilitarian theory of punishment.124 “During most of
this century utilitarian considerations dominated the discussion of the
justification of punishment . . . . When one reads papers from this era, one is
left with the distinct impression that retributivism had been completely
discredited and quietly laid to rest.”125 Moreover, the American legal system
displays its adherence to utilitarian ideologies through its creation of systems
such as pretrial diversion programs, probation, and parole, which serve to
limit punishment to the extent necessary to protect society.126 Additionally,
the assignment of different punishments for different crimes is derived from
utilitarian ideologies, as well as the concept that the punishment a criminal
receives should be proportional to the harm caused by the crime
committed.127 For example, murder typically calls for imprisonment of a
long duration, or even the death penalty, while a simple assault and battery is
typically punished with a short jail sentence or probation and a fine.128 Thus,
although retributive ideals are present within the American legal system, it is
clear the American legal system favors utilitarian philosophies when it
comes to punishment.129
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NEW HAMPSHIRE AND WASHINGTON ARE TWO OF THE LATEST
STATES TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY
New Hampshire

On May 30, 2019, New Hampshire officially became the twenty-first
state to abolish the death penalty when the Senate voted to override
Governor Sununu’s veto of a bill repealing the State’s death penalty.130 The
Senate vote, which was tallied at sixteen votes to eight, was exactly the twothirds supermajority needed to override Governor Sununu’s veto.131 One
reason for abolishing the death penalty, according to New Hampshire State
Senator Melanie Levesque, is that the practice of capital punishment is
“archaic, costly, discriminatory, and final.”132 Specifically, the costly nature
of the death penalty seems to have played a large role in the State’s abolition
of capital punishment as supporters of the abolition movement in New
Hampshire say the barbaric practice has cost the State millions of dollars.133
Pursuing the death penalty is “particularly [costly] when the state must pay
to provide defense for indigent defendants in lengthy trials and penalty
hearings.”134 For example, lawmakers noted that it had cost the State
roughly $2.5 million to prosecute the case of a single defendant on the
State’s death row.135
Prior to its abolition, New Hampshire allowed the death penalty as
punishment in capital murder cases, which must have involved: “the murder
of police or court officers; murder of judges; murders for hire; [or] murders
connected to drug deals, rape, kidnapping, and home invasions.”136
130.
Eli Watkins, New Hampshire Repeals Death Penalty After Lawmakers
Override Republican Governor, CNN: POL. (May 30, 2019, 2:42 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2019/05/30/politics/new-hampshire-death-penalty/index.html;
Bill
Chappell, New Hampshire Abolishes Death Penalty as Lawmakers Override Governor’s Veto,
NPR (May 30, 2019, 12:24 PM), http://www.npr.org/2019/05/30/728288240/new-hampshireabolishes-death-penalty-as-lawmakers-override-governors-veto; New Hampshire Becomes 21st
State to Abolish Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (May 30, 2019),
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/new-hampshire-becomes-21st-state-to-abolish-death-penalty.
131.
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Nevertheless, the final version of House Bill 455-FN changed the language
of the New Hampshire capital murder statute to now read: “[a] person
convicted of a capital murder . . . shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life
without the possibility for parole.”137 For comparison, the original language
of the New Hampshire capital murder statute stated that “[a] person
convicted of a capital murder may be punished by death . . . .”138 However,
House Bill 455-FN also clarified that “this act shall apply to persons
convicted of capital murder on or after the effective date of this act.” 139
Therefore, the Bill does not apply retroactively, which means that it does not
affect the death sentence of Michael Addison, the lone inmate on New
Hampshire’s death row, “who was convicted of the 2006 killing of [a]
Manchester police officer.”140 However, New Hampshire State Senator
Sharon Carson believes that courts’ interpretations of the new Bill will
eventually lead to Mr. Addison being removed from death row, stating “‘[i]f
you think you’re passing this today and Mr. Addison is still going to remain
on death row, you are confused’ . . . ‘Mr. Addison’s sentence will be
converted to life in prison.’”141
B.

Washington

Prior to New Hampshire, Washington became the twentieth state to
abolish the death penalty when the Supreme Court of Washington decided
State v. Gregory142 on October 11, 2018.143 In Gregory, the Supreme Court
of Washington held that the death penalty in Washington was
unconstitutional as administered because it was applied in an “arbitrary and
racially biased manner.”144 Moreover, the Court held that because the death
penalty?gclid=CjwKCAjwxev3BRBBEiwAiB_PWGTBQonh4M7yrm7HIHpKQ2PzArRbyEg
bGV0bUTWF8PsTodjSIq_01hoCOOQQAvD_BwE (last visited Dec. 14, 2020); New
Hampshire Abolishes Death Penalty After State Senate Overrides Governor, supra note 131.
137.
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141.
New Hampshire Abolishes Death Penalty After State Senate Overrides
Governor, supra note 131; New Hampshire Becomes 21st State to Abolish Death Penalty,
supra note 131.
142.
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penalty was applied in an arbitrary and racially discriminatory manner, it
“fail[ed] to serve any legitimate penological [purpose].”145 In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court of Washington relied heavily on a report that
the Court called the “Beckett Report.”146 The Beckett Report was a study
conducted by American sociologist Katherine Beckett “on the effect of race
and county on the imposition of the death penalty.”147 Three conclusions
were supported by the Beckett Report:
(1) there is significant county-by-county variation in decisions to
seek or impose the death penalty, and a portion of that variation is
a function of the size of the black population but does not stem
from differences in population density, political orientation, or
fiscal capacity of the county; (2) case characteristics as
documented in the trial reports explain a small portion of variance
in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty; and (3) black
defendants were four and a half times more likely to be sentenced
148
to death than similarly situated white defendants.

Moreover, “[a]fter running various models . . . Beckett summarized her
findings regarding race” as follows:
From December 1981 through May of 2014, special sentencing
proceedings in Washington State involving Black defendants were
between 3.5 and 4.6 times as likely to result in a death sentence as
proceedings involving non-Black defendants after the impact of
the other variables included in the model has been taken into
149
account.

In reaching its decision in Gregory, the Supreme Court of
Washington made sure to clarify that it was the “death penalty, as
administered,” and not the actual punishment of death that was
unconstitutional.150 This meant that the door was open for Washington
lawmakers to modify the Washington death penalty statute so that it
conformed with the state’s constitutional standards.151 However, the
Washington Senate instead passed a proposal on January 31, 2020, that was
submitted by Attorney General Bob Ferguson, to formally repeal the state’s
death penalty, and instead mandate a sentence of life imprisonment without
145.
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147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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the possibility of parole.152 The Bill, which passed the State Senate with
bipartisan support after a twenty-eight to eighteen vote, “now heads to the
state House for consideration.”153 This is the third time in as many years that
the Washington Senate has passed this Bill, which stalled in the state House
the previous two years.154 However, there is optimism among abolition
supporters in Washington that the state House will pass the Bill this time
around.155 The reason for this optimism is two-fold: first, new Democratic
House Speaker, Laurie Jinkins—whose predecessor “prevented the Bill from
coming up for a vote in the House in 2018 and 2019”—“has said she
personally supports the Bill”; and second, Washington Governor, Jay Inslee
has said he will sign the Bill if it makes it to his desk. 156 Finally, it is also
noteworthy that the title of Senate Bill 5339 is “reducing criminal justice
expenses by eliminating the death penalty and instead requiring life
imprisonment without possibility of release or parole as the sentence for
aggravated first degree murder.”157 The title of the Senate Bill clearly
illustrates that, like New Hampshire, the Washington legislators’ decision to
abolish the death penalty is at least partly motivated by the exorbitant costs
associated with enforcing the barbaric practice.158
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S.B. 5339, 66th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020); Senate Passes Bill to
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WHY FLORIDA SHOULD FOLLOW SUIT

Lack of Deterrent Effect

The argument most often cited in support of the death penalty is that
the threat of execution is an effective deterrent of future crime.159 However,
there is no evidence to support this assertion, and as Cesare Beccaria put it,
“[t]he death penalty makes an impression that, despite all of its force, cannot
compensate for the inclination to forgetfulness, which is natural to man even
in the most important matters and is hastened by the passions.”160 In his
writing, Beccaria also states “[f]or a punishment to be just, it must have only
that degree of intensity that suffices to deter men from crime.” 161 However,
most capital crimes are committed during situations of extreme emotional
duress or under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol—when logical and
rational thinking are absent.162 In these cases, capital offenses are committed
by individuals who are “unable to appreciate the consequences” of their
actions.163 But, even when the crime is actually planned, the criminal
typically anticipates committing the offense and escaping without detection
or arrest.164 Therefore, it logically follows that the threat of even the severest
punishment will have no deterrent effect on someone that fully expects to
commit the crime and avoid detection.165 Nevertheless, if severe punishment
can be proven to deter crime, then life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole “is severe enough to deter any rational person from committing a
[capital offense].”166 Thus, the critical question is not whether the death
penalty would deter capital offenses in and of itself, but whether the death
penalty is a more effective deterrent than its alternative—life imprisonment
without parole—to justify its costly and final nature.167
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Additionally, a study conducted by Abdorrahman Boroumand Center
(“ABC Study”) that was released on December 13, 2018, examined eleven
countries that have abolished the death penalty at least ten years prior to the
conduction of the study.168 The researchers plotted the changes in the
murder rate for these eleven countries over the last ten years.169 The study
found that:
[D]eath penalty abolition correlated on average with a decline in
murder rates in [all] eleven countries . . . . In fact, . . . a country in
this set which abolished the death penalty could expect an average
of approximately six less murders per 100,000 people a decade
after abolition.170

Thus, as the study concluded, fears by proponents of the death penalty that
abolition will lead to more crime, “or at least weaken deterrence,” seem to
be “unfounded.”171 Death penalty proponents may see the ABC Study and
point out that the eleven countries examined do not necessarily represent
America.172 While this observation may be true, there is evidence to
support that the trend extrapolated from the ABC Study is also present
within the United States.173 For example, the murder rate in death penalty
states, collectively, has been higher than the murder rate in non-death
penalty states, collectively, in every single year since 1990—nearly thirty
years.174 The difference is not particularly close either, as death penalty
states have had a 28% higher murder rate on average than non-death penalty
states since 1999, with the highest percent difference being 47% in 2007.175
Moreover, a study conducted in 2008 by Michael L. Radelet—a
sociology professor from the University of Colorado-Boulder—examined the
opinions of leading criminology experts on the deterrence effects of the death
penalty and found that 88.2% of respondents do not believe that the death
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penalty deters murder.176 “[A] level of consensus comparable to the
agreement among scientists regarding global climate change.”177 In fact,
nearly 19% of the experts surveyed believe that the imposition of the death
penalty actually leads to a higher murder rate, a phenomenon known as the
“brutalization hypothesis.”178 Thus, “[d]eterrence is a function not only of a
punishment’s severity, but also of its certainty and frequency.”179
B.

Applied in Arbitrary and Discriminatory Manner

As was found in both Furman and Gregory, the practice of the death
penalty is unconstitutional when it is applied in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.180 However, the death penalty has always been
applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, and this still holds true
today.181 “The death penalty is supposed to be reserved for the most
culpable. Instead, it’s inflicted on the most vulnerable.”182 In the United
States, between the years of 1930 and the end of 1996, there were 4220
inmate executions; more than half of which were African American.183 This
should not be surprising, however, as death rows across the country have
habitually housed a “disproportionately large population of African
Americans, relative to their percentage of the total population.”184 For
example, when comparing African American and white offenders over the
past century, African Americans were often sentenced to capital punishment
for crimes that did not amount to capital offenses for whites, such as rape and
burglary.185 This inequitable distribution of capital punishment is evidenced
by the fact that, of the 455 men executed for rape between the years of 1930
and 1976, an astonishing 405—90%—were African American.186
176.
Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide
Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 501
(2009); A Clear Scientific Consensus That the Death Penalty Does Not Deter, AMNESTY INT’L
(June 18, 2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/a-clear-scientific-consensus-that-the-deathpenalty-does-not-deter/.
177.
A Clear Scientific Consensus That the Death Penalty Does Not Deter,
supra note 176.
178.
Id.; Radelet & Lacock, supra note 176, at 503.
179.
The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
180.
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
181.
See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
182.
Death Penalty, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, http://eji.org/issues/death-penalty/
(last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
183.
The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
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Proponents of the death penalty may argue today that these trends of racial
discrimination are things of the past, however, the data clearly illustrates the
falsity of such an assertion.187 “African Americans make up 42% of people
on death row and 34% of those executed, but only 13% of the population is
[African American].”188 Moreover, “since the revival of the death penalty”
in 1976, about half of the inmates on death row at any given time are African
American.189 Even more notable is the racial comparison of the victims:
“[a]lthough approximately 49% of all homicide victims are white, 77% of
capital homicide cases since 1976 have involved a white victim.”190 Thus,
African Americans who are found guilty of killing a white victim are at the
greatest risk, over any other race or demographic, to be sentenced to capital
punishment.191
These discriminatory influences on the imposition of capital
punishment can also be found within the State of Florida.192 One of the main
conclusions derived from the Beckett Report, which led to the Supreme
Court of Washington holding that the imposition of the death penalty was
unconstitutional, was the finding that “there is significant county-by-county
variation in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty, and a portion of
that variation is a function of the size of the black population . . . .”193
Likewise, in Florida, out of sixty-seven total counties, the top three counties
when it comes to executions—Miami-Dade County, Orange County, and
Duval County—are ranked last, sixth to last, and eighth to last, respectively,
in percentage of Whites among the population.194 Moreover, Miami-Dade
County has the largest Hispanic population in the state, where 64.7% of the
county is composed of Hispanics, and Duval County ranks third in the State
when it comes to percentage of African Americans within the population.195
Meanwhile, 49.2% of the population of Orange County is composed of a
combination of African Americans and Hispanics.196 These three counties
account for more than 35% of all executions in the State of Florida since

187.
See id.
188.
Death Penalty, supra note 182.
189.
The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
190.
Id.
191.
See id.
192.
See Execution List:
1976 – Present, FLA. DEP’T CORRS.,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/execlist.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2020); Race and Ethnicity in
Florida
(State),
STAT.
ATLAS,
http://statisticalatlas.com/state/Florida/Race-andEthnicity#figure/county (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
193.
State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 630 (Wash. 2018).
194.
See Race and Ethnicity in Florida (State), supra note 192.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
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1979, but only make up roughly 23% of the State’s total population.197
Finally, since 1979, the State of Florida has executed ninety-nine individuals,
twenty-nine of which—roughly 29%—have been African American.198 This
is despite the fact that the African American population in Florida was 13.8%
in 1980, and was still only 16.9% in 2018.199 Thus, as was the case in
Washington, the data supports the assertion that there is a county-by-county
variation in decisions to seek or impose the death penalty in the State of
Florida.200 This variation has led to counties with some of the smallest white
populations, as well as some of the highest population of minorities, being
impacted the most by the imposition of capital punishment.201
Lastly, the death penalty unfairly discriminates against the poor, as it
is mostly imposed on people who do not have the means to hire an effective
attorney.202 “The failure to provide adequate counsel to capital defendants
and people sentenced to death is a defining feature of the American death
penalty.”203 “Whether a defendant will be sentenced to death . . . [has a
direct correlation] . . . [with] the quality of the defendant’s legal team . . .
.”204 This is not to say that there are no competent and effective lawyers that
can provide exceptional representation to capital defendants—because that is
simply not true.205 However, as stated previously, most capital defendants
cannot afford to hire adequate representation and are, therefore, appointed
lawyers that are typically “overworked, underpaid, and inexperienced” in
trying capital cases.206 This typically results in a failure to “adequately
investigate cases, call witnesses, and challenge forensic evidence,” as capital
cases are complex, time-consuming, and financially taxing.207 Insufficient
representation leads to wrongful convictions and death sentences that are
difficult to rectify on appeal.208 Moreover, there is no right to counsel after
the first appeal, thereby leaving defendants “sentenced to death with little
hope for relief during postconviction proceedings.”209
197.
Id.; see also Execution List: 1976 – Present, supra note 192.
198.
See Execution List: 1976 – Present, supra note 192.
199.
Florida,
RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB,
(Jan.
12,
2018),
http://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/states/florida; see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1980 CENSUS
OF POPULATION 7, 19 (1982); Race and Ethnicity in Florida (State), supra note 192.
200.
See Execution List: 1976 – Present, supra note 192.
201.
Id.; see also Race and Ethnicity in Florida (State), supra note 192.
202.
Death Penalty, supra note 182.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
Death Penalty, supra note 182.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
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Rate of Error

Unlike any other criminal punishment, the death penalty is
irreversible and final.210 This finality means an inability to correct any
mistakes that may have led to a wrongful conviction.211 While some
proponents of the death penalty may make the absurd argument that the
merits of the death penalty are worth the occasional execution of [an]
innocent life, most proponents instead try to argue that there is little
likelihood of executing an innocent life.212 As to the first argument, the
death of even one innocent life at the hands of the government is one too
many, and the mere possibility that an innocent life can be executed should
be sufficient to halt this barbaric practice.213 The second argument, although
a bit more rational than the first, still lacks merit.214 Since 1973, 1522
individuals have been executed in the United States, and in that same time
frame, 170 individuals have been exonerated and released from death row.215
These statistics indicate that for about every nine executions in the United
States, one individual is exonerated of all charges that put him or her on
death row—roughly an 11% rate of error.216 However, the numbers in
Florida paint an even bleaker picture, as the State leads the nation in
exonerations by a considerable margin.217 As of January 2020, twenty-nine
individuals on Florida’s death row have been exonerated and released,
leading to roughly a 30% error rate—significantly higher than the national
error rate of roughly 11%.218 For comparison, the next closest state when it
comes to exonerations is Illinois with twenty-one, and after that, there is a
significant drop-off, as the next closest state is Texas with only thirteen
exonerations.219 Finally, one need not look far to find examples of wrongful
convictions.220 In Brevard County, located on Central Florida’s east coast,
there have been at least three life sentences in which individuals “wrongfully
210.
211.
212.
213.

The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
See id.
Id.
See Marshall Frank, It’s Time to Put Death Penalty to Rest in U.S., FLA.
TODAY
(June
22,
2017,
2:09
PM),
http://www.floridatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/06/22/time-death-penaltyabolished/420377001/.
214.
See Death Penalty, supra note 182; Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet,
supra note 100; The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
215.
Death Penalty, supra note 182.
216.
Id.
217.
Innocence, supra note 102.
218.
Id.; Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
219.
Innocence, supra note 102.
220.
See Frank, supra note 213.
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served [twenty-seven] years, [twenty-two] years, and [four] years [in prison]
as innocent men.”221 Had these men been sentenced to death, rather than life
imprisonment, two would have likely been executed prior to their
exoneration due to this imperfect system.222
D.

Cost

Another misconception about capital punishment is that it is cheaper
than life imprisonment, and therefore, abolishing the death penalty would be
unfair to the taxpayer.223 However, when all the relevant costs are factored
in, just the opposite is true.224 “The death penalty is not now, nor has it ever
been, a more economical alternative to life imprisonment.”225 A murder trial
involving the death penalty typically takes considerably longer than a trial
that does not involve the death penalty.226 These litigation costs, including
the time of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, are usually covered by
the taxpayers.227 Moreover, the prolonged period of time between the
imposition of the death penalty and the actual execution elevates costs, as
taxpayers bear the cost to house these inmates in separate death row
housing.228 However, this delay prior to execution is “unavoidable, given the
procedural safeguards [that are mandated] by the courts in capital cases.”229
Thus, the only way to reduce the costs associated with the death penalty
would be to remove the procedural safeguards and constitutional protections
afforded to capital defendants, thereby increasing the likelihood of executing
an innocent defendant.230 Finally, Florida is not impervious to the high costs
associated with enforcing the death penalty.231 In fact, “Florida, with one of
the nation’s [most populous] death rows, has estimated that the true cost of
each execution is approximately $3.2 million, or approximately six times the
cost of a life-imprisonment sentence.”232 This money can be better utilized
by the State, as in a paradoxical turn of events, enforcing the death penalty

221.
Id.
222.
Id.
223.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 20.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id. at 21.
227.
Id.
228.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 3, 21; see also The Case Against the Death
Penalty, supra note 155.
229.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 3.
230.
Id. at 4.
231.
See id. at 21.
232.
Id. (internal emphasis omitted).
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takes money that can be used to enhance public safety, among other
things.233
VI.

LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS A SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVE TO THE DEATH
PENALTY

Rather than continuing the barbaric practice of the death penalty,
Florida should instead transition to the more humane alternative of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for capital punishment.234 As
this Comment has outlined, there are a multitude of reasons to support this
transition.235 First, the threat of life imprisonment without the possibility for
parole is severe enough to deter any rational person from committing capital
offenses.236 Moreover, there is no evidence that suggests that the death
penalty is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment without the
possibility for parole.237 In fact, as mentioned previously, death penalty
states consistently have higher murder rates than non-death penalty states.238
Therefore, the death penalty is relegated to an unjustified form of retribution
that is inconsistent with the ideologies of punishment utilized within the
United States.239 As Cesare Beccaria put it:
[T]here is no one who, upon reflection, would choose the total and
permanent loss of his own liberty, no matter how advantageous a
crime might be: therefore, the intensity of perpetual penal
servitude, substituted for the death penalty, has all that is necessary
240
to deter even the most determined mind.

Second, if the death penalty is abolished, life imprisonment without the
possibility for parole would be applied universally as capital punishment.241
This would resolve the issue of arbitrary and discriminatory application of
the death penalty that has rendered the death penalty unconstitutional on
233.
The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
234.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 1, 7; see also Florida Death Penalty Fact
Sheet, supra note 100.
235.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 1–2.
236.
Id.
237.
Id. at 4; Radelet & Lacock, supra note 176, at 490.
238.
See Murder Rate of Death Penalty States Compared to Non-Death
Penalty States, supra note 173.
239.
See Punishment, supra note 10; The Case Against the Death Penalty,
supra note 155.
240.
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 53.
241.
See Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/sentencing-alternatives/life-without-parole (last
visited Dec. 14, 2020); The Death Penalty: Questions and Answers, supra note 11.
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multiple occasions.242 Third, whereas the death penalty is final and
irreversible, life imprisonment without the possibility for parole would
provide the opportunity to rectify any mistakes before it is too late.243 It is
common knowledge that the American criminal justice system is imperfect,
and mistakes happen.244 However, with the death penalty, the victims must
pay the ultimate price for mistakes that result from an imperfect system that,
ironically, is supposed to provide justice.245
Finally, despite the
misconceptions, life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is
substantially more cost-effective than the death penalty.246
VII.

CONCLUSION

Simply put, there are no reasons that justify the barbaric, irreversible
practice of the death penalty when there is a suitable alternative that is just as
effective at deterring crime, if not more effective, and far less costly to the
taxpayer.247
Despite all its might, the death penalty fails in its ultimate endeavor
to deter crime, which relegates the practice to a purely retributive
punishment.248 However, pure retributivism is inconsistent with the
philosophies of punishment employed in the United States, especially such
an extreme form of retribution.249 But, even if the United States adhered to
purely retributive ideals, that still would not explain why murder is the only
crime that is punished in a reciprocal manner.250 Why are torturers not
punished with torture, or rapists punished with rape?251 Following this
principle of punishment is unreasonable, impractical, and leads to an
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.252

242.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972); State v. Gregory, 427
P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018); see also BEDAU, supra note 155, at 8–9.
243.
See BEDAU, supra note 155, at 2; The Case Against the Death Penalty,
supra note 155.
244.
See Greg Johnson, A More Perfect Criminal Justice System, PENN TODAY
(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.penntoday.upenn.edu/2014-12-18/features/more-perfectcriminal-justice-system.
245.
See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155; Death Penalty,
supra note 182.
246.
BEDAU, supra note 155, at 2, 20; The Case Against the Death Penalty,
supra note 155.
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See The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
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To be clear, there is no doubt that criminals deserve to be punished,
and that the severity of the punishment should reflect the severity of the
crime committed.253 However, it is well-understood that there are limits on
the severity of punishments.254 Governments that understand and respect
these limits do not use premeditated homicide as a means to enforce social
policy.255 It is ironic that, despite the centuries of debate and evolution
regarding the death penalty, it is the words of Cesare Beccaria, all the way
back in 1764, that still carry the most weight:
The death penalty is not useful because of the example of cruelty that it
gives to men. If the passions or the necessities of war have taught us
how to shed human blood, the laws, which moderate the conduct of
men, should not augment that cruel example, which is all the more
baleful when a legal killing is applied with deliberation and formality.
It seems absurd to me that the laws, which are the expression of the
public will, and which execrate and punish homicide, should
themselves commit one, and that to deter citizens from murder they
should order a public murder.256

Today, the abolition movement is stronger than ever as states
continue the trend of abolishing the death penalty.257 Moreover, it is
inevitable that the death penalty will eventually be prohibited in all
circumstances, as the law of torture should be interpreted today as
prohibiting the barbaric practice of capital punishment.258 But, Florida
should not wait for this tipping point to abolish capital punishment.259 New
Hampshire and Washington have each cited compelling rationales in their
respective decisions to abolish the death penalty that are applicable to
Florida.260 These rationales include its excessive cost as well as arbitrary and
discriminatory application.261
Additionally, abolition supporters have
pointed to the death penalty’s lack of deterrent effect and its astonishing rate
of error as grounds to end the barbaric practice.262 Thus, whether Florida
lawmakers are driven by morality, statistical data, or financial reasons, there
253.
Id.
254.
Id.
255.
The Case Against the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
256.
BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 55.
257.
See Bessler, supra note 2, at 47; State by State, supra note 18.
258.
Bessler, supra note 2, at 46–47.
259.
See id. at 46; Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
260.
See State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 642 (Wash. 2018); Chappell, supra
note 130; Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, supra note 100.
261.
See Gregory, 427 P.3d at 642; Chappell, supra note 130.
262.
See Death Penalty, supra note 182; The Case Against the Death Penalty,
supra note 155.
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are a multitude of guiding principles that support the immediate abolition of
Florida’s death penalty.263

263.
See Florida Death Penalty Fact Sheet, supra note 100; The Case Against
the Death Penalty, supra note 155.
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INTRODUCTION

On March 16, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States
announced that the Court was postponing upcoming oral arguments for the
first time in over 100 years.1 The last time the Court did so was in response
to the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918, which only delayed the Court one
month.2 The only other postponements were more than 200 years ago in
1793 and then again in 1798 in response to the yellow fever.3 The everdeveloping novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) has provided United States
citizens with a first-hand look into how overwhelmingly disruptive a
pandemic can be on the criminal justice system and society as a whole.4
The first confirmed case in the United States appeared on January
21, 2020.5 In less than six months, there were over 3.7 million confirmed
domestic cases and over 140,000 domestic deaths as a result of the virus.6
Further, there is currently no foreseeable quarantine end date, but when
things do return to some form of normalcy, the devastating effects will be
felt for many years to come.7 This is especially true for the United States’
criminal justice system.8 The unanticipated halt of the judiciary has led to
one of the biggest disruptions in our nation’s history, resulting in a backlog
of thousands of individuals who remain incarcerated without a court date in
sight.9 Many constitutional rights are being affected by this standstill, but
none as prevalent as the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.10

1.
Melissa Chan, ‘It Will Have Effects for Months and Years.’ From Jury
Duty to Trials, Coronavirus Is Wreaking Havoc on Courts, TIME (Mar. 16, 2020, 4:44 PM),
http://www.time.com/5803037/coronavirus-courts-jury-duty.
2.
Id.; Richard Altieri & Hayley Evans, The Supreme Court’s Coronavirus
Postponement: Pandemics, Precedent and National Risks, LAWFARE (Mar. 31, 2020, 8:00
AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-courts-coronavirus-postponement-pandemicsprecedent-and-national-risks.
3.
Altieri & Evans, supra note 2.
4.
See Pandemic Disrupts Justice System, Courts, A.B.A. NEWS (Mar. 16,
2020), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2020/03/coronavirusaffecting-justice-system.
5.
Derrick B. Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html.
6.
United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CDC (July 21,
2020), http://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases.
7.
See James Paton, When, and How, Does the Coronavirus Pandemic End?,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2020, 12:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0403/when-and-how-does-the-coronavirus-pandemic-end-quicktake; Pandemic Disrupts Justice
System, Courts, supra note 4; Chan, supra note 1.
8.
See Chan, supra note 1.
9.
Id.
10.
See id.
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In 1967, the Court established that a criminal defendant’s right to a
speedy trial was a constitutionally protected fundamental right that applied to
all fifty states in Klopfer v. North Carolina.11 The seminal decision,
however, is the 1972 holding of Barker v. Wingo.12 In Barker, Justice
Powell discusses the societal disadvantages of pretrial incarceration and
further provides factors that courts must consider to alleviate these
disadvantages by ensuring that a defendant has not been deprived of their
right to a speedy trial.13 The interests articulated in Barker expand on the
concept that the right to a speedy trial benefits not only the accused, but also
society as whole—recognizing that the right “exists separate from, and at
times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.”14
The idea of obtaining justice in a timely fashion and affording the
accused this right derives its foundation from English law.15 The right to a
speedy trial’s earliest known origin is from the Assize of Clarendon of 1166,
in which King Henry II of England initiated a transformation of old English
law into the various concepts that the United States’ legal system recognizes
today.16 This led not only to jury trials, but also to the inception of timely
justice:
And when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has
been arrested through the aforesaid oath, if the justices are not
about to come speedily enough into the country where they have
been taken, let the sheriffs send word to the nearest justice by
some well-informed person that they have arrested such men, and
the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs informing them
where they desire the men to be brought before them; and let the
sheriffs bring them before the justices. 17

Similar concepts regarding the right to a speedy trial were
subsequently recorded in the Magna Carta in 1215, and became the first
articulation of the right in modern jurisprudence.18 Chief Justice Warren’s
opinion in Klopfer noted that the ideas introduced by the Assize of
Clarendon and the Magna Carta were cardinal to the rights introduction in

11.
386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
12.
407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972).
13.
See id. at 519, 530.
14.
Id. at 519.
15.
Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.
16.
Id.; Patrick Ellard, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the Right to a
Speedy Trial to Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1207,
1209 (2007).
17.
Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223 n.9 (quoting the Assize of Clarendon of 1166).
18.
Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.
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the Sixth Amendment, which now applies to all fifty states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
This Comment will consider the right to a speedy trial’s applicability
during the COVID-19 pandemic, and whether the rule can adequately adapt
without diminishing the meaning of the constitutional guarantee.20
Specifically, this Comment will address the Supreme Court of Florida’s
orders tolling the speedy trial clock that continues to delay a criminal
defendant’s day in court.21 First, this Comment will discuss the four factors
articulated in Barker for determining whether a criminal defendant has been
deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.22 Second, this
Comment will discuss how Florida’s statutory speedy trial rule functions
under normal circumstances.23 Specifically, the time frames prescribed
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191.24 Third, this Comment will
discuss how Florida’s speedy trial rule is currently functioning during the
COVID-19 pandemic and conduct an analysis of the administrative orders
that continue to suspend the speedy trial clock.25 Finally, this Comment will
apply the Barker factors to the continued suspension of the speedy trial clock
and address the ramifications that Florida’s indefinite court closure may have
on criminal defendants’ constitutional right to a speedy trial.26
II.

SPEEDY CONSIDERATIONS

The speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . .
trial . . . ”27 The clause “is activated only when a criminal prosecution has
begun and extends only to those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the
course of that prosecution.”28 Further, indictment is not needed for
invocation of the provision, but the Court has held that the protection does
not extend to any period prior to arrest.29 Therefore, the right attaches and

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part II; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191; see also discussion infra Part III.
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
Id. at 321.
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may be invoked at the time of arrest or formal charge, whichever comes
first.30
Unlike other amendments found within the Bill of Rights, the Sixth
Amendment has had a history of discrepancy regarding its several provisions
and their applicability to the states.31 This is especially true when it comes to
the right to a speedy trial; in fact, the right to a speedy trial was not declared
fundamental until 1967.32 Furthermore, one author argues that the Court’s
delayed declaration as fundamental and ambiguous precedent concerning the
right, has led to the right of a speedy trial being seen as a “‘second-class’
citizen . . . not worthy of equal treatment with other comparable safeguards
afforded criminal defendants.”33 However, one would think that the right to
a speedy trial would be scrupulously examined since its deprivation may lead
to dismissal of a case in its entirety.34
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to provide a bright-line test for
determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred, and has left that
up to each state’s discretion.35 The Court did, however, establish four factors
that should be considered when assessing whether a violation did occur: (A)
length of delay; (B) reason for delay; (C) the defendant’s assertion of their
No single factor is
rights; and (D) prejudice to the defendant.36
determinative; instead, all the factors must be considered together.37
A.

The Length of Delay

The first factor, length of delay, is a two-prong test that functions as
a triggering mechanism for the four-prong analysis of whether there has been
a violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.38 First, the defendant must
allege that the elapsed time between their arrest—or formal charge—and a
trial has crossed the threshold of ordinary, thus making the delay
“presumptively prejudicial.”39 Courts have generally held that a delay in
30.
See id. at 320–21; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 64–65 (1975)
(per curiam) (holding if arrest precedes indictment or arraignment, time must be calculated
from date of arrest).
31.
See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 195 nn.38–40 (1953).
32.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
33.
ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 177 (1992).
34.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
35.
Id. at 523.
36.
Id. at 530.
37.
Id. at 533.
38.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992); see also Barker,
407 U.S. at 530.
39.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; see also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S.
64, 65 (1975) (per curiam).
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excess of one year is considered presumptively prejudicial.40 On the other
hand, the “length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry . . . [depends]
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.”41 Once the defendant has
shown the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the court must then consider
how far the delay has extended past this threshold.42 “This latter enquiry is
significant to the speedy trial analysis because . . . the presumption that
pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.”43
B.

The Reason for the Delay

The second factor, reason for the delay, is closely related to the first
factor in that different weight is given for different reasons.44 For example,
intentional attempts to hamper the defense is weighed heavily against the
prosecution.45 While more neutral reasons, including overloaded courts and
negligence, are weighed less heavily, “but nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant.”46 Further, delays that result
from valid reasons such as case complexity and good-faith interlocutory
appeals will not weigh against the government at all.47 Finally, if there are
multiple causes for several delays, they are all considered in the aggregate,
with consideration for whether an earlier delay is the cause of a later delay.48

40.
See United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 60 (1st Cir. 2007)
(finding a five-and-a-half-year delay on a conspiracy charge was presumptively prejudicial);
United States v. Bass, 460 F.3d 830, 836 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding a thirteen-month delay on
conspiracy to distribute cocaine was presumptively prejudicial).
41.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31; see also Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 60–61
(holding no speedy trial violation because the complexity of the case required numerous pretrial motions).
42.
See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992).
43.
Id. at 652.
44.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding
delay from the complexity of a sixty-person drug conspiracy case with over 350 pretrial
motions filed did not weigh against the government).
48.
See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91–92 (2009) (holding that
subsequent delays by the government were still weighed heavily against the defendant
because their cause was the defendant’s prior disruption of proceedings).
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The Defendant’s Assertion of Their Rights

The third factor is whether the defendant asserts the right.49 The
Supreme Court in Barker overturned the rule that a defendant who fails to
demand a speedy trial forever waives their right.50 This was otherwise
known as the demand-waiver rule, which relied on the assumption that delay
solely benefits the defendant.51 As a result, the Court provided a more
workable analysis and held that whether the defendant asserts the right
should weigh differently based on the facts of each case.52 For example, a
defendant who does demand a speedy trial serves as strong evidence that the
defendant has been deprived of their right.53 In contrast, “failure to assert the
right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a
speedy trial.”54
D.

Prejudice to the Defendant

The fourth and final factor is prejudice, which is assessed in light of
the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect: Oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety, and concern of the
accused, and impairment of the defense.55 The burden of showing prejudice
is on the defendant, and the mere “possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to
support [the] . . . position that . . . speedy trial rights [are] violated.”56
Further, as with the first three factors, prejudice is neither “a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial.”57 Therefore, if the defendant cannot show actual prejudice, it is an
error not to consider the other three factors.58 However, lower courts have
been reluctant to find a violation and grant dismissal without a showing of
prejudice.59 This is likely because, in 1992, the Court in Doggett v. United

49.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 531.
50.
Id. at 528.
51.
Id. at 525.
52.
Id. at 528–29.
53.
Id. at 531–32; see also United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 61
(1st Cir. 2007) (holding repeated demand weighed heavily in defendant’s favor).
54.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
55.
Id.
56.
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986).
57.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
58.
See United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 664–65 (6th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2002).
59.
See United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009)
(finding no speedy trial violation because defendant would have been imprisoned despite
delay; thus, no actual prejudice could be found); United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25,
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States60 focused solely on the three prejudicial interests of prong four in
As a result, some
evaluating whether a violation had occurred.61
commentators argue that the four-prong analysis should be abandoned, and a
violation should be assessed relative to which interests were harmed and to
what degree.62
Absent any decision to the contrary, the balancing of all four prongs
is still required for an adequate evaluation of a violation.63 However, the
three interests have an importance beyond the Barker analysis in that the
interests provide a baseline for states to prescribe their own speedy trial rules
that adequately uphold constitutional standards.64 Thus, the Court in Barker
went to extensive lengths to define and give context to all three.65 Unlike the
four factors, however, the interests are more abstract and provide
justifications for this constitutional guarantee.66 This is because the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial differs from other constitutional
guarantees because it benefits society as a whole and not solely the
defendant.67 “It does not preclude the rights of public justice.”68
First, oppressive pretrial incarceration is only applicable when the
defendant is in jail awaiting trial, and does not apply when the defendant has
been released on bail.69 This is because post-accusation delay, accompanied
by pretrial incarceration, affects several things beyond the accused
themselves.70 For example, imprisonment often leads to disruption of family
life, job loss, lost earnings, and contributes to the issues of jail
overcrowding.71 Furthermore, the ability to rehabilitate an individual whose
case was unduly delayed diminishes as the length of their pretrial

61 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no speedy trial violation because delay only caused a normal
amount of anxiety and did not impair the defense; thus, no actual prejudice could be found).
60.
505 U.S. 647 (1992).
61.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 658–59 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 659–64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62.
See Brian P. Brooks, A New Speedy Trial Standard for Barker v. Wingo:
Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 595–96
(1994).
63.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
64.
See id. at 523.
65.
See id. at 532–33.
66.
See id.
67.
Id. at 519.
68.
Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
69.
See United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2007).
70.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
71.
Id. at 520–21, 532; see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320
(1971).
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incarceration increases.72 It is especially harmful to impose these burdens on
someone who will ultimately be found innocent.73
Second, anxiety and concern of the accused is designed to address
and protect those released on bail and awaiting trial.74 Further, the speedy
trial guarantee is designed to limit the “impairment of liberty imposed on an
accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by
arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.”75 Specifically, to
reduce anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation.76 However,
defendants must make a particularized showing that the anxiety suffered is
distinguishable from similarly situated defendants since anxiety will be
found to some degree in every case.77 This usually comes in the form of
public condemnation and communal suspicion.78 Although this interest is
directed toward an accused released on bail, it may also be applicable to
those incarcerated awaiting trial if it is distinguishable.79
The final interest, impairment of a defense, was noted by the Court
as being the most important of the three interests “because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system.”80 Witnesses die, evidence may be lost or destroyed during the
period of delay, but the most damaging is the loss of memory because it is
not always reflected on the record.81 However, much like the other interests,
it is entirely dependent upon the facts of the particular case, and therefore, is
“best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial.”82
As such, some courts are reluctant to declare that the defense was impaired if
they cannot identify specific evidence that was made unavailable, or less
persuasive, because of the delay.83

72.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 520.
73.
See id. at 533.
74.
See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986) (citing United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116. 120 (1966)); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222
(1967).
75.
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
76.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
77.
United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006); Morris v.
Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir. 1975).
78.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 527.
79.
See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379 (1969) (finding that a prisoner
who is in prison serving time for an unrelated offense may still be prejudiced by anxiety and
concern).
80.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
81.
Id.
82.
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 (1978), cert. denied 140
S. Ct. 282 (2019).
83.
See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 820 (10th Cir. 1998).
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THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IN FLORIDA

A criminal defendant in the State of Florida has the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial under both the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Florida Constitution.84 Further, Florida courts
use the Barker factors to analyze a constitutional speedy trial claim.85 The
Court in Barker noted that there is “no constitutional basis for holding that
the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or
months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period
consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less
precise.”86
As such, rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
(“Florida rule”) prescribes that in the absence of demand for a speedy trial,
criminal defendants charged with a felony are entitled to be brought to trial
within 175 days after they have been taken into custody.87 Whereas criminal
defendants charged with a misdemeanor are entitled to be brought to trial
within ninety days after they have been taken into custody.88 Further,
custody for the purposes of the Florida rule, occurs when the person is either
formally arrested or provided with a notice to appear in lieu of a physical
arrest.89 Moreover, the Florida rule provides for the right, both with or
without demand, and provides different lengths of time. 90 Therefore, if a
defendant has a bona fide desire to demand a speedy trial and obtain a trial
sooner, the defendant has the right to be brought to trial within sixty days by
filing a demand for a speedy trial.91 However, if the provided time period
expires, the defendant may file a notice of expiration, which requires the trial
court to hold a hearing to determine whether the failure to bring the
defendant to trial is attributable to the defendant.92 If the court determines
that it is not attributable to the defendant, it must then schedule a trial within
ten days of the hearing.93 If the defendant is not subsequently brought to trial
within this ten-day period, they may then be entitled to dismissal and
discharge.94 The purpose of such a drastic remedy is to ensure that “persons
84.
U.S. CONST. amend VI; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
85.
See Fletcher v. State, 143 So. 3d 469, 471–72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); Niles v. State, 120 So. 3d 658, 663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
86.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
87.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a).
88.
Id.
89.
Id. 3.191(d)(1)–(2).
90.
Id. 3.191(a), (b), (g).
91.
Id. 3.191(b).
92.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(p)(2)–(3).
93.
Id. 3.191(p)(3).
94.
Id.
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charged with crimes are not allowed to languish in jail or otherwise suffer the
indignities of a pending prosecution for an unreasonable length of time” and
to promote judicial efficiency.95
However, Florida criminal court proceedings have been anything but
judicially efficient since the onset of the novel Coronavirus.96 On March 17,
2020, Florida’s Chief Justice Charles Canady ordered state circuit court
judges to cancel, postpone, or reschedule all but “essential” court
proceedings.97 As of July 22, 2020, there have been forty-four statewide
pandemic—including amended—orders issued by the Supreme Court of
Florida setting a statewide framework for emergency response within
Florida’s court system.98 The large majority of which affect the Florida
speedy trial rule.99
IV.

SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS AND THE CORONAVIRUS

On March 9, 2020, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis declared a state
of emergency for the entire State of Florida.100 Four days later, on March 13,
2020, the Supreme Court of Florida issued its first administrative order
addressing the right to a speedy trial.101 The Court stated that it was the
intent of the order to suspend the speedy trial procedure in the manner
described in Sullivan v. State102 and State v. Hernandez.103 Although many
amendments and clarifications have been made in the subsequent orders, all

95.
State v. Smail, 346 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also
State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 1980).
96.
See In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida
State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5 (Fla. July 2, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/639134/file/AOSC20-23-Amendment5.pdf (suspending the speedy trial clock on July 2, 2020 and noting that it has been suspended
since March 13, 2020).
97.
In re COVID-19 Essential and Critical Trial Court Proceedings, Fla.
Admin.
Order
No.
AOSC
20-15
(Fla.
Mar.
17,
2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/631996/7181425/AOSC20-15.pdf.
98.
Information on COVID-19 Emergency Orders & Advisories, FLA. SUP.
CT., http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/Emergency (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
99.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96;
discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
100.
Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52 (Mar. 9, 2020).
101.
In re COVID-19 Emergency Procedures in the Florida State Courts, Fla.
Admin.
Order
No.
AOSC
20-13
(Fla.
Mar.
13,
2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/631744/7178881/AOSC20-13.pdf.
102.
913 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
103.
617 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also Fla. Admin. Order
No. AOSC 20-13, supra note 101; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note
96.
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of the subsequent orders that address speedy trial apply the suspension in the
same manner described in Sullivan and Hernandez.104
A.

Speedy Tolling

There are numerous reasons why the pretrial time period may be
extended without breaching one’s constitutional right, and under normal
circumstances, “[a] trial judge has enormous discretion in deciding whether
to grant an extension of the speedy trial time limitations.”105 This extension
is otherwise known as “tolling” the speedy trial period.106 For example, the
otherwise applicable time periods may be extended for “exceptional
circumstances” like unexpected illness,107 a showing by the state that the
complexity of the case requires more time,108 a showing by the state that
specific evidence is unavailable but will become available at a later date,109 a
showing by either the defendant or state that a delay is necessary due to
unforeseen developments,110 a showing of necessity to accommodate a codefendant,111 or a showing by the state that the accused has caused a major
delay or disruption preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise. 112
Once a defendant has demanded a speedy trial, they essentially waive their
right to obtain a further continuance, and alternatively, the state may not ask
for a further continuance unless one of these exceptional circumstances
exist.113 However, above all of this lies the administrative power of the
Supreme Court of Florida.114
In Sullivan, the defendant “filed a notice for Expiration of Speedy
Trial on which the [lower] court took no action until January 3, 2005.”115
However, the defendant’s recapture period expired on December 30, 2004,
during Seminole County’s two-week holiday recess which was noted as not
being an official holiday by the appellate court.116 Appellant filed a motion
104.
Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96.
105.
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(i), (l); Burns v. State, 433 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
106.
See State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 1980).
107.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(l)(1).
108.
Id. at 3.191(l)(2).
109.
Id. at 3.191(l)(3).
110.
Id. at 3.191(l)(4).
111.
Id. at 3.191(l)(5).
112.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(l)(6).
113.
Id. at 3.191(g), (i)(2), (l).
114.
See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
115.
Sullivan, 913 So. 2d at 763.
116.
See id. The recapture period is the short period of time in which the state
is given to bring the accused to trial after the accused files a motion for discharge, notifying
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for discharge, which the lower court denied, finding that the holiday was an
“exceptional circumstance” under the Florida rule 3.191(l).117 Subsequently,
on appeal, the appellate court found the holiday recess was not an exception
circumstance.118 However, during the defendant’s arrest and the expiration
of the speedy trial period, there were three different administrative orders
issued by the Supreme Court of Florida.119 All of which tolled the speedy
trial clock in Seminole County for a cumulative period of fifteen days as a
result of three different hurricanes.120 Thus, the appellate court ultimately
concluded the notice of expiration was premature.121
Similarly, in Hernandez, the defendant filed a motion for discharge
in Dade County, was not brought to court, and was subsequently discharged
because the ten-day period lapsed.122 However, when hurricane Andrew hit
Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida issued an administrative order tolling
the speedy trial clock in Dade County.123 Five days had run prior to the
Order and only three days had run after the two-week tolling period
commenced.124 Thus, only eight of the ten days had run and the defendant’s
discharge was ultimately reversed.125 The appellate court held that pursuant
to Article V, Section II of the Florida Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Florida has the power to administer the judiciary, allowing for the tolling of
the speedy trial clock.126
B.

Administrative Decisions

“Florida’s state courts system first began extensive emergency
preparedness planning for infectious diseases in 2002 following the anthrax
attacks in Florida a year earlier. Those plans were updated and deployed
during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.”127 The justification is “[t]he
pandemic scenario is distinct from other emergency scenarios, hurricanes for
the state that the basic speedy trial time has expired; the recapture period is provided by rule
3.191(p)(3) which gives the state ten days to bring the defendant to trial or face discharge. See
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(p)(3).
117.
See Sullivan, 913 So. 2d at 763; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(l).
118.
Sullivan, 913 So. 2d at 763.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
123.
Id.
124.
See id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § II(a).
127.
Chief Justice Suspends Most Face-to-Face Legal Proceedings Due to
COVID-19, FLA. BAR NEWS, (Mar. 13, 2020), http://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-barnews/chief-justice-suspends-most-face-to-face-legal-proceedings-due-to-covid-19/.
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example, recently impacting the Florida State Courts System.” 128 One major
difference is that “court operations may be dramatically impacted for
potentially an extended period of time,” which was hypothesized as being
anywhere from twelve to eighteen months.129 Yet the emergency procedures
being applied to the speedy trial clock are the same procedures that are
applied to hurricanes.130 As a result, the numerous emergency orders and
subsequent amendments have continued to suspend the speedy trial clock,
which has now been nonoperational since March 13, 2020.131 However, not
all criminal defendants are in the same position because depending upon
which Judicial Circuit a defendant is located, the right to a speedy trial may
not exist for the foreseeable future.132
1.

Guiding Rules and Tolling Progression

On March 13, 2020, Chief Justice Charles Canady issued the first
suspension of the speedy trial clock for two weeks.133 Additionally, the
Court amended the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration to provide the
chief judge of each circuit authority to deal with the effects of the
emergency.134 This includes the implementation of procedures, specifically
“those affecting speedy trial.”135 On March 19, 2020, all emergency orders
previously issued were extended for “at least another three weeks,” and on
March 24, 2020, Chief Justice Canady further suspended the speedy trial
clock through April 20, 2020.136
128.
GEN. SERVS. UNIT, OFF. OF THE STATE COURTS ADM’R, STRATEGY FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA AND OTHER INFECTION DISEASE OUTBREAKS: KEEPING THE COURTS
OPEN IN A PANDEMIC 8 (2002).
129.
Id.
130.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-13, supra note 101 (applying the
tolling of speedy trial periods in the same manner as Sullivan v. State and State v. Hernandez
to COVID-19, which both tolled the speedy trial clock due to hurricanes); Hernandez, 617 So.
2d at 1103; Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
131.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96.
132.
See infra Section IV.2.; In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency
Measures for the Florida State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4 (Fla.
June 16, 2020), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/637809/file/AOSC2023-Amendment-4.pdf; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96.
133.
Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-13, supra note 101.
134.
In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205, Fla.
Admin. Order No. SC 20-346 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2020), https://efactsscpublic.flcourts.org/casedocuments/2020/346/2020-346_disposition_149072_d29.pdf.
135.
Id.
136.
Press Release from Fla. Supreme Court Spokesman, Craig Waters,
Tallahassee (extending all prior orders another three weeks) (Mar. 19, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/632165/7183384/03-19-2020_CanadyCovid-Emergency.pdf; In re COVID-19 Emergency Measures in the Florida State Courts, Fla.
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On April 6, 2020, the Supreme Court of Florida issued the first order
on COVID-19 emergency procedures, which essentially combined the
provisions of several previous administrative orders into a single
Further, Chief Justice Canady emphasized that “[t]he
document.137
overarching intent of those orders has been to mitigate the impact of
COVID-19, while keeping the courts operating to the fullest extent.”138 The
order also included “guiding principles.”139 The first of which states that
“[t]he presiding judge in all cases must consider the constitutional rights of
crime victims and criminal defendants.”140 Despite the emphasis on
constitutional rights, and in consideration for the safety of all participating,
the order further suspended the speedy trial clock more than a month past the
initial end date through June 1, 2020.141
On May 4, 2020, the Court amended the COVID-19 emergency
procedures order (“Amendment I”) and suspended the speedy trial clock
another full month through July 6, 2020.142 Throughout the month of May,
however, Florida began to see a flattening of the COVID-19 curve, and as a
result, Governor DeSantis began to greenlight a reopening strategy.143 On
May 21, 2020, the judiciary also formulated a reopening plan that further
amended and expanded on the comprehensive emergency procedures in the
prior amended order (“Amendment II”).144 The plan consisted of four
anticipated phases for the pandemic: Phase 1, “in-person contact is
inadvisable,” thus the most restrictive limits are placed on in-person contact
to avoid COVID-19 spread; Phase 2, “limited in-person contact . . . for
certain purposes,” but protective measures still will be required; Phase 3, “inAdmin.
Order
No.
AOSC
20-17
(Fla.
Mar.
24,
2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/632431/7186205/AOSC20-17.pdf.
137.
See In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida
State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23 (Fla. Apr. 6, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/636183/7227828/AOSC20-23original.pdf.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida
State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23 Amend. 1 (Fla. May 4, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/636182/7227821/AOSC20-23amendment1.pdf.
143.
See David Fleshler, After Biggest One-day Coronavirus Total, How Bad
Could It Get In Florida?, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL, June 17, 2020, at 1.
144.
See In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida
State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23 Amend. 2 (Fla. May 21, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/633282/file/AOSC20-23amendment2.pdf.
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person contact is more broadly authorized and protective measures . . .
relaxed”; and Phase 4, “COVID-19 no longer presents a significant risk to
public . . . safety.145 In addition, there was no further suspension made to
Amendment I’s speedy trial clock in Amendment II.146
The reopening plan was the result of the work done by the Court
Operations Subgroup (“Workgroup”) that was “created to develop findings
and recommendations on the continuation of all court operations and
proceedings statewide . . . that addresses each of the following anticipated
phases of the pandemic.”147 The seventeen-member workgroup consists of
an array of individuals who work within Florida’s judicial system, including
several judges, court staffers, a public defender, a state attorney, a clerk of
court, and a former member of the Bar of Board of Governors.148 The
Workgroup accounts for a variety of factors, researches best practices, and
then presents their findings and recommendations to Chief Justice Canady
for approval and subsequent order.149
When Amendment II was released, all Florida courts were in Phase
150
1. In order to transition to Phase 2 in a manner consistent with parameters
set forth in Amendment II, Chief Justice Canady issued a separate order on
May 21, 2020, establishing health and safety precautions to be used for the
expansion of court operations.151 The transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 can
only occur once each appellate court and each trial court within the circuit
has met five benchmark criteria: (a) no COVID-19 cases in the courthouse
within fourteen days or applicable self-quarantine of the infected and deep
cleaning if such cases have occurred; (b) local and state restrictive orders
permit the activity; (c) surrounding community shows fourteen-day
improvements in case reporting; (d) an increase in adequate testing
programs; and (e) other building occupants and justice system partners have

145.
Id.
146.
See id.
147.
In re COVID-19 Public Health and Safety Precautions for Phase 2, Fla.
Admin.
Order
No.
AOSC
20-32
(Fla.
May
21,
2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/636079/file/AOSC20-32.pdf.
148.
See In re Workgroup on the Continuity of Court Operations and
Proceedings During and After COVID-19, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-28 (Fla. Apr. 21,
2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/634099/7204903/AOSC2028.pdf.
149.
See id.; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147.
150.
Press Release from Fla. Supreme Court Spokesman Craig Waters
(addressing case backlog and remote civil jury trials) (May 22, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/636108/7226957/05-22-2020-PressRelease-Pandemic-Remote-Jury-Pilot.pdf.
151.
Id.; See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147; Fla. Admin.
Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 2, supra note 144.
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been consulted.152 In addition to the five benchmark criteria, the circuit must
develop an operational plan addressing the implementation of the
workgroup’s report.153
On June 8, 2020, the Supreme Court of Florida further amended the
COVID-19 emergency procedures order (“Amendment III”) to extend the
suspension of the speedy trial clock through July 20, 2020.154 Amendment
III was also followed by a memorandum from Chief Justice Canady issued to
the chief judges of each circuit regarding the transition to Phase 2.155 The
memo acknowledged that the workgroup was re-evaluating the fivebenchmark system and encouraged the chief judges “to proceed judiciously
in moving into or operating under Phase 2, in the event refinements are
made.”156 This inauspicious foresight from Chief Justice Canady was also
presented at a time when Florida had liberally loosened up restrictions and
subsequently saw the largest single-day count of cases—since the pandemic
began—on June 13, 2020.157
On June 16, 2020, the speedy trial clock was suspended indefinitely
in the fourth amended COVID-19 emergency procedure order (“Amendment
IV”).158 Amendment IV stated that all time periods involving the right to a
speedy trial were suspended until ninety days after Chief Justice Canady has
approved the certification of a chief judge’s transition into Phase 3.159
Furthermore, the ten day period in Florida Rule 3.191(p)(3) was increased to
thirty days until the circuit has transitioned to Phase 4.160 In other words,
adding twenty days to the time period that would remedy a failure to be tried
within the—now indefinite—speedy trial period.161 Interestingly, on the
152.
Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147.
153.
See id.
154.
See In re Comprehensive COVID-19 Emergency Measures for the Florida
State Courts, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 3 (Fla. June 8, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/637271/7239420/AOSC2023%20Amendment%203.pdf.
155.
Memorandum from Charles Canady, C.J., Sup. Ct. Fla. to Chief Judges
Dist. Ct. App. et al. (June 8, 2020) (on Resumption of In-person Proceedings), (available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/637273/7239447/06-08-2020Memorandum-In-Person-Proceedings.pdf.).
156.
Id.
157.
Julie Bosman & Mitch Smith, Infections Rise in Many States that
Reopened, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2020, at A1.
158.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4, supra note 132.
159.
Id.
160.
Id. Recall that rule 3.191(p)(3) states that “[a] defendant not brought to
trial within the 10-day period through no fault of the defendant, on motion of the defendant or
the court, shall be forever discharged from the crime.” FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(p)(3).
161.
See Fla. Admin Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4, supra note 132; FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.191(p)(3).
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same day, the workgroup published a guide to “best practices” for court reopenings.162 The first page of the guide provided priority recommendations
in which circuits should consider in determining which cases should be heard
first when jury trials resume.163 The number one recommended priority was
speedy trials.164
On July 2, 2020, the fifth amended COVID-19 emergency procedure
order (“Amendment V”) did not alter Amendment IV’s speedy trial
guidelines despite the fact that no circuit had begun transition to Phase 3.165
The Workgroup’s second amended order seemed somewhat hopeful because
the Workgroup established a criteria for transitioning from Phase 2 to Phase
3, which requires continual operation under Phase 2 for at least one month.166
However, just five days prior, Florida set a record for the most confirmed
new cases in a single day—9585.167 As a result, in addition to establishing a
certification process for transitioning to Phase 3, the Workgroup also
provided new criteria for circuits to follow if the circuit needs to revert back
to Phase 1.168 Especially noteworthy, the latest orders made no mention of
transitioning to Phase 4.169
2.

Circuit Application

Hypothetically, if a judicial circuit made the Phase 1 to Phase 2
transition on May 21, 2020, when the available transition was first imposed,
and subsequently made the transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 on July 2,
2020, when it was first imposed, the criminal defendant’s speedy trial clock
162.
Memorandum from Charles Canady, C.J., Sup. Ct. of Fla., to C.Js. Cir.
Cts. & Trial Ct. Admins. (June 16, 2020) (on Guidance and Best Practice Materials),
(available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/637816/7251530/06-162020-Best-Practices-Guidelines.pdf.).
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96; Press
Release from Fla. Supreme Court Spokesman, Craig Walters (addressing case backlog and
remote
civil
jury
trials)
(July
2,
2020)
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/639139/7265664/07-02-2020-PressRelease-Pandemic-Procedures-Amendments.pdf. Recall that Phase 3 transition was required
before the ninety-day speedy trial suspension even began. See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC
20-23, Amend. 4, supra note 132.
166.
In re COVID-19 Public Health and Safety Precautions for Operational
Phase Transitions, Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2 (Fla. July 2, 2020),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/639136/file/AOSC20-32-Amendment2.pdf.
167.
Robles Frances, A ‘Scary’ Fivefold Surge in Cases Over Two Weeks, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2020, at A7.
168.
Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2, supra note 166.
169.
See id.; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96.
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would not begin until September 30, 2020—ninety days after the transition
from Phase 2 to Phase 3 occurred.170 In other words, the constitutional
guarantee to a speedy trial would be suspended for 201 days, or six months
and seventeen days.171 If the hypothetical criminal defendant’s speedy trial
clock then ran out, the criminal defendant could then file a motion for
discharge.172 However, if the circuit was still in Phase 3 when the motion for
discharge is filed, the criminal defendant would then be subject to the thirtyday extended recapture period.173
Unfortunately, this hypothetical calculation does not exist, seeing as
one of the earliest circuits to transition to Phase 2 was the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit on June 1, 2020.174 Despite being in Phase 2 for over three months,
at the time of this writing, the Nineteenth Circuit has not made the transition
to Phase 3.175 In fact, as of September 2, 2020, no circuit has made the
transition to Phase 3.176 Several circuits, including the Ninth and the
Eleventh Judicial Circuits, have had to revert out of Phase 2 and back into
Phase 1, while several circuits, including the Fifth and Thirteenth Judicial
Circuits, have not made the transition out of Phase 1.177 Further, the Seventh
170.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147; Fla. Admin.
Order No. AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2, supra note 166; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23,
Amend. 4, supra note 132.
171.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147; Fla. Admin.
Order No. AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2, supra note 166; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23,
Amend. 4, supra note 132. There are 201 days between March 13, 2020, and September 30,
2020. See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147; Fla. Admin. Order No.
AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2, supra note 166; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4,
supra note 132.
172.
See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(j).
173.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4, supra note 132; FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.19(i)(5).
174.
See COVID-19/Coronavirus Updates, NINETEENTH JUD. CIR.,
http://www.circuit19.org/covid19 (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
175.
See id.
176.
Courts
Phase
Status,
FLORIDA
COURTS,
http://www.flcourts.org/Publications-Statistics/Publications/Courts-Phase-Status (last visited
Dec. 14, 2020).
177.
See 9th Circuit Court Reverts from Phase 2 to Phase 1 of Opening; Public
Access to Osceola County Courthouse Limited Again, POSITIVELY OSCEOLA, (June 26, 2020),
http://www.positivelyosceola.com/9th-circuit-court-reverts-from-phase-2-to-phase-1-ofopening-public-access-to-osceola-county-courthouse-limited-again/; In re COVID-19
Emergency Procedures, Court Operations Reverting to Phase 1 in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
of Florida, 11th Jud. Cir. Fla. Admin. Order No. 20-13 (Fla. June 25, 2020),
http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/docs/1-2013%20Courthouse%20revert%20to%20Phase%201%20-Covid-19%20%20CONFORMED.pdf; In re Face Coverings & Social Distancing Requirements in
Courthouse Facilities During COVID-19 Mitigation Efforts, 13th Jud. Cir. Fla. Admin. Order
No. S-2020-029 (Fla. June 30, 2020), http://www.fljud13.org/Portals/0/AO/DOCS/S-2020-
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Judicial Circuit transitioned many of its court facilities into Phase 2, while
various other court facilitates remain in Phase 1.178
Regardless of which phase the circuit is currently situated, a speedy
trial calculation would not be measurable until the circuit has made the
transition to Phase 3 and has some sense of positivity that the circuit would
not revert back to Phase 2.179 Even then, however, a proper time estimate
would require a calculation of the backlog of criminal cases that have
developed since the courts closed on March 13, 2020.180 The issue of case
backlog has been a topic of discussion for the Workgroup, seeing as it
directly correlates to the speedy trial clock being lifted in Phase 3. 181
Although it was noted that the resumption and backlog “should be addressed
in the Phase 3 operational plan,” the Phase 3 operational plan did not have a
clear instruction.182 However, despite the indefinite suspension of the
statutorily mandated speedy trial period under the Florida rule, the
constitutional right to a speedy trial does not disappear because COVID-19
makes it impossible to meet the statutory deadlines.183 It is still the State’s
responsibility to conduct trials and hearings within a reasonable time after
the judicial system reopens.184
V.

THE RECOMMENCEMENT OF THE COURTS AND THE RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE DELAY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE

The Court in Barker posed an overarching emphasis on the interests
that society shares with the accused when evaluating whether a criminal
defendant has been deprived of their right to a speedy trial.185
029.pdf;
Latest
Update
from
the
Fifth
Circuit,
FIFTH
JUD.
CIR.,
http://www.circuit5.org/coronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
178.
In re Phase 2 Transition for Court Facilities, 7th Jud. Cir. Fla. Admin.
Order
No.
Z-2020-050
(Fla.
July
2,
2020),
http://www.circuit7.org/Communications/Phase_2.pdf.
179.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 4, supra note 132.
Phase 3 is the final tolling period allotted by the Supreme Court of Florida. Id.
180.
See id.; Waters, supra note 150.
181.
Workgroup on the Continuity of Court Operations and Proceedings
During and After COVID-19, Meeting Minutes 2 (June 18, 2020), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/content/download/638453/file/covid-wg-minutes-200618.pdf.
182.
Id. “[V]ariations in caseloads, dockets, facilities, resources, and available
employees make it difficult to establish functional and effective statewide directives.” Fla.
Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147.
183.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96;
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
184.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 529. Placing “the primary burden on the courts and
the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.” Id.
185.
Id. at 519–21.
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The right to a speedy trial is generically different from
any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the
protection of the accused. In addition to the general concern that
all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair
procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the
interests of the accused.186

The Court’s recognition of this interest came at a time when there
was no mass pandemic or natural disaster, but rather applied society’s
interest for a timely trial to a fully functioning court system.187 The emphasis
of society’s interest in a functioning court system was also recognized by the
Supreme Court of Florida when the general public began to be known as
“justice stakeholders” in referencing the Workgroup’s considerations on
moving forward.188 Barker enumerated several interests the right was
designed to protect, several of which are much more applicable to the given
situation than others.189 For example, the lack of a prompt trial contributes to
case backlog, resulting in an overcrowding issue that leads to oppressive
prison conditions and subsequently affects prisoner rehabilitation.190 Further,
lengthy pretrial incarceration is costly to the accused, their families, and the
taxpayers.191 For the accused, imprisonment often leads to job loss and
disruption to family life.192 Furthermore, the lost earnings not only affect the
defendant’s family, but society as a whole loses wages that may have been
earned if the defendant was not awaiting trial.193 Finally, the tax payer is
paying the cost of keeping a prisoner in jail, which in 2015, averaged
$19,000.00 a year per prisoner in Florida.194
The Barker factors have been applied in Florida courts to determine
whether a defendant has been deprived of their constitutional right to a

186.
Id. at 519.
187.
See id. at 516–21.
188.
Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147.
189.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–21; Ellard, supra note 16, at 1211 (placing
heavy emphasis on the interests affected by oppressive pretrial incarceration during posthurricane Katrina in Louisiana).
190.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20, 532–33.
191.
Id. at 520–21.
192.
Id. at 532.
193.
Id. at 521.
194.
See id. at 520–21; Jeremy Thompson & Chanelle Artiles, Dismantling the
Sexual Abuse-to-Prison Pipeline: Texas’s Approach, 41 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 239,
252 (2016).
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speedy trial.195 However, because Florida has a speedy trial rule with
specified time constraints, a criminal defendant may be entitled to relief
under a statutory deprivation or a constitutional deprivation.196 Florida
courts generally balance the first three Barker factors that directly deal with
delay—length of delay, reason for delay, and assertion of the right—against
each other, and then conduct an analysis of the prejudice suffered as a result
of the delay.197 Although “[n]one of the individual categories are
determinative by themselves . . . certain inquiries (i.e. length and prejudice)
can carry greater weight when viewed together.”198
A.

Delay

“Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there
is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”199
However, regarding the statutory time periods, the Supreme Court of Florida
has held that “the legislature intended to establish a ‘triggering mechanism,’
which establishes presumptive prejudice and requires consideration of the
other factors.”200 Absent an assertion of the right to a speedy trial that
invokes the statutory time periods of Florida Rule 3.191, Florida courts will
generally not find delays to be presumptively prejudicial unless the delay is
in excess of one year.201 With regard to the delays posed by COVID-19, the
analysis for whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was compromised
will be different depending upon whether the defendant alleges a procedural
violation under Florida Rule 3.191, or a constitutional violation under the
Sixth Amendment.202 Nevertheless, even if a 3.191 violation is not found
from the outset, a defendant may still be entitled to dismissal from a
constitutional standpoint.203

195.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. State, 143 So. 3d 469, 471–72 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); Niles v. State, 120 So. 3d 658, 663 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
196.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(p)(3).
197.
See Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226, 246, 247 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
Szembruch v. State, 910 So. 2d 372, 376 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam); Fletcher,
143 So. 3d at 471–72.
198.
Szembruch, 910 So. 2d at 376.
199.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
200.
R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla. 1992).
201.
See State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
202.
Szembruch, 910 So. 2d at 376; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.191.
203.
See King v. State, 468 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
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The length of delay will differ for each defendant depending upon
the facts of the specific case.204 Moreover, the delay will depend on which
circuit the defendant was arrested in because of the different phases each
circuit is in currently.205 Furthermore, absent an assertion under Florida’s
rule, it is likely that the one-year minimum threshold will be met for many
criminal defendants because criminal proceedings stopped on March 13,
2020, and no circuit has entered Phase 3 as of September 13, 2020.206 The
issue defendants will face, however, is that mandated court closure is a good
reason for delay that is no fault of the state.207 Further, when courts do
eventually open, Florida courts have held that overcrowded court dockets are
a neutral reason that does not weigh against the state at all.208 Other than the
length of delay, the only fact that may weigh in the defendant’s favor is
complexity of the case.209 For instance, if the case is relatively simple, it
should be resolved in a more timely fashion.210 However, the Workgroup’s
recommendation suggests that when courts do reopen, capital offenses
should take priority over less severe matters.211 As a result of the unique
circumstance and balance of the first three factors, the decision of whether a
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of their right to a speedy trial
will ultimately hang on the prejudice suffered.212
B.

Prejudice

Prejudice is “determined in light of the purpose of the speedy trial
rule. It was designed to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimize
the accused’s anxiety and concern, and limit the possibility of impairing the
204.
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858 (1978), cert. denied 140
S. Ct. 282 (2019).
205.
See, e.g., COVID-19/Coronavirus Updates, supra note 174. For instance,
the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit entered Phase 2 on June 1, 2020, while the Eleventh Circuit
reverted to Phase 1 on June 25, 2020. Id.; Fla. Admin Order No. AOSC 20-13, supra note
177; COVID-19/Coronavirus Updates, supra note 174.
206.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96;
Waters, supra note 136; Courts Phase Status, supra note 176.
207.
See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
208.
State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
209.
See State v. Polk, 993 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam).
210.
See id.
211.
See Memorandum from Charles Canady, C.J, Sup. Ct. Fla., supra note
162.
212.
See State v. Jenkins, 899 So. 2d 1238, 1240, 1242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that although the other three Barker factors were found, the lack of actual
prejudice does not warrant dismissal of the case).
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defense.”213 Of the possible ways a defendant may be prejudiced,
impairment of a defense is the most important of the three interests “because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness
of the entire system.”214 The obvious theme surrounding the prevention of
prejudice is the societal interests that the Florida rule, and the Constitution,
protect.215
Examining each of these areas separately under the present
circumstances, oppressive pretrial incarceration is only applicable to
defendants who are presently incarcerated awaiting trial, not those that have
been released on bail.216 With this in mind, “[t]he time spent in jail awaiting
trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job;
it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness.”217 The economic pitfalls of
pretrial incarceration are also coming at a time when the United States is
experiencing the first economic recession since the economic collapse of
2009.218 Furthermore, imposing long exposure to an overcrowded prison
system on someone who has not been convicted yet is oppressive under
normal circumstances.219 Imposing this burden on an individual while a
deadly virus spreads throughout the jail system would obviously attribute to
the oppressive nature of a pretrial incarceration with unknown length.220 It
would be especially unfortunate to impose these burdens “on those persons
who are ultimately found to be innocent.”221
Second, anxiety and concern are applicable to defendants released on
bail because they can often be disadvantaged by restraints on their liberty
and “by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility” from
213.
Id. at 1241.
214.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
215.
See id. at 519; State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518, 519–20 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
216.
See Bonamy, 409 So. 2d at 520.
217.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
218.
Jeanna Smialek, It’s Official: The U.S. is in a Recession, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2020, at B2.
219.
See Michael Levenson & Alan Yuhas, Inmate Released Amid Pandemic
Killed Someone the Next Day, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15/us/florida-inmate-coronavirus-murder.html; Barker, 407
U.S. at 532–33.
220.
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 520. “Lengthy exposure to these [poor prison]
conditions ‘has a destructive effect on human character and makes rehabilitation of the
individual offender much more difficult.’” Id. (quoting Federal Bail Procedures: Hearings
on S. 2838, S. 2839, and S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rts. and the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Jud. Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1964)
(testimony of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons)); see also Levenson & Yuhas,
supra note 219.
221.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
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the surrounding community.222 This anxiety increases as pretrial delay
grows longer.223 Further, COVID-19 presents a unique situation since one of
the biggest difficulties that the general public is facing is the mental anguish
and anxiety caused by the current situation.224 Although no Florida court has
found anxiety and concern to be applicable to incarcerated individuals, an
unknown court date for an elongated period, in addition to COVID-19’s
prevalence in Florida’s jail system, may warrant the analysis in the future.225
Finally, and most significantly, is the possibility that the passage of
time will hinder a defendant’s ability to defend himself.226 As more time
progresses, “witnesses’ memories fade, witnesses and victims disappear or
are hard to locate, and documents get lost, destroyed, or misplaced.”227
Although “[a] defendant must do more than simply allege that memories fade
or that evidence may be lost,” the daily increase in positive cases and death
may very well make a defense impossible.228 As of July 17, 2020, there were
327,241 total cases within the state of Florida, resulting in 4,805 deaths.229
As the speedy trial clock remains suspended, the likelihood that a key
witness will become sick—and potentially die—continues to increase as
more and more people test positive every day.230 Although all three of these
factors must be examined in the aggregate, the obvious concern is that all
three of them are affected by the passage of time.231
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since Florida’s Governor declared a state of emergency on March 9,
2020, the Supreme Court of Florida has consistently provided guidance and
leadership addressing how to adapt and prevent the spread of COVID-19
222.
Id.
223.
See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 271 (1968)).
224.
Jane E. Brody, Fear of the Virus Can Be Just as Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2020, at D9.
225.
See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379 (1969); Levenson & Yuhas, supra
note 219.
226.
Szembruch v. State, 910 So. 2d 372, 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
227.
Id.
228.
State v. Bonamy, 409 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see
also Frances, supra note 167, at A7.
229.
Michelle Marchante, Florida Adds More than 100 Deaths for Fourth Day
in a Row as COVID-19 Cases Pass 327,000, MIAMI HERALD (July 17, 2020),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/coronavirus/article244296557.html.
230.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96;
Marchante, supra note 229.
231.
Szembruch, 910 So. 2d at 379, 381.
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within the judicial system.232 This transparency and progressive outlook on
public health cannot be overlooked.233 The “justice stakeholders” of Florida
can rest easy, knowing there are still leaders that have their best interests in
mind.234 On the other end, however, is the unavoidable victim that this has
created, the right to a speedy trial.235 Attorneys and defendants may begin
pursuing negotiated settlements rather than tolerate the uncertainty of when
they will see a court room.236 For some this may be sensible, but there may
be individuals who see no other option than to plead guilty rather than wait
for the chance of acquittal at trial—a day that is seemingly unattainable in
Florida’s current state.237 Regardless of the outcome in an individual case,
the legal maxim, “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied,” will be the heartbeat of
many criminal matters for years to come.238

232.
Fla. Exec. Order No. 20-52 (Mar. 9, 2020); see also Information on
COVID-19 Emergency Orders & Advisories, supra note 98.
233.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, Amend. 2, supra note 144.
234.
See id.; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-32, supra note 147.
235.
See Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5, supra note 96.
236.
See Brooks, supra note 62, at 600.
237.
See Chan, supra note 1; Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC 20-23, Amend. 5,
supra note 96; discussion supra IV.B.2.
238.
Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1958); see also Chan, supra note
1.
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